Development of comprehension of sentences with “because” or “if”

The comprehension of sentences with “because” or “if” was investigated in children aged 2;9–11;11. Imitation, comprehension (choosing one of two picture sequences to go with a sentence), recognition (judging sentences with connective or structure differences as heard before or not), and synonymy (judging equivalence of meaning in sentences with different connectives or structures) tasks were administered, along with logical ordering, reversibility, and classification tasks. Above-chance responding in the comprehension task occurred by age 8, and in recognition and synonymy by age 10. Cognitive performance predicted 28.4% of the variance in the linguistic scores and cognitive success was concurrent with or preceded linguistic success. Comprehension of “because” and “if” appears to develop gradually, and is related to the development of certain operative rules.     

Studies in social influence: V. Minority influence and conversion behavior in a perceptual task

The effects of influence attempts by a majority and by a minority were examined on both a manifest response level and a latent perceptual level. Female subjects were exposed to a series of blue slides that were consistently labeled as green by a female confederate. The confederate was presented as a member of either a majority or a minority. On each trial, subjects were required to indicate the color of the slide presented and the color of the afterimage perceived on a white screen following removal of the slide. It was predicted that (a) the subject's judgment of the chromatic afterimage would be modified when the influence agent represented a minority, and (b) this modification will be more pronounced when the source of influence is absent than when it is present. The results supported the prediction in both the main study and its replication.     

Visual processing of multielement arrays and selective backward masking

In the first of two selective masking experiments, 7-letter rows were followed at several ISIs by a mask or no-mask and a bar-marker partial report cue. The results suggest that the arrays were processed ends-first and then, in general, from both ends towards the middle. In the second experiment, bar-marker partial report cues were presented at the onset or offset of 6-letter/1-digit or 7-letter rows. The subjects could not anticipate the category of the to-be-reported item with the alphanumeric displays. With a delayed cue, selective masking was obtained with both mixed category and pure letter arrays, but with simultaneous cuing, masking was always distributed across all serial positions. The results suggest that the subjects: (a) abstracted some information about category from the mixed arrays during an initial parallel stage of processing, (b) selectively attended to mainly the cued item with simultaneous probes with homeogeneous and mixed category displays, and (c) employed an ends-first processing strategy with both types of arrays when the bar-marker partial report cue was delayed.     

Relationship between response to graded exposure and marital satisfaction in agoraphobics

Agoraphobics who were satisfied in their marriage responded well to graded exposure and maintained their improvement to 3-months follow-up. Satisfaction with self and partner remained unchanged in patient and spouse. Agoraphobics who were dissatisfied with their marriage improved initially with graded exposure but later lost most of their gains and reported no change in general neurotic symptoms. Marital dissatisfaction also remained unchanged. Patients' dissatisfaction with their spouses, measured before therapy, predicted outcome in the sample as a whole.     

Integrating velocity,time, and distance information: A developmental study

The development of understanding the relationships between velocity, time, and distance was investigated in three tasks. In each task, values of two dimensions were given, and 5-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults had to infer values of the third dimension. These inferences were made in all age groups. The integration rules were found to depend upon age and task. In the distance = time × velocity task, all age groups obeyed the normative multiplication rule. In the time = distance ÷ velocity task, the two older age groups obeyed the normative division rule, but the 5-year-olds shifted to a simpler subtraction rule. In the velocity = distance ÷ time task, which was the most difficult, the two older age groups simplified to use of a subtraction rule, and the 5-year-olds simplified even further to use of a distance-only rule. The knowledge level revealed for young children contrasts sharply with results from previous studies using Piagetian choice tasks, which apparently investigate selective attention to one dimension rather than conceptual understanding of relations.     

Postdecisional preference for decision-relevant information as a function of the competence of its source and the degree of familiarity with this information

Three experiments are reported concerning the determinants of postdecisional preferences for decision-relevant information. Two factors were considered: the competence of the source of the information and the degree of prior familiarity with the contents of the information. The first two experiments showed that the competence of the source of decision-supporting information affected the desirability of reading both types of information, whereas the competence of the source of decision-opposing information had very little effect on the desirability of reading either type. In the third experiment, the effects of giving subjects access to prior information supporting or opposing their view on their preferences for further information were investigated under conditions in which the number of choices of this later information were either limited or unlimited. The effects of prior information on choices of decision-supporting information were identical regardless of whether the total amount of information available was limited or unlimited: Less decision-supporting information was chosen when subjects had previously been exposed to decision-supporting information than when they had not, and this difference was greater when they had not previously been exposed to decision-opposing information. However, the choices of decision-opposing information under unlimited choice conditions increased with the amount of decision-supporting information previously read, but decreased with the amount of decision-opposing information previously read. The processes that underlie the choices of information under conditions in which several types are available are discussed.     

Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception

Understanding of another person's wrong belief requires explicit representation of the wrongness of this person's belief in relation to one's own knowledge. Three to nine year old children's understanding of two sketches was tested. In each sketch subjects observed how a protagonist put an object into a location x and then witnessed that in the absence of the protagonist the object was transferred from x to location y. Since this transfer came as a surprise they had to assume that the protagonist still believed that the object was in x. Subjects had to indicate where the protagonist will look for the object at his return. None of the 3–4-year old, 57% of 4–6-year old, and 86% of 6–9-year old children pointed correctly to location x in both sketches. Of the many cases where 4–6-year olds made an error they failed in only about 20% to remember the initial location correctly. As a test of the stability of children's representation of the protagonist's wrong belief the sketches continued with a statement about the protagonist's intention to either deceive an antagonist or truthfully inform a friend about the object's location. Independent of age, of those children who correctly thought that the protagonist would search in x, 85% of the time they also correctly thought that he would direct his antagonist to location y and his friend to location x. This shows that once children can represent a person's beliefs they can constrain their interpretation of this person's stated intentions to the person's beliefs. In a more story-like situation another group of children had to infer a deceptive plan from the depiction of a goal conflict between two story characters and one character's expedient utterance. At the age of 4–5 years children correctly judged this utterance as a lie only 28% of the time while 5–6-year olds did so 94% of the time. These results suggest that around the ages of 4 to 6 years the ability to represent the relationship between two or more person's epistemic states emerges and becomes firmly established.     

A comparison between the development of the appearance-reality distinction in the People's Republic of China and the United States

A study of the appearance-reality distinction in American 3- to 5-year-olds was replicated with Chinese 3- to 5-year-olds. The error patterns, age changes, and absolute levels of performance were similar in the two samples. It was speculated that the acquisition of this distinction may be a universal, possibly age-linked development that is probably fueled by experiences with appearance-reality discrepancies that are available in all cultures.     

The development of discourse mapping processes: the on-line interpretation of anaphoric expressions

The present research focuses on how children integrate the antecedent of different kinds of anaphor into their on-going interpretation of an utterance, and on the kinds of cues they use to help them to do this. These issues were studied by examining the on-line processing of three types of anaphoric devices—repeated noun phrases, general terms and pronoun anaphors. The data showed that by the age of five, anaphoric mapping processes in general are well-mastered, although all age-groups (5, 7, 10 year olds and adults) found general term anaphors more difficult to interpret. The major developmental differences concerned the processing of anaphoric pronouns. For five year olds, pronouns were primarily interpreted as devices which maintained the thematic subject of the discourse, but when there was no thematic subject they relied primarily on pragmatic plausibility in their assignment of pronominal co-reference. As children get older, they are able to take advantage of the lexical properties of pronouns and all three sources of information—lexical, pragmatic inference and the thematic structure of the discourse—play contributory roles in the assignment of reference to a pronoun.     

A characterization of stochastic independence by association,with an application to random utility theory

A characterization of stochastic independence in terms of association of random variables is given. The result is applied to yield a simple proof of the Sattath-Tversky inequality without continuity assumptions.