艾勒悖论(Allais Paradox)另释

艾勒悖论违背了期望效用(Expected Utility)理论的独立性(independence)原则,成为欲推翻期望效用理论的杠杆。“齐当别”抉择模型不将风险决策行为看成是追求某种“最大期望值”的抉择反应,而将其看成是“最好可能结果之间的取舍”或者“最坏可能结果之间的取舍”。此项研究设计了一“判断”技术,并用此对艾勒设计的选择问题加以检验。实验表明,判断结果所示的“齐当别”策略能满意地对艾勒选择题作出解释。     

Meno's Paradox in Context

I argue that Meno's Paradox targets the type of knowledge that Socrates has been looking for earlier in the dialogue: knowledge grounded in explanatory definitions. Socrates places strict requirements on definitions and thinks we need these definitions to acquire knowledge. Meno's challenge uses Socrates' constraints to argue that we can neither propose definitions nor recognize them. To understand Socrates' response to the challenge, we need to view Meno's challenge and Socrates' response as part of a larger disagreement about the value of inquiry.     

Ultralarge lotteries: Analyzing the Lottery Paradox using non-standard analysis

A popular way to relate probabilistic information to binary rational beliefs is the Lockean Thesis, which is usually formalized in terms of thresholds. This approach seems far from satisfactory: the value of the thresholds is not well-specified and the Lottery Paradox shows that the model violates the Conjunction Principle. We argue that the Lottery Paradox is a symptom of a more fundamental and general problem, shared by all threshold-models that attempt to put an exact border on something that is intrinsically vague. We propose application of the language of relative analysis—a type of non-standard analysis—to formulate a new model for rational belief, called Stratified Belief. This contextualist model seems well-suited to deal with a concept of beliefs based on probabilities ‘sufficiently close to unity’ and satisfies a moderately weakened form of the Conjunction Principle. We also propose an adaptation of the model that is able to deal with beliefs that are less firm than ‘almost certainty’. The adapted version is also of interest for the epistemicist account of vagueness.     

On the Continuity and Origin of Identity in Distributed Ledgers: Learning from Russell's Paradox

This article studies the origin and continuity of the identity of the entities inscribed in a distributed ledger. Specifically, it focuses on the differences between the identities of the entities that exist in a distributed ledger and those of the entities that exist outside the ledger but must be represented in the ledger in order to interact with it. It suggests that a distributed ledger that contains representations of entities that exist outside the ledger can yield a continuum of interconnected existing and past identities that is constantly redefined to represent new conceptual entities. This continuum can be understood as a metasortal—or a sortal of sortals—that resembles the mathematical structure of a set of sets. Further, the article presents the dilemma that arises when representing the identities of entities in a distributed ledger, and it draws an analogy between this dilemma and Russell's Paradox.     

There cannot be two omnipotent beings

We argue that there is no metaphysically possible world with two or more omnipotent beings, due to the potential for conflicts of will between them. We reject the objection that omnipotent beings could exist in the same world when their wills could not conflict. We then turn to Alfred Mele and M.P. Smith’s argument that two coexisting beings could remain omnipotent even if, on some occasions, their wills cancel each other out so that neither can bring about what they intend. We argue that this argument has an absurd consequence, namely having to regard an utterly powerless being as omnipotent.     

Blueprint for a dynamic deontic logic

Extending the idiom of dynamic logic we outline a deontic logic in which deontic operators operate on terms rather than on formulæ. In a second step we distinguish between what we call real and deontic actions.     

Plural signification and the Liar paradox

In recent years, speech-act theory has mooted the possibility that one utterance can signify a number of different things. This pluralist conception of signification lies at the heart of Thomas Bradwardine’s solution to the insolubles, logical puzzles such as the semantic paradoxes, presented in Oxford in the early 1320s. His leading assumption was that signification is closed under consequence, that is, that a proposition signifies everything which follows from what it signifies. Then any proposition signifying its own falsity, he showed, also signifies its own truth and so, since it signifies things which cannot both obtain, it is simply false. Bradwardine himself, and his contemporaries, did not elaborate this pluralist theory, or say much in its defence. It can be shown to accord closely, however, with the prevailing conception of logical consequence in England in the fourteenth century. Recent pluralist theories of signification, such as Grice’s, also endorse Bradwardine’s closure postulate as a plausible constraint on signification, and so his analysis of the semantic paradoxes is seen to be both well-grounded and plausible.

风死不救与医疗欠费——临床医德悖论及其化解

本文分析了一民工重伤求治,被六家医院拒收的事件,指出在实行临床医德准则过程中存在着悖论现象,并阐述临床医德悖论产生的原因,提出化解临床医德悖论具体的途径。     

Toward a Cosmic Christology: A Kerygmatic Proposal

This kerygmatic (Tillich) proposal for a cosmic christology presupposes (with Sittler) that in our times the scope of christology must be as large as the whole creation. Noting a body of extant literature pertaining to the theme (Teilhard de Chardin, Tillich, Gunton, Moltmann, Fox, McFague, Edwards), this article argues that Martin Luther's “ubiquity Christology” should receive a fresh hearing in order to broaden and deepen the current discussion, in a way that can contribute both to kerygmatic and apologetic theological constructions. Concerns of critics of Luther's ubiquity Christology are addressed and its underdeveloped character is noted, with suggestions for expanding Luther's vision. At the end, the potential ecumenical benefits of this kind of reclamation of Luther's thought are affirmed, as is the need for kerygmatic theologians to develop not only cosmic christologies, but also cosmic pneumatologies.