Is the victim Max (Planck) or Moritz? How victim type and social value orientation affect dishonest behavior

Does the potential victim of dishonest behavior—a family or a bank, a pensioner or an insurance firm—affect the propensity to engage in such behavior? We investigate the effect of victim type—an individual person or an impersonal institution—on dishonest behavior and test whether it interacts with potential perpetrators' social value orientation (prosocial or proself). In a between‐subjects design, we allowed experimental participants (N = 368) to misreport private information in order to increase (decrease) their profit (loss) at the expense of either another participant or the experimenter's budget. Both prosocials and proselfs engaged in dishonesty, but proselfs did so much more. Furthermore, prosocials reduced their dishonesty when the victim was another person, rather than an institution, but proselfs did not. A direct implication is that the dishonesty of prosocials may be curbed by increasing the salience of the adverse effect their dishonesty has on other individual people but that such interventions will not be effective for proselfs. In contrast with recent results, we did not find a general effect of increased dishonesty under a loss (vs. gain) frame.     

Self‐concept clarity and relationship satisfaction at the dyadic level

Self‐concept clarity is an individual resource that is associated with couple relationship well‐being. In two dyadic studies, the authors investigated whether and how self‐concept clarity has implications for both partners' relationship satisfaction. Study 1 tested and supported the hypothesis that self‐concept clarity concurrently predicts own and partner's relationship satisfaction through couple identity in a sample of 202 dating couples. Study 2 tested and supported the hypothesis that self‐concept clarity predicts longitudinal change in own and partner's relationship satisfaction through positive (i.e., supportive and common) dyadic coping behaviors in a sample of 97 married couples. The findings clarify and expand the benefits of self‐concept clarity for partners' relational well‐being.     

A mechanism for biasing the appraisal process in affective agents

In this paper we present a mechanism to model the influence of agents’ internal and external factors on the emotional evaluation of stimuli in computational models of emotions. We propose the modification of configurable appraisal dimensions (such as desirability and pleasure) based on influencing factors. As part of the presented mechanism, we introduce influencing models to define the relationship between a given influencing factor and a given set of configurable appraisal dimensions utilized in the emotional evaluation phase. Influencing models translate factors’ influences (on the emotional evaluation) into fuzzy logic adjustments (e.g., a shift in the limits of fuzzy membership functions), which allow biasing the emotional evaluation of stimuli. We implemented a proof-of-concept computational model of emotions based on real-world data about individuals’ emotions. The obtained empirical evidence indicates that the proposed mechanism can properly affect the emotional evaluation of stimuli while preserving the overall behavior of the model of emotions.     

The relationship between attitudes toward suicide and willingness to pay for suicide prevention: a cross-sectional study in Japan

There are gaps in our knowledge of the role attitudes toward suicide play in determining people’s willingness to participate (WTP) for suicide prevention. We conducted a large nationwide cross-sectional study with the aim of clarifying the relationship between WTP for reducing suicide risk and attitudes toward suicide. Ordinal logistic regression analyses (n = 1771) showed that there were significant associations of WTP for suicide prevention with ‘Suicide as a right’ (β = ?.15, 95% CI: ?.25 to ?.04, p = .006), ‘Preventability/readiness to help’ (β = .81, 95% CI: .69–.94, p < .001) and ‘Common occurrence’ (β = .32, 95% CI: .19–.46, p < .001). ‘Incomprehensibility/unpredictability’ did not show an association with WTP. Taxpayer acceptance for suicide prevention is more likely to be achieved through provision of information that increases endorsement of ‘preventability/readiness to help’ and ‘common occurrence’ factors, and decreases ‘suicide as a right’ scores.     

The Relatively Infinite Value of the Environment

Some environmental ethicists and economists argue that attributing infinite value to the environment is a good way to represent an absolute obligation to protect it. Others argue against modelling the value of the environment in this way: the assignment of infinite value leads to immense technical and philosophical difficulties that undermine the environmentalist project. First, there is a problem of discrimination: saving a large region of habitat is better than saving a small region; yet if both outcomes have infinite value, then decision theory prescribes indifference. Second, there is a problem of swamping probabilities: an act with a small but positive probability of saving an endangered species appears to be on par with an act that has a high probability of achieving this outcome, since both have infinite expected value. Our paper shows that a relative (rather than absolute) concept of infinite value can be meaningfully defined, and provides a good model for securing the priority of the natural environment while avoiding the failures noted by sceptics about infinite value. Our claim is not that the relative infinity utility model gets every detail correct, but rather that it provides a rigorous philosophical framework for thinking about decisions affecting the environment.     

The Square Circle

This article shows that there are square circles (or equivalently, round squares) in the sense that there are mathematical objects that are at the same time both perfectly circular and perfectly square. The philosophical significance of this is discussed, especially in view of philosophy's widespread use of “square circle” as a typical example of an impossibility. In particular, the focus is on what the existence of square circles means for the possibility of conceptual analysis, and more generally what we can learn about the nature of non‐formal concepts and their use in philosophy.     

Philosophy Makes No Progress,So What Is the Point of It?

Philosophy makes no progress. It fails to do so in the way science and mathematics make progress. By “no progress” is meant that there is no successive advance of a well‐established body of knowledge—no views are definitively established or definitively refuted. Yet philosophers often talk and act as if the subject makes progress, and that its point and value lies in its doing so, while in fact they also approach the subject in ways that clearly contradict any claim to progress. This article presents evidence for, and a theoretical explanation of, the view that philosophy makes no progress, concluding with an account of what philosophy is and what the point and value of it is. Philosophy should not be shy about being what it is, nor should it pretend to be what it is not. What it is should be reflected in philosophizing and the way it is taught.     

Reinforcement value and fixed‐interval performance

The concept of reinforcement value summarizes the effect of different variables, such as reinforcement delay, reinforcement magnitude, and deprivation level, on behavior. In the present set of experiments, we evaluated the effect of reinforcement devaluation on performance under FI schedules. The literature on timing and reinforcement value suggests that devaluation generates longer expected times to reinforcement than the same intervals trained under control conditions. We devalued reinforcement with delay in Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2, and diminished deprivation in Experiments 3A and 3B. Devaluation reduced response rates, increased the number of one‐response intervals, and lengthened postreinforcement pauses, but had inconsistent effects on other timing measures such as quarter life and breakpoint. The results of delayed reinforcement and diminished deprivation manipulations are well summarized as reinforcement devaluation effects. These results suggest that devaluation may reduce stimulus control. In addition, we argue that the process by which delayed reinforcement affects behavior might also explain some effects observed in other devaluation procedures through the concept of reinforcement value.     

Psychological ethical climate,leader–member exchange and commitment to superior customer value: influencing salespeople’s unethical intent and sales performance

In today’s competitive environment, salespeople are challenged with creating customer value in an ethical manner while meeting performance goals. Sales supervisors play a critical role in ensuring that this challenge is met. This research examines the roles of psychological ethical climate and leader–member exchange (LMX) in encouraging salespeople’s commitment to providing superior customer value, reducing their unethical intentions and improving sales performance. Results indicate that business-to-business salespeople’s psychological ethical climate perceptions influence their perceived relationship with their sales supervisor (i.e. LMX relationship) as well as their commitment to providing superior customer value. LMX also directly influences commitment to providing superior customer value, which in turn affects salespeople’s unethical intent and quota performance. Theoretical and managerial implications based on the study’s findings are provided, as well as directions for future research.     

Evaluating Effort: Influences of Evaluation Mode on Judgments of Task‐specific Efforts

The claim that humans adapt their actions in ways that avoid effortful processing (whether cognitive or physical) is a staple of various theories of human behavior. Although much work has been carried out focusing on the determinants of such behaviors, less attention has been given to how individuals evaluate effort. In the current set of experiments, we utilized the general evaluability theory to examine the evaluability of effort by examining subjective value functions across different evaluation modes. Individuals judged the anticipated effort of four task‐specific efforts indexed by stimulus rotation, items to be remembered, weight to be lifted, and stimulus degradation across joint (i.e., judged comparatively) and single evaluation modes (i.e., judged in isolation). General evaluability theory hypothesizes that highly evaluable attributes should be consistently evaluated (i.e., demonstrate similar subjective value functions) between the two modes. Across six experiments, we demonstrate that the perceived effort associated with items to be remembered, weight to be lifted, and stimulus degradation can be considered relatively evaluable, while the effort associated with stimulus rotation may be relatively inevaluable. Results are discussed within the context of subjective evaluation, internal reference information, and strategy selection. In addition, methodological implications of evaluation modes are considered. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.