Abolishing Morality

Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I explore a dispute among moral error theorists about how to deal with false moral judgments. The advice of the moral abolitionist is to stop making moral judgments, but the contrary advice of the moral fictionalist is to retain moral language and moral thinking. After clarifying the choice that arises for the moral error theorist, I argue that moral abolitionism has much to recommend it. I discuss Mackie’s defense of moral fictionalism as well as a recent version of the same position offered by Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall, and Caroline West. Then I second some remarks Ian Hinckfuss made in his defense of moral abolitionism and his criticism of “the moral society.” One of the worst things about moral fictionalism is that it undermines our epistemology by promoting a culture of deception. To deal with this problem Richard Joyce offers a “non-assertive” version of moral fictionalism as perhaps the last option for an error theorist who hopes to avoid moral abolitionism. I discuss some of the problems facing that form of moral fictionalism, offer some further reasons for adopting moral abolitionism in our personal lives, and conclude with reasons for thinking that abolishing morality may be an essential step in achieving the goals well-meaning moralists and moral fictionalists have always cherished.

Psychology is About Processes

Out of the eight points of methodological criticism against contemporary psychology formulated by Watson (Psychological Bulletin 31:755–776, 1934) and put forward by Toomela in this issue, the overemphasis on prediction, the neglect of individual differences, the habit of the differences between the mental states of subjects in objective experimental conditions are particularly important. Modern cognitive psychology has began to remedy those problems, in part by proposing broad, integrative theories. It is not useful to subdivide psychology into “schools of thought” defined by their methodological practices.

Zollner错觉的阈限测定

该研究选取大学生为被试,采用最小变化法,分别测量了干扰线对数、干扰线与主线之间的间隔、主线之间的间隔等三个变量导致Z?llner错觉产生的绝对阈限。每个变量中主线与水平面的夹角分为45°和90°两种条件。结果发现,若要产生Z?llner错觉：1）干扰线对数的阈限分别为5对、7对;2）干扰线与主线之间的间隔阈限分别为6.58像素、4.48像素,3）干扰线之间的间隔阈限分别为124.44像素、131.73像素。此外还发现：4）在Z?llner错觉形成的影响因素中,从大到小依次是：干扰线对数、主线之间的间隔、干扰线与主线之间的间隔;5）45°情况下比90°情况下更容易产生错觉;6）在Z?llner错觉知觉中,期望误差严重。     

损失规避源于得失程数多于获得？——损失规避的得失程数变化视角的再检验

刘欢、梁竹苑 和 李纾（2009a）在证明损失规避的得失程数变化视角时所取的损益值取值范围、对安于现状偏差影响的控制以及所选取的得两程失一程和得三程失两程的决策对象这四个方面存在的缺陷。本研究通过弥补上述缺陷并设计无关变量得到更严格控制的得三程失两程的决策情景,对得失程数变化视角重新进行了检验。结果发现,寿命“得一程失一程”的属性并未导致损失规避消失;在广泛的损益值范围内以自由为对象的决策同样表现为损失规避;将自由感知为生而拥有和后天获得的人数大致相当;因而得失程数变化视角需作出重要修正,同时前景理论与情绪预测误差理论亦不可完全预测损失规避出现的条件。     

More efficient parameter estimates for factor analysis of ordinal variables by ridge generalized least squares

Data in psychology are often collected using Likert‐type scales, and it has been shown that factor analysis of Likert‐type data is better performed on the polychoric correlation matrix than on the product‐moment covariance matrix, especially when the distributions of the observed variables are skewed. In theory, factor analysis of the polychoric correlation matrix is best conducted using generalized least squares with an asymptotically correct weight matrix (AGLS). However, simulation studies showed that both least squares (LS) and diagonally weighted least squares (DWLS) perform better than AGLS, and thus LS or DWLS is routinely used in practice. In either LS or DWLS, the associations among the polychoric correlation coefficients are completely ignored. To mend such a gap between statistical theory and empirical work, this paper proposes new methods, called ridge GLS, for factor analysis of ordinal data. Monte Carlo results show that, for a wide range of sample sizes, ridge GLS methods yield uniformly more accurate parameter estimates than existing methods (LS, DWLS, AGLS). A real‐data example indicates that estimates by ridge GLS are 9–20% more efficient than those by existing methods. Rescaled and adjusted test statistics as well as sandwich‐type standard errors following the ridge GLS methods also perform reasonably well.     

Bad News for Moral Error Theorists: There Is No Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies

A ‘companions in guilt’ (CG) strategy against moral error theory aims to show that the latter proves too much: if sound, it supports an implausible error-theoretic conclusion in other areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie [2016 Cowie, C. 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] has recently produced what he claims is a ‘master argument’ against all such strategies. The essence of his argument is that CG arguments cannot work because they are afflicted by internal incoherence or inconsistency. I argue, first, that Cowie's master argument does not succeed. Beyond this, I argue that there is no good reason to think that any such argument—one that purports to identify an internal incoherence in CG arguments—can succeed. Second, I argue that the main substantive area of disagreement between error theorists and CG theorists essentially concerns the conceptual profile of epistemic reasons—specifically, whether they are strongly categorical—not the ontological question of whether such reasons exist (in some form or other). I then develop an argument in favour of the CG theorist's position by considering the moral error theorist's arguments in support of the conceptual claim that moral reasons are strongly categorical. These include, notably, criticisms made by Joyce [2011] and Olson [2014] of Finlay's [2008] ‘end relational’ view of morality, according to which moral reasons are relative to some end or standard, hence not strongly categorical. Examining these criticisms, I argue that, based on what moral error theorists have said regarding the conceptual profile of moral reasons, there is a strong case to be made that moral reasons are strongly categorical (hence, according to the moral error theorist, ontologically problematic) if and only if epistemic reasons are.     

Tympanic Membrane Temperature and Hemispheric Cognitive Style

The authors tested the hypothesis that there is a correlation between hemispheric cognitive style and ear temperature. A sample of 100 participants completed a measure of hemispheric cognitive style, the Hemispheric Consensus Prediction Profile. Ear temperatures were taken in 2 sessions, 2 times for each ear at each session. Average left ear temperature was subtracted from average right ear temperature as an index of dominant temperature. Only 56 of the participants showed a stable dominant ear temperature. For these 56 participants, there was a statistically significant positive correlation between scores on the Hemispheric Consensus Prediction Profile and tympanic member temperature (Spearman's ρ =.29, 95% CI [.04,.51]). Individuals with a left hemispheric cognitive style tended to have a warmer left tympanic membrane temperature while those with a right hemispheric cognitive style tended to have a warmer right tympanic membrane temperature. Tympanic membrane temperatures are easily obtained using inexpensive and noninvasive technology. The relationship suggested by these findings may open new opportunities for the study of cerebral asymmetry.     

回忆任务对合作抑制和错误修剪的调节——情绪效价和编码水平的影响

前人在项目回忆条件的合作记忆研究中记录到明显的合作抑制和错误修剪,背景提取条件的相关研究尤显不足;同时,情绪效价和编码水平对两类现象调节的研究尚未涉及。为此,本文在两个实验中采用经典合作记忆研究范式,以不同情绪效价的词汇为实验材料并以词汇在学习阶段的呈现颜色为背景展开研究。实验1和实验2分别在学习阶段采用了深编码和浅编码任务,回忆阶段则均含项目回忆(回忆已学词汇)和背景提取(回忆词汇在学习阶段的呈现颜色)两种任务。采用深编码条件的实验1的结果显示,项目回忆比背景提取条件的合作抑制更强、错误修剪更弱,回忆任务与词汇情绪效价交互影响合作抑制强度;采用浅编码条件的实验2则发现错误修剪在两种任务间的差异不显著。两实验的联合分析显示,回忆任务与编码水平交互影响合作抑制和错误修剪强度。上述结果表明:回忆任务对合作抑制和错误修剪的调节支持双重加工模型;回忆任务与情绪效价对合作抑制强度的交互影响支持权衡说,且与双重加工模型相吻合;回忆任务与编码水平交互影响合作抑制和错误修剪强度。     

Null hypothesis significance testing and Type I error: The domain problem

Although many common uses of p-values for making statistical inferences in contemporary scientific research have been shown to be invalid, no one, to our knowledge, has adequately assessed the main original justification for their use, which is that they can help to control the Type I error rate (Neyman & Pearson, 1928, 1933). We address this issue head-on by asking a specific question: Across what domain, specifically, do we wish to control the Type I error rate? For example, do we wish to control it across all of science, across all of a specific discipline such as psychology, across a researcher's active lifetime, across a substantive research area, across an experiment, or across a set of hypotheses? In attempting to answer these questions, we show that each one leads to troubling dilemmas wherein controlling the Type I error rate turns out to be inconsistent with other scientific desiderata. This inconsistency implies that we must make a choice. In our view, the other scientific desiderata are much more valuable than controlling the Type I error rate and so it is the latter, rather than the former, with which we must dispense. But by doing so—that is, by eliminating the Type I error justification for computing and using p-values—there is even less reason to believe that p is useful for validly rejecting null hypotheses than previous critics have suggested.