Gert on Subjective Practical Rationality

The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.

The phenomenology of virtue

What is it like to be a good person? I examine and reject suggestions that this will involve having thoughts which have virtue or being a good person as part of their content, as well as suggestions that it might be the presence of feelings distinct from the virtuous person’s thoughts. Is there, then, anything after all to the phenomenology of virtue? I suggest that an answer is to be found in looking to Aristotle’s suggestion that virtuous activity is pleasant to the virtuous person. I try to do this, using the work of the contemporary social psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and his work on the ‘flow experience’. Crucial here is the point that I consider accounts of virtue which take it to have the structure of a practical expertise or skill. It is when we are most engaged in skilful complex activity that the activity is experienced as ‘unimpeded’, in Aristotle’s terms, or as ‘flow’. This experience does not, as might at first appear, preclude thoughtful involvement and reflection. Although we can say what in general the phenomenology of virtue is like, each of us only has some more or less dim idea of it from the extent to which we are virtuous—that is, for most of us, not very much.     

“For a New World”: On the practical impulse of Husserlian theory

The thesis of this article is that in Husserlian phenomenology there is no opposition between theory and praxis. On the contrary, he understands the former to serve the latter, so as to usher in a new world. The means for doing is the phenomenological reduction or epoché. It gives the phenomenologist access to the starting point, the “first things,” and orients his/her striving towards reason and the renewal of humanity. Careful attention to the significance of the epoché also sheds light on Husserl’s understanding of the relationship of phenomenology not only to philosophy but also to the other sciences. Though an exposition of the “phenomenology of the philosophical vocation” which Husserl sketched in the 1920s, e.g., in his Kaizo articles and lectures on first philosophy, the author seeks to shore up his thesis. For Walter Biemel     

Cognitive Theory and Phenomenology in Arendt’s and Nussbaum’s Work on Narrative

In this essay I compare Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s approach to narrativity. The point of the comparison is to find out which approach is more adequate for practical philosophy: the approach influenced by cognitive theory (Nussbaum) or the one influenced by hermeneutic phenomenology (Arendt). I conclude that Nussbaum’s approach is flawed by methodological solipsism, which is due to her application of cognitive theory.

Driver distraction based lane-keeping assistance

Driver assistance systems could be much more effective, if they were adaptive to the driver’s state. Following the idea of a lane-keeping assistance system, which is adaptive to the use of in-vehicle information systems (IVIS), two field experiments were conducted. The first experiment concerned the influence of typical IVIS tasks on lane-keeping. Most IVIS tasks increased the lateral deviations, but in the majority of cases the drivers were still able to stay in their lane.The second experiment concerned two questions: (1) how much lateral support would be needed and (2) how drivers accept this kind of support. The results show that all lateral support algorithms increased the lane-keeping performance with the algorithms providing a higher amount of assistance proving the most useful. All assistance systems were rated as helpful and were considered to increase driver safety, both by the drivers who did not have problems in lane-keeping without assistance.In light of these results an adaptation of a lateral support system to the IVIS-use seems to be useful and worthwhile.     

Freedom and Practical Reason

Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's imperiling practical reason.

Categorical and Agent-neutral Reasons in Kantian Justifications of Morality

The dispute between Kantians and Humeans over whether practical reason can justify moral reasons for all agents is often characterized as a debate over whether reasons are hypothetical or categorical. Instead, this debate must be understood in terms of the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. This paper considers Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality as a case study of a Kantian justification of morality focused on deriving categorical reasons from hypothetical reasons. The case study demonstrates first, the possibility of categorical agent-relative reasons, and second, that inattention to this possibility has caused considerable confusion in the debate between Kantians and Humeans.

中美互助养老“时间银行”模式对比研究

概述了时间银行的由来及在国内外的发展情况,对中美互助养老“时间银行”运作模式进行了比较:美国有全国性的总行、经费来源多元、服务内容多样、计量方式统一、存储兑换灵活便捷、志愿者来源多、政府从立法上保障了服务的可持续发展;我国“时间银行”缺少主管部门和监督主体、经费来源有限、服务内容单一、计量方式不统一、存储兑换仅限于某一“时间银行”内部、志愿者参与意愿低、缺少专门法律法规的保障。在此基础上分析了我国互助养老“时间银行”运行面临的伦理冲突,指出我国发展互助养老“时间银行”的具体路径和对策。