Adaptive Anchoring Model: How Static and Dynamic Presentations of Time Series Influence Judgments and Predictions

When attempting to predict future events, people commonly rely on historical data. One psychological characteristic of judgmental forecasting of time series, established by research, is that when people make forecasts from series, they tend to underestimate future values for upward trends and overestimate them for downward ones, so‐called trend‐damping (modeled by anchoring on, and insufficient adjustment from, the average of recent time series values). Events in a time series can be experienced sequentially (dynamic mode), or they can also be retrospectively viewed simultaneously (static mode), not experienced individually in real time. In one experiment, we studied the influence of presentation mode (dynamic and static) on two sorts of judgment: (a) predictions of the next event (forecast) and (b) estimation of the average value of all the events in the presented series (average estimation). Participants' responses in dynamic mode were anchored on more recent events than in static mode for all types of judgment but with different consequences; hence, dynamic presentation improved prediction accuracy, but not estimation. These results are not anticipated by existing theoretical accounts; we develop and present an agent‐based model—the adaptive anchoring model (ADAM)—to account for the difference between processing sequences of dynamically and statically presented stimuli (visually presented data). ADAM captures how variation in presentation mode produces variation in responses (and the accuracy of these responses) in both forecasting and judgment tasks. ADAM's model predictions for the forecasting and judgment tasks fit better with the response data than a linear‐regression time series model. Moreover, ADAM outperformed autoregressive‐integrated‐moving‐average (ARIMA) and exponential‐smoothing models, while neither of these models accounts for people's responses on the average estimation task.     

The Senses as Signalling Systems

A central goal of the philosophy of perception is to uncover the nature of sensory capacities. Ideally, we would like an account that specifies what conditions need to be met in order for an organism to count as having the capacity to sense or perceive its environment. And, on the assumption that sensory states are the kinds of things that can be accurate or inaccurate, a further goal of the philosophy of perception is to identify the accuracy conditions for sensory states. In this paper I recommend a novel approach to these core issues, one that draws heavily on game-theoretic treatments of signalling in nature. A benefit of the approach is that it helps us to understand why biologists attribute sensory powers to such a diverse range of organisms, including plants, fungi, and algae.     

Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument

The moral error theorist claims that moral discourse is irredeemably in error because it is committed to the existence of properties that do not exist. A common response has been to postulate ‘companions in guilt’—forms of discourse that seem safe from error despite sharing the putatively problematic features of moral discourse. The most developed instance of this pairs moral discourse with epistemic discourse. In this paper, I present a new, prudential, companions-in-guilt argument and argue for its superiority over the epistemic alternative.     

Modelling perceived risk and trust in driving automation reacting to merging and braking vehicles

Perceived risk and trust are crucial for user acceptance of driving automation. In this study, we identify important predictors of perceived risk and trust in a driving simulator experiment and develop models through stepwise regression to predict event-based changes in perceived risk and trust. 25 participants were tasked to monitor SAE Level 2 driving automation (ACC + LC) while experiencing merging and hard braking events with varying criticality on a motorway. Perceived risk and trust were rated verbally after each event, and continuous perceived risk, pupil diameter and ECG signals were explored as possible indictors for perceived risk and trust.The regression models show that relative motion with neighbouring road users accounts for most perceived risk and trust variations, and no difference was found between hard braking with merging and hard braking without merging. Drivers trust the automation more in the second exposure to events. Our models show modest effects of personal characteristics: experienced drivers are less sensitive to risk and trust the automation more, while female participants perceive more risk than males. Perceived risk and trust highly correlate and have similar determinants. Continuous perceived risk accurately reflects participants’ verbal post-event rating of perceived risk; the use of brakes is an effective indicator of high perceived risk and low trust, and pupil diameter correlates to perceived risk in the most critical events. The events increased heart rate, but we found no correlation with event criticality. The prediction models and the findings on physiological measures shed light on the event-based dynamics of perceived risk and trust and can guide human-centred automation design to reduce perceived risk and enhance trust.     

A comparison of intraverbal training procedures for children with autism

We compared the effectiveness of three training procedures, echoic and tact prompting plus error correction and a cues-pause-point (CPP) procedure, for increasing intraverbals in 2 children with autism. We also measured echoic behavior that may have interfered with appropriate question answering. Results indicated that echoic prompting with error correction was most effective and the CPP procedure was least effective for increasing intraverbals and decreasing echoic behavior.     

The sunk cost effect with pigeons: some determinants of decisions about persistence

The sunk cost effect occurs when an individual persists following an initial investment, even when persisting is costly in the long run. The current study used a laboratory model of the sunk cost effect. Two response alternatives were available: Pigeons could persist by responding on a schedule key with mixed ratio requirements, or escape by responding on a second key. In Experiment 1, mean response requirements for persistence and escape were varied across conditions. Pigeons persisted (committing the sunk cost error) when persisting increased the mean response requirement only slightly but not when persisting was sufficiently nonoptimal. Experiment 2 explored more systematically combinations of ratios and probabilities assigned to the schedule key. Persistence varied with the ratio of the mean global response requirements for persistence and escape. In Experiment 3, transitions between ratios were signaled. This reduced nonoptimal persistence, and produced some instances of a reverse sunk cost error--escaping when persistence was optimal. In Experiment 4, it was optimal to escape after the second-smallest ratio ever presented. Pigeons escaped at approximately the optimal juncture, especially in conditions with added signals. Overall, this series of experiments suggests that the sunk cost error may arise in part because persistence is the default behavioral strategy in situations where the contingencies for escape and persistence are insufficiently disparate and/or it is relatively difficult to discriminate when to escape. The study also demonstrates the utility of animal models of complex decision making situations.     

Perspectives on prediction: Does third-person imagery improve task completion estimates?

People typically underestimate the time necessary to complete their tasks. According to the planning fallacy model of optimistic time predictions, this underestimation occurs because people focus on developing a specific plan for the current task and neglect the implications of past failures to meet similar deadlines. We extend the classic planning fallacy model by proposing that a phenomenal quality of mental imagery – the visual perspective that is adopted – may moderate the optimistic prediction bias. Consistent with this proposal, participants in four studies predicted longer completion times, and thus were less prone to bias, when they imagined an upcoming task from the third-person rather than first-person perspective. Third-person imagery reduced people’s focus on optimistic plans, increased their focus on potential obstacles, and decreased the impact of task-relevant motives on prediction. The findings suggest that third-person imagery helps individuals generate more realistic predictions by reducing cognitive and motivational processes that typically contribute to bias.     

Gender and Roles in a Hospital Setting

No abstract available for this article.     

In Defense of Anti‐Archimedean Moral Realism: A Response to Recent Critics

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that many putatively nonmoral metaethical theories can only be understood as being internal to the moral domain. If correct, this position, referred to as anti‐archimedeanism, has profound implications for the methodology of metaethics. This is particularly true for skeptical metaethical theories. This article defends a version of anti‐archimedeanism that is true to the spirit rather than the letter of Dworkin's original thesis from several recent objections. First, it addresses Kenneth Ehrenberg's recent attempt to demonstrate how certain metaethical theories can be understood in a morally neutral manner. It then discusses Charles Pigden's claim that Dworkin begs the question against error theorists and nihilists by assuming a conceptual space that error theorists and nihilists would reject. It concludes that the anti‐archimedean methodology originally proposed by Dworkin is defensible, and can be used to support a robust form of moral realism.     

Knowledge of Results for Motor Learning: Relationship Between Error Estimation and Knowledge of Results Frequency

The authors of the present study investigated the apparent contradiction between early and more recent views of knowledge of results (KR), the idea that how one is engaged before receiving KR may not be independent of how one uses that KR. In a 2 × 2 factorial design, participants (N = 64) practiced a simple force-production task and (a) were required, or not required, to estimate error about their previous response and (b) were provided KR either after every response (100%) or after every 5th response (20%) during acquisition. A no-KR retention test revealed an interaction between acquisition error estimation and KR frequencies. The group that received 100% KR and was required to error estimate during acquisition performed the best during retention. The 2 groups that received 20% KR performed less well. Finally, the group that received 100% KR and was not required to error estimate during acquisition performed the poorest during retention. One general interpretation of that pattern of results is that motor learning is an increasing function of the degree to which participants use KR to test response hypotheses (J. A. Adams, 1971; R. A. Schmidt, 1975). Practicing simple responses coupled with error estimation may embody response hypotheses that can be tested with KR, thus benefiting motor learning most under a 100% KR condition. Practicing simple responses without error estimation is less likely to embody response hypothesis, however, which may increase the probability that participants will use KR to guide upcoming responses, thus attenuating motor learning under a 100% KR condition. The authors conclude, therefore, that how one is engaged before receiving KR may not be independent of how one uses KR.