N.哈特曼的价值柏拉图主义

N.哈特曼的价值柏拉图主义是由价值本质论、关系论、发现论、理想论、原则论等观点构成的一个完整的理论范式。如果说在柏拉图的理念论中概念与理念处于一种杂合不分的混沌状态,休谟、叔本华等不满于此状态而试图对其作出明晰的区分,那么这些观点显示哈特曼既欲明晰鸿沟又要弥合鸿沟的理论创意。立基于价值柏拉图主义和价值绝对主义,又摆向价值自然主义和价值相对主义,显示了哈特曼价值论乃至整个价值柏拉图主义的理论困境及摆脱困境的理论努力。     

ANTIVOLUNTARISM AND THE BIRTH OF AUTONOMY

Traditionalist and radical orthodox critiques of the Enlightenment assert that the modern discourse on moral self‐government constitutes a radical break with the theocentric model of morality which preceded it. Against this view, this paper argues that the conceptions of autonomy emerged from the effort to reconcile commitments within the Christian tradition. Through an analysis of the moral thought of the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, this paper contends that distinctively Christian theological concerns concerning moral accountability to God and the character of divine‐human moral relationships produced a theory of moral autonomy which anticipates that of Kant. This paper highlights the role of anti‐voluntarism in the creation of this moral standpoint, and argues that the resultant moral view is an “internalization” of the voluntarist model of sovereignty.     

The influence of Platonism on mathematics research and theological beliefs

An age-old debate in the philosophy of mathematics is whether mathematics is discovered or invented. There are four popular viewpoints in this debate, namely Platonism, formalism, intuitionism, and logicism. A natural question that arises is whether belief in one of these viewpoints affects the mathematician’s research? In particular, does subscribing to a Platonist or a formalist viewpoint influence how a mathematician conducts research? Does the area of research influence a mathematician’s beliefs on the nature of mathematics? How are the beliefs regarding the nature of mathematics connected to theological beliefs? In order to investigate these questions, five professional research mathematicians were interviewed. The mathematicians worked in diverse areas within analysis, algebra, and within applied mathematics, and had a combined 160 years of research experience. Although none of the mathematicians wanted to be pigeonholed into any one category of beliefs, the study revealed that four of the mathematicians leaned towards Platonism, which runs contrary to the popular notion that Platonism is an exception today. This study revealed that beliefs regarding the nature of mathematics influenced how mathematicians’ conducted research and were deeply connected to their theological beliefs. The findings are presented in the form of vignettes that give an insight into the mathematical and theological belief structures of the mathematicians.     

Rethinking the Ontology of Cartesian Essences

The old and recent debates on Cartesian essences have focused on the question of whether Descartes is a Platonist or a conceptualist about essences. I argue that this is a false dichotomy. An adequate account of Cartesian essences must accommodate and reconcile two central doctrines and texts in Descartes' philosophy. I will argue that recent conceptualist and Platonist interpretations neither accommodate these doctrines nor reconcile these texts. Such failures are not accidental since Descartes' doctrines of divine creation and simplicity render it impossible for Descartes to be either a conceptualist or a Platonist. Failure to notice this fact explains why there has been no progress on this exegetical issue.     

Platonic Knowledge and the Standard Analysis

Abstract

In this paper I explore Plato’s reasons for his rejection of the so‐called standard analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. I argue that Plato held that knowledge is an infallible mental state in which (a) the knowable is present in the knower and (b) the knower is aware of this presence. Accordingly, knowledge (epistēmē) is non‐propositional. Since there are no infallible belief states, the standard analysis, which assumes that knowledge is a type of belief, cannot be correct. In addition, I argue that Plato held that belief (doxa) is only possible for the sort of being capable of knowledge. This is because self‐reflexivity is necessary for infallible knowledge and self‐reflexivity is only possible if the intellect is immaterial. This capacity for self‐reflexivity is also essential for belief, since beliefs are, paradigmatically, not dispositions but self‐reflexive mental states.     

What is it all about? Some reflections on Wouter Hanegraaff's Esotericism and the Academy

In reviewing the growth of the field of study of ‘Western esotericism,’ this article compares the attempts at delineating its intellectual and religious genealogy by von Stuckrad (Locations of Knowledge in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Leiden: Brill, 2010) and Hanegraaff (Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). The essay challenges the thesis that ‘Western esotericism’ was a decisive element in the formation of modern Western identities and some other elements of the reconstruction of the origin of the field delineated by Hanegraaff.     

‘In human shape to become the very beast!’ – Henry More on animals

ABSTRACT

Animals – both tame and wild, as metaphors and as real presences – populate many of More’s works. In this essay, I show that, from the early Psychodia Platonica to the Divine Dialogues, animals are at the core of key metaphysical issues that reverberate on the levels of psychology and ethics. In particular I discuss three main aspects: (1) the role of animals in More’s critique of atheism, both as safeguard for the body–soul interaction and as proofs of divine providence in nature; (2) the problem of evil in the universe, and how to justify the existence of ‘evil’ animals in particular; (3) the differentiation between animals and humans, especially on the basis of their respective possibility of attaining happiness. In all three cases, I argue that More attempts to ‘tame’ the nature of animals, and yet that he is aware that ‘animality’ remains partly untamed.     

Carving,taming or gardening? Plutarch on emotions,reason and virtue

This article attempts to provide an overview and discussion of Plutarch’s views in his Moralia about emotions and their relation to moral virtue and reason. By tracking different clusters of imagery – artisanal, zoological and botanic – that Plutarch uses in his essays to articulate the relationship between emotions and reason, it explores three philosophical perspectives on emotions: emotions of a virtuous person are likened to a well-shaped piece of material; to animals that need to be guided or reined in by their master; and to wholesome plants in a garden. Each of these imageries is used to support a different account of moral virtue: virtue as the emotional disposition to feel moderately; virtue as the obedience of emotions to the commands of reason; and virtue as the absence of bad emotions and flourishing of the good ones. This analysis enables us to weigh the influences of major philosophers on Plutarch’s account, and to elucidate his commitment on both metriopatheia and apatheia.     

How philosophy and theology have undermined bioethics.

This essay begins by distinguishing among the viewpoints of philosophy, theology, and religion; it then explores how each deals with "sin" in the bioethical context. The conclusions are that the philosophical and theological viewpoints are intellectually defective in that they cripple our ability to deal with normative issues, and are in the end unable to integrate Christian concepts like "sin" successfully into bioethics. Sin is predicated only of beings with free will, though only in Western Christianity must all sins be committed with knowledge and voluntarily. Without the notions of free will, sin, and a narrative of redemption, bioethics remains unable to provide itself with an adequate normative framework. Bioethics, and morality in general, remain a morass precisely because there has been a failure to translate Christian morality into fully secular and scientistic terms.     

Models and fictions in science

Non-actual model systems discussed in scientific theories are compared to fictions in literature. This comparison may help with the understanding of similarity relations between models and real-world target systems. The ontological problems surrounding fictions in science may be particularly difficult, however. A comparison is also made to ontological problems that arise in the philosophy of mathematics.