A Behavioral Analysis of Morality and Value

Morality has long been conceived as divinely instituted, so otherworldly, rules meant not to describe or explain behavior but to guide it towards an absolute good. The philosophical formulation of this theory by Plato was later grafted onto Christian thought by Augustine and Aquinas. The equally ancient theory of the Greek sophist Protagoras (that the good is relative to personal preferences and morality to man-made social customs) was forgotten until revived in the 18th and 19th centuries by such empiricists as David Hume and J. S. Mill. Then it was dismissed again in the 20th century by G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross as naturalistic fallacy, that is, conflation of what is with what ought to be. However, those who took this dismissive attitude themselves made the reverse mistake of conflating what ideally ought to be with what actually is. In other words, they mistook ideals for actualities. As B. F. Skinner (1971) said in Beyond Freedom and Dignity, sorting things out requires behaviorist parsing of the good (the personally reinforcing) and duty (the socially reinforced).     

The vicissitudes of affect in Horney's theory

Abstract

Karen Horney, a Neo-Freudian analyst who immigrated from Germany to the USA, undertook the difficult task of developing a theory that remained concrete psychology without resorting to biology or to metapsychological entelechies. Although her basic construct, as in Freud, is a conflict between nature and culture, nature for her is the naturally endowed real self, which the neurotic abandons bowing to cultural pressures. This process of desertion is teleological and based on imagination, and is also creative. It entails the pursuit of a god-like idealized image of the self shaped according to narrow and despoiled values. Being interpersonal, Horney's theory avoids third-person objectification which creates a false distance; it thus remains (inter)subjective. A theory of interpersonal affect, it is dramatic before being dynamic. It also abandons claims to universality as it does to the “objectivity” of the natural sciences. Horney's focus on alienation brings her close to Hegel and Marx, a neglected fact, and she pioneered feminist and self-help theories. The difficulty in reading Horney is not her abstruseness, since her theory refuses technicism. It resides rather in that resistance created by what Althusser called interpellation: one feels her finger pointed at oneself as one reads.     

Tracing the Path from Personality — via Cooperativeness — to Conservation

Ecological behaviour is often conceptualized as an instance of cooperating in a social dilemma situation. Thus, it has been argued to relate to dispositional tendencies of moral virtue and pro‐social orientation. To embed such notions in models of basic personality, we herein predicted that the recently proposed sixth basic personality factor, Honesty–Humility — which specifically pertains to individual differences in cooperativeness — is linked to environmental attitudes and ecological behaviour. Results from two studies (N = 137 and N = 531, respectively) supported these hypotheses and showed that Honesty–Humility explains incremental variance beyond the remaining, more classical five factors of personality. In addition, mediation analyses revealed that Honesty–Humility exerts part of its influence via individual differences in pro‐social value orientations. Individual tendencies to cooperate in social dilemma situations could thus be shown to form a bridge between basic personality dimensions and ecological behaviour. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Value Differentiation Between Enemies and Allies: Value Projection in National Images

The current study aimed to investigate value projection between Palestinians, Israelis, Americans, and Swiss as a function of their group's stance toward the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict. Drawing on image theory, we assumed that images—operationalized by value projection—would be a function not just of features of the target group, but of the rater group's relationship with the target group. Value projection can be seen as an indicator of (de)humanization as values represent goals and desirable behaviors of a person. We therefore expected higher projection to ally than to enemy groups, whereas we expected no difference in projection to out‐groups with neutral relations. Results show that allies did indeed project Security and Power to a higher degree to each other than to enemies, and enemies showed no, or even negative, projection onto each other. The ally of the enemy (Americans) was projected less negatively by Palestinians than vice versa, pointing to the higher complexity of third‐party images as opposed to the more classical ally and enemy images. As expected, Swiss students showed almost no difference in projection to the different out‐groups. These results confirm that the relationship between groups (e.g., alliance, enmity) rather than a consensual view of particular nations determines images.     

Motivational pathways to STEM career choices: Using expectancy–value perspective to understand individual and gender differences in STEM fields

The United States has made a significant effort and investment in STEM education, yet the size and the composition of the STEM workforce continues to fail to meet demand. It is thus important to understand the barriers and factors that influence individual educational and career choices. In this article, we conduct a literature review of the current knowledge surrounding individual and gender differences in STEM educational and career choices, using expectancy–value theory as a guiding framework. The overarching goal of this paper is to provide both a well-defined theoretical framework and complementary empirical evidence for linking specific sociocultural, contextual, biological, and psychological factors to individual and gender differences in STEM interests and choices. Knowledge gained through this review will eventually guide future research and interventions designed to enhance individual motivation and capacity to pursue STEM careers, particularly for females who are interested in STEM but may be constrained by misinformation or stereotypes.     

Counter-Closure

The focus of this paper is the prima facie plausible view, expressed by the principle of Counter-Closure, that knowledge-yielding competent deductive inference must issue from known premises. I construct a case that arguably falsifies this principle and consider five available lines of response that might help retain Counter-Closure. I argue that three are problematic. Of the two remaining lines of response, the first relies on non-universal intuitions and forces one to view the case I construct as exhibiting a justified, true belief to which none of the usual diagnoses of knowledge failure in Gettier cases apply. The second line involves claiming that Fake Barns and its ilk are misdiagnosed by epistemological orthodoxy as Gettier cases. We are thus confronted by a trilemma: either the case I discuss undermines the first-blush plausible principle of Counter-Closure; or the case I discuss instantiates a novel kind of Gettier case; or a popular conception of a key range of alleged Gettier cases must be rejected. No matter which horn we choose, the case points to a philosophically curious conclusion.     

The Feasibility OF Collectives' Actions

Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be incommensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. According to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents are irrational. Experience shows, however, that incomplete preferences are ubiquitous in ordinary life. In this paper, we aim to do two things: (1) show that there is a good case for revising decision theory so as to allow it to apply non-vacuously to agents with incomplete preferences, and (2) to identify one substantive criterion that any such non-standard decision theory must obey. Our criterion, Competitiveness, is a weaker version of a dominance principle. Despite its modesty, Competitiveness is incompatible with prospectism, a recently developed decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences. We spend the final part of the paper showing why Competitiveness should be retained, and prospectism rejected.     

An appreciative response to Niels Henrik Gregersen's JKR research conference lecture

Abstract

Using human embryos in research remains a controversial issue, especially in Christian bioethics. Although the official Catholic stance rejects human embryonic stem cell research, Christian thinkers T. Peters, K. Lebacqz and G. Bennett support it. They endorse the 14-day Rule and argue that ex vivo embryos lack moral worth. I examine and challenge the 14-day Rule and location argument (in vivo/ex vivo). I develop a theory of holistic anthropology and intrinsic moral value for human embryos. I conclude that intrinsic moral value is not equal to full moral value, and therefore use of embryos in biomedical research is morally permissible.     

Brief encounters and available places to land

In this paper the author addresses the process of ending in brief therapy. While recognizing the importance of attending to the symbolic meaning of the ending itself and the need to interpret this as it manifests in the transference, he points out the limitations of such an approach. He highlights the significance of the environment of interpersonal relationships and family systems and the wider communities in which the client lives. He suggests that the therapist needs to assess the extent to which these can provide an environment that facilitates the client's development and working through as the therapy ends. The therapist needs to establish whether the patient will have an available place to land, and one that provides sufficient security and safety for the client's onward journeying and exploration without the therapist. The author's conceptualization of 'landing at the end of brief therapy' links together Malan's triangles of insight with Sullivan's concept of the ordinary solution and selective inattention and Gustafson's concept of dilemmas to add depth to the therapeutic effectiveness with which the practitioner can approach brief therapy in general, and the ending in particular. The article concludes with a case example that illustrates these themes.