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481.
482.
Both the Mohist canon and the works of Aristotle recognize that people sometimes fail to act according to virtues, roles and duties, what in a Western context is called akrasia or “weakness of will,” an important topic in both Greek and contemporary philosophy. I argue that questions of akrasia are treated different in the early Chinese and ancient Greek philosophy. Greek accounts focus on issues of will and control, while some Chinese thinkers treat akrasia as a lack of a skill, and the failure to act in the right way is less lack of will than lack of skill. I begin with a brief account of the problem of akrasia as first presented by Plato in the “Protagoras” and Republic, and developed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. I then turn to akrasia in an early Chinese context, focusing on a very different Mohist view of akrasia as lack of a skill. Finally, I contrast the “skill” the Mohists find lacking with a very different account of skill in the Zhuangzi. 相似文献
483.
Markos Valaris 《Ratio》2020,33(2):97-105
Almost everything that we do, we do by doing other things. Even actions we perform without deliberation or conscious planning are composed of ‘smaller’, subsidiary actions. But how should we think of such subsidiary actions? Are they fully-fledged intentional actions (in the sense of things that we do for reasons) in their own right? In this paper I defend an affirmative answer to this question, against a recently influential form of scepticism. Drawing on a distinctive kind of ‘action-demonstrative’ representation, I show that the sceptic's arguments do not go through. 相似文献
484.
485.
486.
Aqsa Ejaz Liam P. Maher Delphine Lacaze Samina Quratulain Gerald R. Ferris 《Psychologie appliquee》2023,72(1):317-347
This two-study research package investigates the interactive effects of perceptions of organizational politics, political skill, and political will on psychological need satisfaction, which has been shown to predict a number of different important organizational outcomes. Drawing primarily on social/political influence and self-determination theories, we propose that although perceptions of organizational politics (i.e., as an important situational or contextual variable) can demonstrate need-thwarting effects for some, its effects can be need-satisfying for those individuals with high levels of political skill and political will. In Study 1, we analyze a sample of 142 individuals to demonstrate that possessing political skill attenuates the negative effects of perceptions of organizational politics on psychological need satisfaction. In Study 2, we analyze a sample of 420 individuals to demonstrate that respondents with high levels of both political skill and political will experience their highest levels of need satisfaction in highly political environments. Theoretical contributions, limitations and future research directions, and practical implications are discussed. 相似文献
487.
AbstractTheories on motor skill acquisition predict that earlier learning stages require more attention, which should lead to higher cognitive-motor dual-task interference in novices as compared to experts. Expert and novice table tennis players returned balls from a ball machine while concurrently performing an auditory 3-back task (working memory). The groups did not differ in 3-back performance in the single task. Cognitive dual-task performance reductions were more pronounced in novices. A similar pattern emerged for the number of missed balls in table tennis, except that experts outperformed novices already in the single task. Experts consistently showed costs of about 10%, while novices showed costs between 30% and 50%. The findings indicate that performances of novices suffer considerably in motor-cognitive dual-task situations. 相似文献
488.
John W. Krakauer 《Philosophical Psychology》2019,32(5):822-830
ABSTRACTThe seeming distinction between motor and cognitive skills has hinged on the fact that the former are automatic and non-propositional (knowing-how), whereas the latter are slow and deliberative (knowing-that). Here, the physiological and behavioral phenomenon of long-latency stretch reflexes is used to show that “knowing-that” can be incorporated into “knowing-how,” either immediately or through learning. The experimental demonstration that slow computations can, with practice, be cached for fast retrieval, without the need for re-computation, dissolves the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist distinction: All complex human tasks, at any level of expertise, are a combination of intelligent reflexes and deliberative decisions. 相似文献
489.
Alison Springle 《Philosophical Psychology》2019,32(5):634-660
ABSTRACTThe acquisition of a skill, or knowledge-how, on the one hand, and the acquisition of a piece of propositional knowledge on the other, appear to be different sorts of epistemic achievements. Does this difference lie in the nature of the knowledge involved, marking a joint between knowledge-how and propositional knowledge? Intellectualists say no: All knowledge is propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists say yes: Knowledge-how and propositional knowledge are different in kind. What resources or methods may we legitimately and fruitfully employ to adjudicate this debate? What is (or are) the right way(s) to show the nature of the knowledge knowers know? Here too there is disagreement. I defend the legitimacy of the anti-intellectualist appeal to cognitive neuroscientific findings against a recent claim that anti-intellectualists conflate the scientific categories of procedural and declarative knowledge with the mental kinds of skill (knowledge-how) and propositional knowledge, respectively. I identify two kinds of arguments for this claim and argue that neither succeeds. 相似文献
490.
Paul J. D’Ambrosio 《The Journal of religious ethics》2020,48(3):474-497
Stories in the Zhuangzi detailing expert artisans and other extraordinary people are often read as celebrations of “skills” or “knacks.” In this paper, I will argue that they would be more accurately understood as “coping” stories. Taken as a celebration of one’s “skill” or “knack” they transform the Zhuangzi into an implicit advocate of conforming to, or even identifying with, one’s social roles. I will argue that the stories of artisans and extraordinarily skilled people are less about cultivating one’s talents so as to “find one’s calling,” better fulfill social expectations, or achieve oneness with Dao, than they are concerned with developing strategies for coping with natural and social contingencies. Read in this way, there is much to learn from the Zhuangzi when reflecting on contemporary social and political issues, especially those related to meritocratic hubris. 相似文献