A study of the foundations of ethical decision making of clinical medical ethicists

A study of clinical medical ethicists was conducted to determine the various philosophical positions they hold with respect to ethical decision making in medicine and their various positions' relationship to the subjective-objective controversy in value theory. The study consisted of analyzing and interpreting data gathered from questionnaires from 52 clinical medical ethicists at 28 major health care centers in the United States. The study revealed that most clinical medical ethicists tend to be objectivists in value theory, i.e., believe that value judgments are knowledge claims capable of being true or false and therefore expressions of moral requirements and normative imperatives emanating from an external value structure or moral order in the world. In addition, the study revealed that most clinical medical ethicists are consistent in the philosophical foundations of their ethical decision making, i.e., in decision making regarding values they tend not to hold beliefs which are incompatible with other beliefs they hold about values.     

价值观的稳定性与可变性

价值观是人们区分好坏、善恶、美丑、损益、是非的信念系统,通常是充满情感的。价值观具有稳定性与可变性的特点。价值观的稳定性表现为:基本价值观具有跨时间的稳定性和跨情境的一致性; 特别是保护性价值观和人生价值观具有较强的稳定性。个人的发展、经历重大事件以及实验干预可导致价值观的改变,可变性主要表现为价值观的重要性发生变化。从我国的实际出发,探讨个人的核心价值观问题、以及价值观研究中国化、价值观研究对价值观教育的启示,乃是我们今后研究的关注点。     

Value and Obligation Once More

In Understanding Moral Obligation (2012), Robert Stern sets out to provide a fresh interpretation of the role of autonomy in Kant's moral philosophy and attempts to rectify J. B. Schneewind's standard account in The Invention of Autonomy (1998). While Stern agrees that Kant's resort to autonomy is at the basis of a constructivist account of moral obligation, he claims that autonomy plays no role in Kant's theory of value, such that, in this respect, Kant remains a realist. Accordingly, Stern characterizes Kant's moral philosophy as a “hybrid” view because he sees it as involving a compromise between realism with regard to value and constructivism with regard to obligation. Stern's interpretation relies on a sharp distinction between value and obligation. The purpose of the present article is to question Stern's reliance on that rigid distinction, which involves intermixing theoretical and practical reason and assumes a distorted view of human agency.     

Sticking to common values: Neighbourhood social cohesion moderates the effect of value congruence on life satisfaction

This article aims to explicate the role of social cohesion in the relationship between adherence to common values and life satisfaction. Shared values are often assumed to be a constitutive element of social cohesion and are used in measurement of the concept. However, sociopsychological theory of values sees social cohesion rather as a moderator of the link between value congruence and life satisfaction, not as a constituent of value congruence. Based on a representative survey of the city of Bremen, Germany (N = 2605), we predict life satisfaction from person‐group value congruence and neighbourhood social cohesion. We find no relationship between value congruence and social cohesion, but a significant positive moderating effect of social cohesion on the relationship between value congruence and life satisfaction. The findings suggest that sticking to common values does not increase social cohesion, but that positive effects of value congruence are more pronounced in high‐cohesion neighbourhoods.     

跨期选择中的年龄差异及其机制

随着老龄化形势日益严峻, 老年人的跨期选择受到越来越多学者的关注。目前关于跨期选择的年老化研究尚存分歧:有研究发现老年人比年轻人更偏好未来获得更大收益; 也有研究发现老年人的选择偏好和年轻人一样, 甚至比年轻人更偏好近期收益。从时间表征和结果价值表征两个维度上的加工过程去分析其对老年人跨期选择的影响, 并进一步阐述认知、动机和情绪因素对两个维度加工过程的影响, 这对于理解当前老年人跨期选择领域研究的分歧有重要科学意义。     

主观社会阶层对亲环境行为的影响: 物质主义价值观的中介作用

研究旨在通过两个实验分别探讨主观社会阶层对亲环境行为的影响及作用路径.结果发现:(1)主观社会阶层对亲环境行为具有显著正向影响,即主观社会阶层感知高的个体更愿意保护环境并为环境活动贡献金钱.(2)物质主义价值观在社会阶层影响亲环境行为中起完全中介作用,即高社会阶层的个体物质主义程度较低并更加亲环境,而低社会阶层的个体则...     

Conceiving of entities as objects and as stuff

What is the difference between conceiving of an entity as an object of some kind and conceiving of it as an amount of solid stuff? We propose that the difference lies in how one thinks about the entity's structure. Object construals require thinking of the structure as being nonarbitrary, whereas substance construals require thinking of the structure as being arbitrary. We report six experiments that provide empirical support for this proposal. Regularity of structure, repetition of structure, and the existence of structure-dependent functions, all of which provide reasons to consider the structure of an entity to be nonarbitrary, were shown to bias participants towards object construals. We also discuss how the proposed account of what it means to construe an entity as an object or as some stuff can account for a range of findings in the literature on lexical development. These include the relation between cohesiveness and ontological category, shape and ontological category, and complexity of shape and ontological category. Finally, we discuss the nature of construals and the relation of object and substance construals to the physical, design, and intentional stances.     

On the Consistency of the Δ1 1-CA Fragment of Frege's Grundgesetze

It is well known that Frege's system in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. Frege's instantiation rule for the second-order universal quantifier makes his system, except for minor differences, full (i.e., with unrestricted comprehension) second-order logic, augmented by an abstraction operator that abides to Frege's basic law V. A few years ago, Richard Heck proved the consistency of the fragment of Frege's theory obtained by restricting the comprehension schema to predicative formulae. He further conjectured that the more encompassing ¹ ₁-comprehension schema would already be inconsistent. In the present paper, we show that this is not the case.