Cognitive diagnosis modelling incorporating item response times

To provide more refined diagnostic feedback with collateral information in item response times (RTs), this study proposed joint modelling of attributes and response speed using item responses and RTs simultaneously for cognitive diagnosis. For illustration, an extended deterministic input, noisy ‘and’ gate (DINA) model was proposed for joint modelling of responses and RTs. Model parameter estimation was explored using the Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. The PISA 2012 computer-based mathematics data were analysed first. These real data estimates were treated as true values in a subsequent simulation study. A follow-up simulation study with ideal testing conditions was conducted as well to further evaluate model parameter recovery. The results indicated that model parameters could be well recovered using the MCMC approach. Further, incorporating RTs into the DINA model would improve attribute and profile correct classification rates and result in more accurate and precise estimation of the model parameters.     

Direct remembering,mediated remembering,and atypical forgetting functions

Atypical forgetting functions have been demonstrated in several recent studies of delayed matching to sample, in which experimental conditions are altered partway through the retention interval. The forgetting functions are atypical in that accuracy or discriminability is not always a negatively accelerated monotonic function of increasing retention interval duration, but may increase at later times in the retention interval. Atypical forgetting functions reflect changes in levels of discrimination. A switch from a lower level to a higher level of discrimination, or vice versa, can occur at any time in the retention interval. The behavioral theories of remembering proposed by Nevin, Davison, Odum, and Shahan (2007), and White and Brown (2014), offer quantitative predictions of forgetting functions that differ in intercept or slope. Both theories are able to account for atypical forgetting functions, by assuming time‐independent changes in the mediating effect of attending to sample and comparison stimuli (in Nevin et al.'s model) or in the direct effect of the context of reinforcement of the conditional discrimination (in White & Brown's model). Despite differences in their main assumptions, the theories have an edge over any theory that assumes that forgetting is time‐dependent.     

An evaluation of a visual–visual successive matching‐to‐sample procedure to establish equivalence classes in adults

Traditionally, behavior analysts have studied stimulus equivalence using a matching‐to‐sample (MTS) preparation. Although researchers have shown the utility of MTS to yield equivalence classes, the procedure requires several prerequisite skills for a learner to accurately respond. Previous research with humans and nonhumans has shown that relational responding can be produced via compound stimulus discrimination and successive matching‐to‐sample (S‐MTS). We conducted four experiments with college students to further evaluate the effectiveness of S‐MTS in the establishment of stimulus relations. S‐MTS trials consisted of the presentation of a single sample stimulus followed by one comparison in a fixed location on a computer screen. Depending upon the sample–comparison relation, participants touched (i.e., go) or did not touch (i.e., no‐go) the comparison stimulus. Following training of the baseline relations (AB/BC), we assessed the emergence of symmetry, transitivity, and equivalence performances (i.e., BA/CB and AC/CA). Results support the utility of the S‐MTS procedure as a possible alternative to traditional MTS. This study has direct implications for participants for whom traditional three‐array MTS procedures may be challenging.     

Validity evidence of Emotional Quotient Inventory: Youth Version (Short) in a sample of Mexican adolescents / Evidencias de validez del Emotional Quotient Inventory: Youth Version (Short) en una muestra de adolescentes mexicanos

The aim of this study was to obtain evidence on the validity of the Emotional Quotient Inventory Youth Version-Short Form (EQ-i:YV-S) with a sample of Mexican adolescent participants. The sample comprised 375 adolescents, 183 males (48.8%), from years seven to 12 (M_age = 14.80, SD = 1.72). Different tests were carried out to provide evidence of the questionnaire’s validity: (1) reliability and internal consistency analyses; (2) exploratory and confirmatory analyses; and (3) correlational and predictive validity analyses through structural equation modelling. The four EQ-i:YV-S subscales (interpersonal, intrapersonal, stress management and adaptability) provided acceptable indexes of reliability. Exploratory factor analysis supported the multidimensionality of the questionnaire. The results of the confirmatory factor analysis showed that the hierarchical model that hypothesized four first-order factors and one second-order factor (social-emotional intelligence) had the best fit for the data. Finally, the positive correlations found between the four specific EQ-i:YV-S subscales, general self-concept and satisfaction with life, supported the convergent validity of the questionnaire; in addition, the questionnaire’s capacity to predict satisfaction with life corroborated its predictive validity. It can therefore be affirmed that the EQ-i:YV-S is a brief questionnaire that is suitable for measuring the emotional intelligence of Mexican adolescents.     

Do young adults show conceptual knowledge of previous distractors?

Using implicit tests, older adults have been found to retain conceptual knowledge of previously seen task-irrelevant information. While younger adults typically do not show the same effect, evidence from one study [Gopie, N., Craik, F. I. M., & Hasher, L. (2011). A double dissociation of implicit and explicit memory in younger and older adults. Psychological Science, 22, 634–640. doi:10.1177/0956797611403321] suggests otherwise. In that study, young adults showed greater explicit than implicit memory for previous distractors on a word fragment completion task. This was interpreted as evidence for maintaining access to previous conceptual knowledge of the distractors. Here, we report two failures to replicate that original finding, followed by a third study designed to test directly whether young adults use conceptual-level information that was previously irrelevant. Our findings agree with others that young adults show weak to no evidence of conceptual knowledge of previously irrelevant information.     

Associative false consumer memory: effects of need for cognition and encoding task

Two experiments investigated the effects of product–attribute associations on false consumer memory. In both experiments, subjects were presented with sets of related product attributes under incidental encoding conditions. Later, recognition memory was tested with studied attributes, non-studied but associated attributes (critical lures) and non-studied unrelated attributes. In Experiment 1, the effect of Need for Cognition (NFC) was assessed. It was found that individuals high in NFC recognised more presented attributes and falsely recognised more associative critical lures. The increase in both true and associative false memory was accompanied by a greater number of responses that index the retrieval of detailed episodic-like information. Experiment 2, replicated the main findings through an experimental manipulation of the encoding task that required subjects to consider purchase likelihood. Explanations for these findings are considered from the perspective of activation processes and knowledge structures in the form of gist-based representations.     

On the Moral Significance of Sacrifice

ABSTRACT

The paper offers a few reflections on moral implications of making sacrifices and on possible duties to make sacrifices. It does not provide an exhaustive or a systematic account of the subject. There are too many disparate questions, and too many different perspectives from which to examine them to allow for a systematic let alone an exhaustive account, and too many factual issues that I am not aware of. Needless to say, the observations that follow are in part stimulated by the popularity of some views that are mistaken. I will not however examine any specific view or account of these matters. The aim is to provide some pointers that will be helpful when considering specific issues regarding the moral significance of sacrifice.     

Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state

This paper constructs a theory according to which an intention is not a mental state but an action at a certain developmental stage. I model intention on organic life, and thus intention stands to action as (e.g.) tadpole stands to frog. I then argue for this theory by showing how it overcomes three problems: intending while (1) merely preparing, (2) not taking any steps, and (3) the action is impossible. The problems vanish when we see that not all actions are mature. Just as some frogs (such as tadpoles) are immature frogs, some actions (such as intentions) are immature actions.