From Modal Discourse to Possible Worlds

The possible-worlds semantics for modality says that a sentence is possibly true if it is true in some possible world. Given classical prepositional logic, one can easily prove that every consistent set of propositions can be embedded in a ‘maximal consistent set’, which in a sense represents a possible world. However the construction depends on the fact that standard modal logics are finitary, and it seems false that an infinite collection of sets of sentences each finite subset of which is intuitively ‘possible’ in natural language has the property that the whole set is possible. The argument of the paper is that the principles needed to shew that natural language possibility sentences involve quantification over worlds are analogous to those used in infinitary modal logic.     

The self in transformation: the passage from a two- to a three-dimensional internal world

This paper seeks to describe some of the steps in the process of transformation from a two-dimensional to a three-dimensional inner world as experienced by a patient who had essentially used up her remaining vital resources. An important hurdle had first to be crossed when the analyst was required to demonstrate her capacity to survive with her in a two-dimensional claustrum, in a solitary confinement. Here, an oppositional defensive system had been created in which positive and negative personifications of vital but withdrawn energies ensured that she was locked within an interior world that sought to bar entry to anyone else, and where the possibility of the transformation of her self was disallowed. The patient had to accept the risk of breaching the system of self-defence before the analyst was allowed a mutual position within her interior world. A series of dreams tracks this transformation internally and in relation to the analyst.     

The Intertwinement of Propositional and Doxastic Justification

One important distinction in the debate over the nature of epistemic justification is the one between propositional and doxastic justification. Roughly, while doxastic justification is a property of beliefs, propositional justification is a property of propositions. On a rather common view, which accounts for doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification plus the so-called ‘basing relation’, propositional justification is seen as the prior notion, and doxastic justification is explained in terms of it. According to the opposing view, the direction of explanation needs to be reversed, and doxastic justification should be seen as primary. I distinguish between two notions of priority, and I argue that they give different verdicts with respect to the issue of which notion of justification comes first. The lesson may be taken to be that propositional and doxastic justification are in a relation of intertwinement.     

WILLIAM WHEWELL,THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS,AND THE MODERN SOLAR SYSTEM

Astronomers of the first half of the nineteenth century viewed our solar system entirely differently from the way twentieth‐century astronomers viewed it. In the earlier period the dominant image was of a set of planets and moons, both of which kinds of bodies were inhabited by intelligent beings comparable to humans. By the early twentieth century, science had driven these beings from every planet in our system except the Earth, leaving our solar system (and perhaps others) as more or less desolate regions for the most part bereft of intelligent life. This essay traces this extinction and its relation to religious thought, noting the role played in it by Sir John Herschel and especially by William Whewell. The inverse square laws for gravitation, heat radiation, and light receive special attention, as does the question of the relevance of the Christian notions of a divine incarnation and redemption.     

If You Can't Change What You Believe,You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.     

Truth as Translation – Part A

According to Tarski's Convention T, the adequacy of a truth definition is (implicitly) defined relatively to a translation mapping from the object language to the metalanguage; the translation mapping itself is left unspecified. This paper restates Convention T in a form in which the relativity to translation is made explicit. The notion of an interpreted language is introduced, and a corresponding notion of a translation between interpreted languages is defined. The latter definition is stated both in an algebraic version, and in an equivalent possible worlds version. It is a consequence of our definition that translation is indeterminate in certain cases. Finally, we give an application of our revised version of Convention T and show that interpreted languages exist, which allow for vicious self-reference but which nevertheless contain their own truth predicate. This is possible if only truth is based on a nonstandard translation mapping by which, e.g., the Liar sentence is translated to its own negation. In this part of the paper this existence result is proved only for languages without quantifiers; in Part B the result will be extended to first-order languages.     

Essai de représentation par des nombres réels d'une analyse infinite des notions individuelles dans une infinité de mondes possibles

The aim of this study is to try to make use of real numbers for representing an infinite analysis of individual notions in an infinity of possible worlds.As an introduction to the subject, the author shows, firstly, the possibility of representing Boole's lattice of universal notions by an associate Boole's lattice of rational numbers.But, in opposition to the universal notions, definable by a finite number of predicates, an individual notion, cannot (as Leibniz pointed out) admits this sort of definition, because each state of an individual subject is characterized by the values (present or absent, applicable or inapplicable) taken by an infinite number of predicates, each of whom may appear or disappear in the next state.The notion of degree of identification of an individual notion is then introduced and arithmetized by a rational number.As an individual notion can be defined by a convergent succession of degrees of identification, the real characteristic number of such an individual notion can be defined by the corresponding convergent succession of rational numbers, satisfying Cauchy's conditions for the convergence of successions.

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Essai de représentation par des nombres réels d'une analyse infinite des notions individuelles dans une infinité de mondes possibles

     

Can Science Help Construct a New Global Ethic? The Development and Implications of Moral Transformation Theory

This paper reports the results of a ten-year search for consensus among scientific findings on the nature of the origin and development of moral sensitivity and morality. Significant agreement on six underlying factors was found. Based on these foundations, a new theory of moral transformation and a scientific "global ethic" relating to the global ethic of Hans Kung and the Parliament of the World's Religions is proposed. Fields surveyed include psychology, sociology, political science, economics, history, and gender and feminist studies in social science; physics and biology in natural science; and brain research, archaeology, and both old and new evolutionary studies and theory, including chaos, self-organizing, and other nonlinear theories, in systems science.