Knowledge claims and context: loose use

There is abundant evidence of contextual variation in the use of “S knows p.” Contextualist theories explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses that refer to standards of justification determined by “practical” features of either the subject’s context (Hawthorne & Stanley) or the ascriber’s context (Lewis, Cohen, & DeRose). There is extensive linguistic counterevidence to both forms. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims is better explained by common pragmatic factors. I show here that one is variable strictness. “S knows p” is commonly used loosely to implicate “S is close enough to knowing p for contextually indicated purposes.” A pragmatic account may use a range of semantics, even contextualist. I use an invariant semantics on which knowledge requires complete justification. This combination meets the Moorean constraint as well as any linguistic theory should, and meets the intuition constraint much better than contextualism. There is no need for ad hoc error theories. The variation in conditions of assertability and practical rationality is better explained by variably strict constraints. It will follow that “S knows p” is used loosely to implicate that the condition for asserting “p” and using it in practical reasoning are satisfied.     

Mackie on Practical Reason

I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism, the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.

Augmenting the theory of planned behaviour: Motivation to provide practical assistance and emotional support to parents

Abstract

Surveys indicate that the highest proportion of people receiving informal care are parents (Green, 1988), yet a literature search showed that psychological studies of motivation to care for parents are limited. The present study utilised an augmented model of the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985) including measures of anticipated regret and carer self-concept, to examine individuals' motivations to provide practical assistance and emotional support to their parents. Intention to provide emotional support was predicted by the theory of planned behaviour constructs, while intention to provide practical assistance was predicted by subjective norm and perceived behavioural control but not by attitude. Anticipated regret substantially improved prediction of both types of behavioural intention. These findings indicate that providing practical assistance and emotional support are motivated behaviours, governed by both rational and emotional factors, suggesting that future research may benefit from adopting a broader perspective based upon social psychological theory     

牟宗三"实践的智慧学"探求诠论

对哲学作为“实践的智慧学”的探求是牟宗三后期哲学思考的核心。这一探索,开启了牟宗三中国哲学与康德哲学双向诠释的基本视域,也拓出了道德形而上学体系建构的理论地平。“实践的智慧学”诠释具有独特的理论内涵,也隐含了牟氏道德形上学自我批判与超越的思想线索。     

The Newxin puzzle

A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice situation—which I refer to as the Newxin puzzle—and discuss its implications in relation to the revisionist approach just described. Using the Newxin puzzle, I argue that the approach leads to a more radically revisionist picture of practical rationality than current debate suggests.

Betting Against Hard Determinism

The perennial fear associated with the free will problem is the prospect of hard determinism being true. Unlike prevalent attempts to reject hard determinism by defending compatibilist analyses of freedom and responsibility, this article outlines a pragmatic argument to the effect that we are justified in betting that determinism is false even though we may retain the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible. The basic argument is that as long as we accept that libertarian free will is worth wanting, there is a defensible rationale, given the uncertainty which remains as to whether determinism is true or false, to refrain from acting on hard determinism, and thus to bet that libertarian free will exists. The article closes by discussing two potentially decisive objections to this pragmatic argument.     

A Conundrum Concerning Creation

In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical reasons to create the actual world.

An epistemology for practical knowledge

Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing – displays formal differences to ordinary empirical, or ‘speculative’, knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on the fact that practical knowledge involves intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman’s account of knowledge as the ability to use a fact as a reason, I develop an alternative, two-tier, epistemology which allows that knowledge might really come in a belief-involving and an intention-involving form.     

实践主体与马克思哲学的生存维度

当代哲学正在发生整体性历史性转型,即生存论的转向,这种转向既是对当代人类生存困境所面临的问题的理论自觉,又是对一个半世纪前马克思开启的生存论哲学的思想发掘和当代阐释。但是,当代西方哲学无论是对当代人类的生存难题的理论求解还是对马克思哲学生存论的当代诠释都具有片面性和主观性。这是因为当代西方哲学生存论的解析视角都离异了马克思的实践主体维度。主体性和实践性是马克思哲学的两大基石,马克思哲学本质上就是实践主体哲学。马克思实践主体哲学生存论认为,人的主体性、实践性是理解人类生存问题的根本前提,无论是人类现实面临的生存困境还是人类最终摆脱现实的异化的生存境遇,本质上都是主体实践的自我生成和自我扬弃的过程。     

Reasons and Requirements

In this essay I defend the claim that all reasons can ground final requirements. I begin by establishing a prima facie case for the thesis by noting that on a common-sense understanding of what finality is, it must be the case that all reasons can ground such requirements. I spend the rest of the paper defending the thesis against two recent challenges. The first challenge is found in Joshua Gert’s recent book, Brute Rationality. In it he argues that reasons play two logically distinct roles – requiring action and justifying action. He argues, further, that some reasons – ‘purely justificatory’ reasons – play only the latter role. Jonathan Dancy offers the second challenge in his Ethics Without Principles, where he distinguishes between the ‘favoring’ and ‘ought-making’ roles of reasons. While all reasons play the former role, some do not play the latter, and are therefore irrelevant to what one ought to do. My contention is that both Gert and Dancy are going to have trouble accounting for our intuitions in a number of cases.