Facts, interpretations, and explanations: a review of Evelyn Fox Keller's Making sense of life

The job of a researcher is to explain the phenomenon that he or she is seeking to understand. To do this requires the accumulation of facts. These facts are then interpreted to arrive at explanations. However, individual researchers often interpret facts in different ways and arrive at disparate explanations. In her book, Making Sense of Life, Evelyn Fox Keller (2002) outlines various approaches used by developmental biologists to understand the animate systems we call life. In this review, I note several parallels between biology and behavior analysis in how facts are discovered, what is an acceptable interpretation of data, and how explanations are arrived at.     

On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth: The Fundamental Problem and a New Perspective

The present article purports to show that the protocol sentence debate, pursued by some leading members of the Vienna Circle in the mid-1930s, was essentially a controversy over the explanation and the real significance of the concept of truth. It is further shown that the fundamental issue underlying the discussions about the concept of truth was the relationship between form and content, as well as between logic/language and the world. R. Carnap was the philosopher who most explicitly and systematically attempted to come to grips with this problem. It is shown that the form-content distinction pervades the three most important phases of Carnap's philosophical development: the structuralist (in Der logische Aufbau der Welt), the syntactical and the semantical. His final semantical stance is essentially determined by the concept of linguistic frameworks. The article purports to demonstrate that this concept cannot be dispensed with in philosophy, but that Carnap failed to work out its ontological implications. Finally, the concept of an internal ontology is briefly delineated. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The ego, the Other and the primal fact

Japan has absorbed many western ideas since the late nineteenth century, but Japanese philosophers have often been reluctant to accept the western idea of the “I” in its entirety. The I transgresses to the Other more easily than western philosophies think and imports what belongs to the Other as his own. How is this possible? Husserl attempted to explain the constitution of the Other by the intentionality that goes from the I to the Other, mediated by the body. However, Husserl later discovered that the constitution of both the I and the Other is more of a two-way movement. This double-movement is essential for all constitutions and departs from a deep (primal) dimension that is not yet egological. Even in the self-reflection of the I, a similar double-movement between the primal and egological dimensions can be seen. The I is supported, but at the same time threatened, by this movement.     

Adverse adolescence experiences,feeling lonely across life stages and loneliness in adulthood

Background/ObjectiveLoneliness is a mental health issue emerging over the life course. This study examines the latent structure of adult loneliness in a non-Western society and its association with adverse adolescence experiences (AAEs) as well as feeling lonely during middle school, high school, and college. Method: A cohort sample living in Northern Taiwan (N = 2,289) was analyzed from adolescence to adulthood. The de Jong Gierveld Loneliness Scale operationalized loneliness by a three-cluster model to present the latent structure of loneliness: emotional, serious emotional, and severe emotional/social loners. AAEs (e.g., abuse, neglect, and dysfunctional family) were measured by seven items. Multivariate multinomial logistic regression models were used to explore the longitudinal effects of AAEs and feeling lonely reported during middle school, high school, and college on adult loneliness. Results: AAEs and feeling lonely during adolescence were significantly associated with serious emotional loneliness and severe emotional/social loneliness during adulthood, even after adjusting for the individual’s characteristics. Attendance at a 4-year college was associated with decreased odds of serious emotional loneliness and severe emotional/social loneliness. Conclusions: Adults with AAEs and feelings of loneliness over life stages are more likely to report loneliness in the emotional and social domains.     

They Might Be a Liar But They’re My Liar: Source Evaluation and the Prevalence of Misinformation

Even if people acknowledge that misinformation is incorrect after a correction has been presented, their feelings towards the source of the misinformation can remain unchanged. The current study investigated whether participants reduce their support of Republican and Democratic politicians when the prevalence of misinformation disseminated by the politicians appears to be high in comparison to the prevalence of their factual statements. We presented U.S. participants either with (1) equal numbers of false and factual statements from political candidates or (2) disproportionately more false than factual statements. Participants received fact-checks as to whether items were true or false, then rerated both their belief in the statements as well as their feelings towards the candidate. Results indicated that when corrected misinformation was presented alongside equal presentations of affirmed factual statements, participants reduced their belief in the misinformation but did not reduce their feelings towards the politician. However, if there was considerably more misinformation retracted than factual statements affirmed, feelings towards both Republican and Democratic figures were reduced—although the observed effect size was extremely small.     

Learning Facts About Migration: Politically Motivated Learning of Polarizing Information About Refugees

Information processing during heated debates on asylum and immigration may often be influenced by prejudice rather than a desire to learn facts. In this article, we investigate how people process empirical evidence on the consequences of refugee arrivals through a novel survey experiment that disentangles politically motivated learning from other forms of learning and expressive responding. Specifically, we ask respondents to interpret a 2×2 table about the relationship between asylum seekers and crime rates. Crucially, respondents are randomly allocated to evaluate a conclusion that triggers their identity-protective stakes or not. In addition, we test for motivated responding as an alternative explanation by randomly providing some respondents with a response format that motivates them to report their inference truthfully. We find that information processing changes substantially when new information challenges existing asylum attitudes. Politically motivated learning is strongest among voters with strong negative prior attitudes towards asylum seekers. Our results also indicate that expressive responding can only partially account for this gap in correctly reported inferences. Our research has important implications for research on the consequences of refugee migration, theories of motivated reasoning, and survey methodology.     

The little obsessional alchemist

Using the psychoanalytic experience with an obsessional child, this paper looks at the moment of insight, that precipitation of coherence which occurs when we say that we suddenly realize something. This is contrasted with the approach of consciously trying to fit theory to the observed facts. Analogies with alchemy are drawn. In addition, the balancing process occurring in obsessional mentality is compared with strangulation by hanging, the opposing forces being comprised of prematurely solidified states of mind such as mania or paranoia which interfere with that fluid state of mind optimal for the precipitation of insight.     

Is it always fallacious to derive values from facts?

Since the time of David Hume, many philosophers have held that there is a logical Is/Ought gap. According to the doctrine of the Is/Ought gap, there are no valid (i.e., non-fallacious) arguments from purely factual premises about whatis the case to moral or normative conclusions about whatought to be. Occasionally, this doctrine has been challenged, but frequently it has been accepted without argumentation. Charles Pigden has recently argued for a logical Is/Ought gap on the grounds of the conservativeness of logic. I offer a counter-example which shows that Pigden's argument is unsound and that there need be no logical gap between Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion. My counter-example is an argument which is logically valid, has only Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion, and does not purport to violate the conservativeness of logic. Moreover, my argument does not rely, as other alleged counter-examples do, on controversial assumptions from Aristotelian biology about natures or ends, or about institutions such as promise-making.     

Validation of psychoanalytic theories: Towards a conceptualization of references

The authors discuss criteria for the validation of psychoanalytic theories and develop a heuristic and normative model of the references needed for this. Their core question in this paper is: can psychoanalytic theories be validated exclusively from within psychoanalytic theory (internal validation), or are references to sources of knowledge other than psychoanalysis also necessary (external validation)? They discuss aspects of the classic truth criteria correspondence and coherence, both from the point of view of contemporary psychoanalysis and of contemporary philosophy of science. The authors present arguments for both external and internal validation. Internal validation has to deal with the problems of subjectivity of observations and circularity of reasoning, external validation with the problem of relevance. They recommend a critical attitude towards psychoanalytic theories, which, by carefully scrutinizing weak points and invalidating observations in the theories, reduces the risk of wishful thinking. The authors conclude by sketching a heuristic model of validation. This model combines correspondence and coherence with internal and external validation into a four‐leaf model for references for the process of validating psychoanalytic theories.