如何用行为经济学应对不确定性：拓展有效助推的范围

本文提出了决策中不确定性的五种类型及其行为学和心理学的应对机制：用简捷启发式替代加权求和应对信息不确定性, 用直觉应对认知不确定性, 用价值观预测选择偏好应对行为不确定性, 用决策参照点的权重替代概率应对结果不确定性, 用时间换时间以降低延迟折扣应对未来不确定性。新行为经济学应当通过“为什么”的功能性分析, 找到行为助推的心理杠杆。化解不确定性本身就是一种有效的行为助推; 化繁为简是行为助推的关键所在。     

Is greed contagious? Four experimental studies

Do people become greedier when interacting with others they perceive to be greedy? It has been speculated that greed contagion exits and may have influenced the 2008 financial collapse. We examined this possibility in four experimental studies using a common pool resource dilemma. Specifically, whether participants' second‐round (R2) withdrawal from the common pool was influenced (a) by their assessment of how greedy their opponents' first‐round (R1) withdrawal was, (b) by R1 opponents' reputation for being greedy, (c) by observing past behavior of others in unrelated interactions, and (d) when R1 opponents directly confronted them with an assessment of their own greediness of their R1 withdrawal. In addition, Study 2 examined R2 interactions involving new opponents. Taken together, results suggest that there is contagion of greed. However, the connection appears to be driven by participants adjusting to their opponent's actual behavior, not by their evaluation of the greediness of such behavior. It seems that perceptions of greed do not mediate future behavior and, thus, are not necessarily contagious, but norms of selfish behavior are. In this sense, greed perceptions appear to by epiphenomenal in that they are an incidental by‐product of the behavioral interaction. We discuss the implications of these findings and suggest directions for further research.     

Ethics training: A genuine dilemma for engineering educators

This is an examination of three main strategies used by engineering educators to integrate ethics into the engineering curriculum. They are: (1) the standalone course, (2) the ethics imperative mandating ethics content for all engineering courses, and (3) outsourcing ethics instruction to an external expert. The expectations from each approach are discussed and their main limitations described. These limitations include the insular status of the stand-alone course, the diffuse and uneven integration with the ethics imperative, and the orphaned status of ethics using the outside expert. A fourth option is proposed — a special modular option. This strategy avoids the limitations of earlier approaches and harmonizes well with curricular objectives and professional values. While some help is provided by a professional ethicist, the headliner for the series of seminars is a high-profile engineer who shares an ethics dilemma encountered in professional practice. Students discuss the case and propose solutions. The goal is to make ethics applicable to real-life problems facing working engineers and to help change behaviors. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology” meeting, New Orleans, 2003.     

Student Evaluations and Moral Hazard

Most universities solicit feedback from students at the end of a course in order to assess student perceptions of the course. This feedback is used for various objectives, including for evaluating teaching by academic administrators. One would therefore expect faculty to rationally take this into account while formulating their teaching strategy. In certain cases, such strategic considerations can give rise to moral hazard. I have modelled the situation using the well-known Prisoners Dilemma game and found that in equilibrium, the teaching style will be examination-centric, while considerations of societal good would demand that the teaching style be knowledge-centric. I also discuss the policy implications for this finding.     

The role of autoshaping in cooperative two-player games between starlings

We report a study of the behavior of starlings in laboratory situations inspired by the “prisoner's dilemma.” Our purpose is to investigate some possible mechanisms for the maintenance of cooperation by reciprocity and to investigate the process of autoshaping at a trial-by-trial level. In Experiment 1, pairs of starlings housed in adjacent cages played a discrete-trial “game” in which food could be obtained only by “cooperation.” In this game, pecking at a response key eliminated the opportunity to obtain food but produced food for the partner. If neither bird pecked, neither had the opportunity to obtain food in that trial. Some level of cooperation persisted for several sessions whether the birds had been pretrained for a high or low probability of pecking at the key. The probability of a cooperative response was higher after trials in which the partner responded (and a reward was obtained) than after trials in which neither bird responded (and no reward was obtained), but the probability of a response was even higher after trials in which the same bird had responded, even though no reward was obtained by the actor in these trials. This behavior did not require visual presence of another player, because similar results were obtained in Experiment 2 (a replicate of Experiment 1 in which the members of the pair could not see each other) and in Experiment 3, a game in which each starling played with a computer responding with “tit for tat.” Using an omission schedule, in which food was given in all trials in which the bird did not peck, Experiment 4 showed that pecking could be maintained by autoshaping. In this experiment, overall probability of pecking decreased with experience, due to a drop in the tendency to peck in consecutive trials. The probability of pecking in trials following a reinforced trial did not decrease with experience. An implementation of the Rescorla–Wagner model for this situation was capable of reproducing molar, but not molecular, aspects of our results. The results violate the predictions of several game-theoretical models for the evolution of cooperation, including tit for tat, generous tit for tat, and the superior win-stay-lose-shift.     

道德直觉合乎道义却不客观

面对道德困境, 道德直觉倾向于促使人们做出道义论的判断。但是, 道德直觉易受情绪因素影响, 具有较强的主观性。道德直觉警惕有意图地使用个人力量造成的伤害, 却会接受由非个人力量或连带作用引发的伤害。“模块近视假说”认为, 大脑中存在一个预警系统, 能快速地对主动伤害的想法发出情绪警报。但该系统的审查机制是一种简单的“单通道”加工, 这种加工局限使连带作用造成的伤害避开了审查机制的监控。道德直觉的不客观提示, 面对现实生活中的道德争议, 不应该仅听凭直觉作为行动的依据。     

The influence of decision time on sensitivity for consequences,moral norms,and preferences for inaction: Time,moral judgments,and the CNI model

It is often discussed that moral judgments are either consistent with the principle of utilitarianism or with the principle of deontology. Utilitarianism is a moral principle stating that the right act is the one that produces the best overall outcome. Deontology represents an ethical position indicating that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action regardless of the consequences. Criticism on the structure of moral dilemmas includes the problem that these dilemmas confound norms and consequences. Recently, a multinomial model (the CNI model) was developed to disentangle and measure sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action (I), respectively. In Experiment 1, we examined the influence of time pressure on moral judgments using the CNI model. We found that time pressure influenced moral dilemma judgments by decreasing participants' sensitivity for consequences. There were no significant effects of time pressure on participants' sensitivity to norms and general preference for inaction. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we examined the link of reaction times to moral judgments more closely by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian version of the CNI model. Longer reaction times lead to an increase in parameter N, and there was no influence of reaction times on parameter C or I.     

The Advantage of Democratic Peer Punishment in Sustaining Cooperation within Groups

In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behavior while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behavior and to increase cooperation is to establish a system of costly peer punishment, that is, the possibility for every individual involved in the dilemma to impose costly punishment on interaction partners. However, recent research revealed that, in contrast to a situation without punishment, peer punishment is inefficient and maladaptive in the sense that the total payoff is reduced and punishment of cooperative individuals (i.e., antisocial punishment) is possible. In the present work, we propose that a system of democratic peer punishment, that is, direct and equal participation of each individual in the punishment decision‐making process with punishment only executed when a majority has voted for its execution, can address the shortcomings of a peer punishment system. Using iterated public goods games, we show higher cooperation levels, higher total payoffs, and reduced executed punishment in the democratic compared with a peer punishment system. Moreover, we document that fairness perceptions, satisfaction, and interpersonal trust are increased in the democratic punishment system. Implications for how cooperation and democratic punishment systems may evolve are discussed. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

病人选择医生的实施与探讨

探讨病人选择医生的实施意义、条件和应防范的一些问题,并对其可能发生的一些难题进行阐述,以便使这一改革举措得以顺利进行和逐步完善。     

Soritic thinking, vagueness, and weakness of will

Soritic thinking based on reasoning that is involved in the sorites paradox plays a crucial role in some forms of weakness of will. Such soritic reasoning leads to failures of behavior, but cannot be shown to be irrational by standard means. Thus weakness of will appears to be rational, whereas strength of will is irrational when viewed soritically. The puzzle is how to undermine weakness of will and expose it as irrational. Even though such weakness of will is not moral, moral-type reasoning involving the principle of equality can be brought to bear. Weakness of will can also be seen to be analogous to free-rider problems and the prisoner's dilemma.