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31.
The seven virtues of simple type theory 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Simple type theory, also known as higher-order logic, is a natural extension of first-order logic which is simple, elegant, highly expressive, and practical. This paper surveys the virtues of simple type theory and attempts to show that simple type theory is an attractive alternative to first-order logic for practical-minded scientists, engineers, and mathematicians. It recommends that simple type theory be incorporated into introductory logic courses offered by mathematics departments and into the undergraduate curricula for computer science and software engineering students. 相似文献
32.
In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions. We also describe an implementation which simulates this reasoning and discuss some issues arising from the simulation. 相似文献
33.
Philip A. Quadrio 《Sophia》2009,48(2):179-193
This paper explores the Rousseauian background to Kant’s critique of metaphysics and philosophical theology. The core idea
is that the rejection of metaphysics and philosophical theology is part of a turn from theoretical to practical reason influential
on European philosophy of religion, a turn we associate with Kant but that is prefigured by Rousseau. Rousseau is not, however,
a thinker normally associated with the notion of metaphysical criticism, nor the notion of the primacy of practical reason.
The paper draws out this dimension of Rousseau’s thinking and its importance for Kantian thought. It will proceed by discussing
the Kant-Rousseau connection; demonstrate the importance of practical philosophy for Kant and the critical project generally;
overview Kant’s critique of metaphysics; and turn to a consideration of Rousseau, particularly from the text émile. Given the indisputable influence of Rousseau on Kant, the purpose of this paper is to explore the ways that Rousseau’s own
rejection of philosophical theology might be suggestive to those interested in Kant and the way in which it throws new light
on Kant’s philosophy of religion. As well as drawing out the Kant-Rousseau connection, it also, implicitly, defends the general
orientation of these philosophers as one that is important, perhaps vital, to philosophy of religion.
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Philip A. QuadrioEmail: |
34.
Although the change of beliefs in the face of new information has been widely studied with some success, the revision of other
mental states has received little attention from the theoretical perspective. In particular, intentions are widely recognised as being a key attitude for rational agents, and while several formal theories of intention have been
proposed in the literature, the logic of intention revision has been hardly considered. There are several reasons for this: perhaps most importantly, intentions are very closely connected
with other mental states—in particular, beliefs about the future and the abilities of the agent. So, we cannot study them
in isolation. We must consider the interplay between intention revision and the revision of other mental states, which complicates
the picture considerably. In this paper, we present some first steps towards a theory of intention revision. We develop a
simple model of an agent’s mental states, and define intention revision operators. Using this model, we develop a logic of
intention dynamics, and then investigate some of its properties. 相似文献
35.
Carlotta Pavese 《Philosophical Psychology》2019,32(5):784-821
ABSTRACTWe represent the world in a variety of ways: through percepts, concepts, propositional attitudes, words, numerals, recordings, musical scores, photographs, diagrams, mimetic paintings, etc. Some of these representations are mental. It is customary for philosophers to distinguish two main kinds of mental representations: perceptual representation (e.g., vision, auditory, tactile) and conceptual representation. This essay presupposes a version of this dichotomy and explores the way in which a further kind of representation – procedural representation – represents. It is argued that, in some important respects, procedural representations represent differently from both purely conceptual representations and purely perceptual representations. Although procedural representations, just like conceptual and perceptual representations, involve modes of presentation, their modes of presentation are distinctively practical, in a sense which I will clarify. It is argued that an understanding of this sort of practical representation has important consequences for the debate on the nature of know-how. 相似文献