Values-based Political Messages and Persuasion: Relationships among Speaker, Recipient, and Evoked Values

The persuasive power of values-based political messages may depend on recipients having (1) shared values with the speaker (a type of personal identity match ); (2) shared political party identifications with the speaker (a type of social identity match ); and/or (3) expectations about values traditionally associated with different political parties (an expectancy violation/confirmation ). The independent and joint effects of these factors on the success of a persuasive message were examined, using the theoretical framework of dual-process models of persuasion. Participants (N = 301), classified according to their party identifications and primary value orientations, read a political speech that varied by argument quality, speaker party, and values evoked. Results indicated that value matching promotes close attention to the message, while party mismatching increases message rejection. These effects depend to some extent, however, on expectancies about values traditionally associated with different parties. Participants especially rejected messages from rival party members when the speaker evoked unexpected values. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the efficacy of values-based political communication.     

A Politically Liberal Conception of Civic Education

Liberal political theory is widely believed to be an inadequate source of civic commitment and thus of civic education primarily because of its commitment to what is perceived as a pervasive individualism. In this paper, I explore the possibility that John Rawls’s later political philosophy may provide a response to this belief. I first articulate a conception of liberal politics derived from Rawls’s idea of reflective equilibrium that generates an overlapping consensus about political principles among those who hold a wide variety of cultural and personal conceptions of the good. Next I develop the aims for civic education in a society that employs such a politics. Then I suggest the elements of the public school curriculum appropriate for such a civic education, including a robust multicultural education, intellectual reflection on the society’s history, and philosophical training that enables children to understand the events and policies of their nation as following from general political principles. I also consider the kinds of classroom practice that seem necessary to provide the motivation to engage in the process of the emergence of an overlapping consensus, including opportunities to develop and to reflect on the principles that may be included in the current consensus and to understand the way in which those principles relate to children’s developing conceptions of the good. Finally, I compare this conception of civic education to those of other liberal theorists.

Leftists’ and rightists’ IQ as a function of stereotype salience

This study examined the intellectual performance of leftists (or liberals) and rightists (or conservatives) when a stereotype about members of a disadvantaged outgroup (immigrants) is salient. Building on system-justification theory (SJT) and the motivated social cognition approach of political conservatism, it was predicted that when the stereotype about immigrant students’ underachievement is salient in academic settings, leftist students would perform worse, whereas rightist students would perform better than in a control condition. In two samples, Swiss native students were first reminded (or not) of the stereotype and then performed a difficult intellectual test. The results yielded support for the predictions. These findings illustrate how different ideological motives (system-challenging vs. system-justifying) might influence performance among leftist and rightist students.     

Ricoeur and the pre-political

We argue that Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative and alienation provides a largely untapped, though potentially fruitful way of re-thinking the question of political agency within the context of globalization. We argue that the political agency of many around the world has been placed in an exceedingly fragile position due to the rapid pace of globalization, the movement of multi-national corporations from their previous national headquarters, etc. We use Ricoeur’s work to argue that the alienation of globalization is not something that can be simply overcome either in a unified world-state or a retreat to protectionist nationalism, because institutional mediation—and consequently alienation—is in some sense constitutive of all politics: the world of political representation operates by its own set of rules, which are at least partially disconnected from the represented world. Using the work of Mouffe, a radical democratic theorist, we then flesh out an ideal of agonistic citizenship (which recognizes both the need for and the inevitability of discursive struggle in politics) in a number of overlapping communities of interest, rather than tying political participation solely to the sovereign government of my state. The state will remain important, but because globalization has disenfranchised so many from their participation in “local” modes of self-governance (tied to the state in which they live), we have a responsibility to re-envision what political participation means outside the traditional context of the state. Rather than merely citizens of a particular state, we need to begin thinking of ourselves politically—and then acting—as “citizens” of Green Peace, Human Rights Watch, Doctors Without Borders, or whatever other supra-local concrete universals or communities of interest to which we belong, investing the time and energy there that we might previously have invested solely in our state’s government. (By implication, we must also ensure that these organizations work in transparent democratic ways themselves.) We believe that by re-plotting our narratives of political engagement in this way, we can positively respond to the alienation created by globalization, while avoiding both the extremes of “McWorld” (hyperglobalism) and “Jihad” (complete skepticism towards, or war against globalization) that Benjamin Barber and David Held have recently described.

The paradox of the political maverick

Attitudes about political mavericks (politicians who cross party lines to “vote their conscience”) depend on whether people construe them in general terms or at the level of specific policy proposals. Three studies examined this hypothesis. In Study 1, participants expressed more positive views of political mavericks described generally than when prompted to consider a maverick of their own political party. Study 2 found that mavericks described in personality trait terms were evaluated more favorably than “party-line” politicians, even when the maverick was of the participant’s own political party. Study 3 found that when participants were provided with specific policy stances, a similarity-attraction pattern was found: opposing party mavericks were evaluated more positively, but same party mavericks were evaluated more negatively, than their party-line counterparts. Politicians challenging participant’s own party on a moral issue were evaluated particularly harshly. Implications of these findings for political perceptions and strategy are discussed.     

Why Education in Public Schools Should Include Religious Ideals

This article aims to open a new line of debate about religion in public schools by focusing on religious ideals. The article begins with an elucidation of the concept ‘religious ideals’ and an explanation of the notion of reasonable pluralism, in order to be able to explore the dangers and positive contributions of religious ideals and their pursuit on a liberal democratic society. We draw our examples of religious ideals from Christianity and Islam, because these religions have most adherents in Western liberal democracies that are the focus of this article. The fifth and most important section “Reasonable pluralism and the inclusion of religious ideals in public secondary schools” provides three arguments for our claim that public schools should include religious ideals, namely that they are important to religious people, that they are conducive for the development of pupils into citizens of a liberal democracy, and that the flourishing of pupils as adults is advanced by encountering religious ideals. We also offer a more practical reason: religious ideals can more easily be included within public education than religious dogmas and rules.

Information Distortion and Voting Choices: The Origins and Effects of Factual Beliefs in Initiative Elections

To account for voter decision making in initiative elections, we integrate theory and research on public opinion, misinformation, and motivated reasoning. Heuristic and motivated reasoning literatures suggest that voters' preexisting values interact with political sophistication such that politically knowledgeable voters develop systematically distorted empirical beliefs relevant to the initiatives on their ballots. These beliefs, in turn, can predict voting preferences even after controlling for underlying values, regardless of one's political sophistication. These hypotheses were tested using a 2003 voter survey conducted prior to a statewide initiative election that repealed a workplace safety regulation. Results showed that only those voters knowledgeable of key endorsements had initiative-specific beliefs that lined up with their underlying antiregulation values. Also, voters' empirical beliefs had an effect on initiative support even after controlling for prior values, and political sophistication did not moderate this effect.     

The Central Role of Group-Based Hatred as an Emotional Antecedent of Political Intolerance: Evidence from Israel

In recent years, political scientists have shifted the focus of explaining political phenomena from the purely cognitive perspective to an integrated emotion-cognition one. Yet most studies which examine antecedents of political intolerance ignore the potential role played by "gut feelings" or group-based negative emotions in endorsing those attitudes. Moreover, even the few studies that deal with emotions and intolerance concentrate exclusively on the role of groups of emotions (positive vs. negative, dispositional vs. surveillance) or on basic emotions (anger or fear) and ignore the potential influence of more complex discrete emotions like hatred on political intolerance. Hence, the main goal of this study was to create a deeper understanding regarding the role of discrete negative emotions in increasing political intolerance among different groups of individuals in different contexts. In order to do so, the relations between political intolerance and three group-based negative emotions (hatred, anger, and fear) were tested by means of four large-scale nationwide surveys. Within the surveys, various intolerance measurement methods were used in various contexts (wartime vs. no-war/routine periods) and among individuals with different levels of political sophistication. Results, obtained via multiple regression analysis and structural equation modeling, show that: (1) Group-based hatred is the most important antecedent of political intolerance even when controlling for important intolerance inducers such as perceived threat. (2) Other group-based negative emotions like anger or fear influence political intolerance wholly through the mediation of hatred or perceived threat. (3) The role of group-based hatred in inducing political intolerance is more substantial in the face of heightened existential threat and among unsophisticated individuals than among sophisticated ones.     

Alienable Speech: Ideological Variations in the Application of Free-Speech Principles

Although freedom of speech is a Constitutionally protected and widely endorsed value, political tolerance research finds that people are less willing to protect speech they dislike than speech they like ( Gibson, 2006 ). Research also suggests liberal-conservative differences in political tolerance ( Davis & Silver, 2004 ). We measured U.S. citizens' political tolerance for speech acts, while manipulating the speaker's ethnicity and the speech's ideological content. Speech criticizing Americans was protected more strongly than was speech criticizing Arabs, especially among more politically liberal respondents. Liberals also reported greater free-speech support. Respondents expressed greater political tolerance for a speaker when he was an exemplar of the criticized group, but showed equal political tolerance for speakers whose group membership (as a White or Black American) was irrelevant to the speech. Finally, implicit political identity showed convergent validity with explicit political identity in predicting speech tolerance, and implicit racial and ethnic preferences showed variable prediction of speech tolerance across the two studies.     

Political mindset: Effects of schema priming on liberal-conservative political positions

Although stable factors play an important role in determining people’s political positions, most Americans also hold a mix of values and beliefs some congruent with political conservatism and some congruent with political liberalism. To investigate this more dynamic component of political thinking, two studies manipulated the relative salience of schemas about personal merit vs. good fortune as explanations for success in life. In Study 1, students at a highly selective university were asked to explain their academic success focusing either on the role of hard work, self-discipline and wise decision-making (Personal Merit condition) or that of chance, opportunity, and help from others (Good Fortune condition). In Study 2, personal merit vs. good fortune was primed through prior exposure to relevant questionnaire items. In both studies, participants in the Good Fortune condition subsequently indicated more support for liberal policies than did those in the Personal Merit condition.