Real Objects Can Impede Conditional Reasoning but Augmented Objects Do Not

In this study, Knauff and Johnson‐Laird's (2002) visual impedance hypothesis (i.e., mental representations with irrelevant visual detail can impede reasoning) is applied to the domain of external representations and diagrammatic reasoning. We show that the use of real objects and augmented real (AR) objects can control human interpretation and reasoning about conditionals. As participants made inferences (e.g., an invalid one from "if P then Q" to "P"), they also moved objects corresponding to premises. Participants who moved real objects made more invalid inferences than those who moved AR objects and those who did not manipulate objects (there was no significant difference between the last two groups). Our results showed that real objects impeded conditional reasoning, but AR objects did not. These findings are explained by the fact that real objects may over‐specify a single state that exists, while AR objects suggest multiple possibilities.     

Representing ethical reality: a guide for worldly non-naturalists

Abstract

Ethical realists hold (i) that our ethical concepts, thoughts, and claims are in the business of representing ethical reality, by representing evaluative or normative properties and facts as aspects of reality, and (ii) that such representations are at least sometimes accurate. Non-naturalist realists add the further claim that ethical properties and facts are ultimately non-natural, though they are nonetheless worldly. My aim is threefold: to elucidate the sort of representation involved in ethical evaluation on realist views; to clarify what exactly is represented and how non-naturalism comes into the picture for non-naturalists; and to defend worldly non-naturalism against some objections. The first question addressed is how we should model evaluation on any realist view, which should in turn guide the identification of which properties and facts are credibly regarded as ‘evaluative’ ones. Then the question is: what role might non-natural properties and facts play, and how are they related to what is represented in ethical evaluation? Once that is clear, we will be in a position to answer certain objections to non-naturalist realism from Jackson, Gibbard, Bedke, and Dreier. I argue that the objections all mischaracterize the role played by non-natural properties and facts on plausible versions of non-naturalist realism.     

Investigating Individual Differences in Toddler Search with Mixture Models

Children's performance on cognitive tasks is often described in categorical terms in that a child is described as either passing or failing a test, or knowing or not knowing some concept. We used binomial mixture models to determine whether individual children could be classified as passing or failing two search tasks, the DeLoache model room task and the Berthier et al. door task. The data support categorical classification of the children and suggest that the increase in average proportion correct with age is the result of an increasing proportion of children who can solve the tasks. Performance on the two tasks was concordant, and improving performance could be due to advances in a single psychological ability, such as cognitive control. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotional,Sensitive, and Unfit for Office? Gender Stereotype Activation and Support Female Candidates

Women are underrepresented at all levels of elected office. It is suspected that gender stereotypes hinder the electoral success of female candidates, but empirical evidence is inconclusive on whether stereotypes have a direct effect on voting decisions. This empirical conflict stems, in part, from the assumption that voters automatically rely on gender stereotypes when evaluating female candidates. This study explicitly tests the assumption of automatic stereotype activation. I suggest that stereotype reliance depends on whether stereotypes have been activated during a campaign, and it is only when stereotypes are activated that they influence evaluations of female candidates. These hypotheses are tested with a survey experiment and observational analysis. The results show that campaign communication activates stereotypes when they otherwise might not be activated, thereby diminishing support for female candidates.     

Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links ((Experiments 1–3). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5).     

熟悉性和兼容性对复合社会范畴刻板印象表征的影响

通过对启动任务范式的改进,运用3个实验全面考察了复合社会范畴本身的熟悉性和兼容性对复合社会范畴刻板印象中抽象表征和样例表征策略运用的影响。实验1分别以熟悉的、不熟悉且在刻板印象上不兼容的复合范畴为研究对象,研究发现对熟悉的复合范畴采用抽象表征,而对不熟悉且在刻板印象上不兼容的复合范畴的表征采用样例表征;实验2以熟悉且在刻板印象上不兼容的复合范畴为研究对象,研究发现对于熟悉但构成范畴不兼容的复合范畴的表征也采用样例表征;实验3采用相同的实验范式,在描述和定义两种启动任务中设置子范畴间兼容的刻板特质词和不兼容的刻板特质词,选择与实验2相同的复合范畴"男中学教师"为目标群体,更加严密地证实和整合了实验1与实验2的研究结论。3个实验的结果说明复合范畴刻板印象的表征关键取决于兼容性,一旦复合社会范畴的构成范畴在刻板印象上不兼容,那么对于这一复合社会范畴刻板印象的表征采用样例表征。当构成复合范畴的两个子范畴之间兼容时,熟悉性成为刻板印象运用抽象表征还是样例表征的影响因素,无论是对内群体的刻板印象还是外群体的刻板印象,对熟悉的刻板特质词的表征运用抽象表征。     

Mental representations of magnitude and order: A dissociation by sensorimotor learning

Numbers and spatially directed actions share cognitive representations. This assertion is derived from studies that have demonstrated that the processing of small- and large-magnitude numbers facilitates motor behaviors that are directed to the left and right, respectively. However, little is known about the role of sensorimotor learning for such number–action associations. In this study, we show that sensorimotor learning in a serial reaction-time task can modify the associations between number magnitudes and spatially directed movements. Experiments 1 and 3 revealed that this effect is present only for the learned sequence and does not transfer to a novel unpracticed sequence. Experiments 2 and 4 showed that the modification of stimulus–action associations by sensorimotor learning does not occur for other sets of ordered stimuli such as letters of the alphabet. These results strongly suggest that numbers and actions share a common magnitude representation that differs from the common order representation shared by letters and spatially directed actions. Only the magnitude representation, but not the order representation, can be modified episodically by sensorimotor learning.     

Do chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) understand single invisible displacement?

Previous research suggests that chimpanzees understand single invisible displacement. However, this Piagetian task may be solvable through the use of simple search strategies rather than through mentally representing the past trajectory of an object. Four control conditions were thus administered to two chimpanzees in order to separate associative search strategies from performance based on mental representation. Strategies involving experimenter cue-use, search at the last or first box visited by the displacement device, and search at boxes adjacent to the displacement device were systematically controlled for. Chimpanzees showed no indications of utilizing these simple strategies, suggesting that their capacity to mentally represent single invisible displacements is comparable to that of 18-24-month-old children.     

Differential developmental trajectories for egocentric, environmental and intrinsic frames of reference in spatial memory

We studied the development of spatial frames of reference in children aged 3-6 years, who retrieved hidden toys from an array of identical containers bordered by landmarks under four conditions. By moving the child and/or the array between presentation and test, we varied the consistency of the hidden toy with (i) the body, and (ii) the testing room. The toy's position always remained consistent with (iii) the array and bordering landmarks. We found separate, additive performance advantages for consistency with body and room. These effects were already present at 3 years. A striking finding was that the room effect, which implies allocentric representations of the room and/or egocentric representations updated by self-motion, was much stronger in the youngest children than the body effect, which implies purely egocentric representations. Children as young as 3 years therefore had, and greatly favoured, spatial representations that were not purely egocentric. Viewpoint-independent recall based only on the array and bordering landmarks emerged at 5 years. There was no evidence that this later-developing ability, which implies object-referenced (intrinsic) representations, depended on verbal encodings. These findings indicate that core components of adult spatial competence, including parallel egocentric and nonegocentric representations of space, are present as early as 3 years. These are supplemented by later-developing object-referenced representations.     

Principled and statistical connections in common sense conception

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. We report six experiments that investigate the nature of the relations we represent between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and its other properties. The experiments provide evidence that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and some of its properties (k-properties; e.g. having four legs for dogs), but not other properties (t-properties; e.g. being brown for dogs). Principled connections are different from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections, (i) license the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess the k-property, (ii) license explanation of the presence of k-properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is, and (iii) license normative expectations concerning the presence of the k-property in tokens of the type. The experiments provide evidence for all three of these aspects of principled connections. The experiments also demonstrate that principled connections must be distinguished from merely strong statistical connections. We suggest that principled connections are one of the fundamental types of relations (in addition to logical, statistical, and causal relations) in terms of which our conceptual knowledge is structured. We argue that principled connections reveal a formal mode of understanding and explanation. This mode of understanding complements other modes of understanding that have been studied within the theory-based approach to conceptual representation. Finally, we suggest that kind representations are distinguished from representations of mere types by the representation of principled connections to k-properties.