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31.
Paul Silva Jr 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2015,93(2):371-387
The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is the distinction between having justification to believe that P (= propositional justification) versus having a justified belief in P (= doxastic justification). The focus of this paper is on doxastic justification and on what conditions are necessary for having it. In particular, I challenge the basing demand on doxastic justification, i.e. the idea that one can have a doxastically justified belief only if one's belief is based on an epistemically appropriate reason. This demand has been used to refute versions of coherentism and conservatism about perceptual justification, as well as to defend phenomenal ‘conservatism’ and other views besides. In what follows, I argue that there is virtually no reason to think there is a basing demand on doxastic justification. I also argue that, even if the basing demand were true, it would still fail to serve the dialectical purposes for which it has been employed in arguments concerning coherentism, conservatism, and phenomenal ‘conservatism’. I conclude by discussing the fact that knowledge has a basing demand and I show why this needn't raise the same sort of problems for coherentism and conservatism that doxastic justification's basing demand seemed to raise. 相似文献
32.
Christian List 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(1):57-65
Suppose the members of a group (e.g., committee, jury, expert panel) each form a judgment on which worlds in a given set are
possible, subject to the constraint that at least one world is possible but not all are. The group seeks to aggregate these
individual judgments into a collective judgment, subject to the same constraint. I show that no judgment aggregation rule
can solve this problem in accordance with three conditions: “unanimity,” “independence” and “non-dictatorship,” Although the
result is a variant of an existing theorem on “group identification” (Kasher and Rubinstein, Logique et Analyse 160:385–395,
1997), the aggregation of judgments on which worlds are possible (or permissible, desirable, etc.) appears not to have been
studied yet. The result challenges us to take a stance on which of its conditions to relax. 相似文献
33.
‘Is’–‘Ought’ Derivations and Ethical Taxonomies 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
Scott Hill 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):545-566
Hume seems to claim that there does not exist a valid argument that has all non-ethical sentences as premises and an ethical
sentence as its conclusion. Starting with Prior, a number of counterexamples to this claim have been proposed. Unfortunately,
all of these proposals are controversial. Even the most plausible have a premise that seems like it might be an ethical sentence
or a conclusion that seems like it might be non-ethical. Since it is difficult to tell whether any of these counterexamples
are genuine, we need a taxonomy that sorts out ethical sentences from non-ethical ones. We need to know the difference between
an ‘Is’ and an ‘Ought’. In the first part of the paper, I establish the need for a taxonomy. I consider some of the most influential
‘Is’–‘Ought’ derivations. These include proposals by Prior and Searle. I argue that each proposal has a premise whose status
as ethical or non-ethical is difficult to determine. In the second part of the paper, I consider taxonomies proposed by Karmo
and Maitzen. I argue against both taxonomies. I end with the claim that we need a taxonomy of ethical sentences and that none
of the current proposals are adequate.
相似文献
Scott HillEmail: |
34.
35.
Samuel Kimbles 《The Journal of analytical psychology》2017,62(1):130-146
In this paper the author describes certain kinds of images (phantoms) that appear in the aftermath of social catastrophes. These phantoms come with an underlying narrative structure, which the author describes as phantom narratives. Phantom narratives show how the unconscious, working at the group and individual levels, provides political and social contexts within which the individual may find a different kind of containment for these catastrophes. In this way their suffering may be potentially processed psychologically and related to symbolically. 相似文献
36.
Religious people seem to believe things that range from the somewhat peculiar to the utterly bizarre. Or do they? According to a new paper by Neil Van Leeuwen, religious “credence” is nothing like mundane factual belief. It has, he claims, more in common with fictional imaginings. Religious folk do not really “believe”—in the ordinary sense of the word—what they profess to believe. Like fictional imaginings, but unlike factual beliefs, religious credences are activated only within specific settings. We argue that Van Leeuwen’s thesis contradicts a wealth of data on religiously motivated behavior. By and large, the faithful genuinely believe what they profess to believe. Although many religions openly embrace a sense of mystery, in general this does not prevent the attribution of beliefs to religious people. Many of the features of religious belief that Van Leeuwen alludes to, like invulnerability to refutation and incoherence, are characteristic of irrational beliefs in general and actually betray their being held as factual. We conclude with some remarks about the common failure of secular people to face the fact that some religious people really do believe wildly implausible things. Such incredulity, as evinced by Van Leeuwen and others, could be termed “disbelief in belief.” 相似文献
37.
In the work of both Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn the scientific literature plays important roles for stability and change
of scientific phenomenal worlds. In this article we shall introduce the analyses of scientific literature provided by Fleck
and Kuhn, respectively. From this background we shall discuss the problem of how divergent thinking can emerge in a dogmatic
atmosphere. We shall argue that in their accounts of the factors inducing changes of scientific phenomenal worlds Fleck and
Kuhn offer substantially different approaches, and we shall discuss in which respects their approaches may be compatible.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
38.
Lloyd Humberstone 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2007,36(1):1-32
The logic of ‘elsewhere,’ i.e., of a sentence operator interpretable as attaching to a formula to yield a formula true at
a point in a Kripke model just in case the first formula is true at all other points in the model, has been applied in settings in which the points in question represent spatial positions (explaining
the use of the word ‘elsewhere’), as well as in the case in which they represent moments of time. This logic is applied here
to the alethic modal case, in which the points are thought of as possible worlds, with the suggestion that its deployment
clarifies aspects of a position explored by John Divers un-der the name ‘modal agnosticism.’ In particular, it makes available
a logic whose Halldén incompleteness explicitly registers the agnostic element of the position – its neutrality as between
modal realism and modal anti-realism. 相似文献
39.
Bridging learning theory and dynamic epistemic logic 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Nina Gierasimczuk 《Synthese》2009,169(2):371-384
This paper discusses the possibility of modelling inductive inference (Gold 1967) in dynamic epistemic logic (see e.g. van
Ditmarsch et al. 2007). The general purpose is to propose a semantic basis for designing a modal logic for learning in the
limit. First, we analyze a variety of epistemological notions involved in identification in the limit and match it with traditional
epistemic and doxastic logic approaches. Then, we provide a comparison of learning by erasing (Lange et al. 1996) and iterated
epistemic update (Baltag and Moss 2004) as analyzed in dynamic epistemic logic. We show that finite identification can be
modelled in dynamic epistemic logic, and that the elimination process of learning by erasing can be seen as iterated belief-revision
modelled in dynamic doxastic logic. Finally, we propose viewing hypothesis spaces as temporal frames and discuss possible
advantages of that perspective. 相似文献
40.
Mark Jago 《Synthese》2009,167(2):327-341
Gaining information can be modelled as a narrowing of epistemic space. Intuitively, becoming informed that such-and-such is the case rules out certain scenarios or would-be possibilities. Chalmers’s
account of epistemic space treats it as a space of a priori possibility and so has trouble in dealing with the information
which we intuitively feel can be gained from logical inference. I propose a more inclusive notion of epistemic space, based
on Priest’s notion of open worlds yet which contains only those epistemic scenarios which are not obviously impossible. Whether something is obvious is not
always a determinate matter and so the resulting picture is of an epistemic space with fuzzy boundaries. 相似文献