IF MEN COULD GET PREGNANT: BETH SINGER AND CAROL GILLIGAN ON ABORTION

Abstract: I argue here that Beth Singer's analysis of rights as operative social norms allows us to make sense of the personal and political complexities of the abortion debate. In particular, I argue that it is only by means of Singer's analysis that we, as feminists, can reconcile our conviction that Carol Gilligan's celebration of empathy and partiality gestures toward something definitive of our moral experience with the need to avail ourselves of the politically efficacious language of rights.     

WHOSE RIGHTS,AND WHAT's THE DIFFERENCE? A CRITIQUE OF BETH SINGER'S “HUMAN RIGHTS: SOME CURRENT ISSUES”

Abstract: In this article I argue against the rights‐based framework defining the abortion debate, and do so by considering the views of Beth Singer, a philosopher whose work conveys a broadly pragmatist formulation of traditional rights‐based language. Although Singer's schema presents a fruitful vantage point from which to consider the abortion question through the discourse of rights, even Singer's use of the language of rights ultimately fails adequately to address the subject. I challenge Singer's view by taking up John Dewey's concept of reflective morality, elucidated in his 1932 Ethics.     

THE THIRD WAY OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES: BEYOND SUI GENERIS RELIGIOUS STUDIES AND THE POSTMODERNISTS

This essay advocates dual-inheritance theory for the renewal of Religious Studies. Not by Genes Alone , by Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd (2005), presents this approach in an admirably clear manner. To make my case, I survey the development of Religious Studies since the Enlightenment, with special attention to the American context. The historical survey brings us to the dawn of the twenty-first century, where Religious Studies is often unnecessarily limited to sui generis Religious Studies and its postmodern critics. Neither approach engages regnant Darwinian theoretical frameworks of gene-culture coevolution productively. In this context, I situate the contributions of dual-inheritance theory as presented by Richerson and Boyd and offer examples of its utility for progress in Religious Studies, its ability to open cooperation across disciplinary boundaries, and its salutary demystification of religion as a culturally unique and coherent phenomenon. I conclude by addressing concerns scholars of religion might entertain regarding the issue of reductionism and how an emergent science of religion might contribute to the traditional concerns of religion-and-science dialogue as it has evolved in the English-speaking context.     

‘Fides mater virtutum est’

Abstract

Peter Martyr Vermigli’s elevation of faith over charity displays similarities and differences with Thomas Aquinas and other medieval authors. For Thomas, faith does not perceive its object and thus denotes an uncertain assent to imperfectly revealed truths. Aquinas posits a reordering of will and intellect in order to explain how faith is more certain than ‘scientia.’ Vermigli on the other hand attempts to maintain the natural order between intellect and will in virtuous action (that is, natural law) even for the theological virtues. He likens faith to vision and practical wisdom arguing that God illuminates the mind to make the object of faith apprehensible to the judgment of reason. This perspective presents a more optimistic account of temporal, intellectual perfection via grace.     

Peter Martyr Vermigli on grace and free choice

Abstract

Within contemporary scholarship there has been considerable debate over the character and scope of Peter Martyr Vermigli’s scholasticism, which has sought to locate his thought between the two poles of the ‘via Thomae’ and the ‘via Gregorii.’ This paper traces the Augustinian-Thomist polarity throughout Vermigli’s doctrine of grace and free choice. In particular it seeks to discover Gregorian distinctives in his thought, namely, doctrinal points shared by Vermigli and Rimini, representing a development of Augustine and a departure from Aquinas. Without denying the important Thomist and Aristotelian elements of his thought, this paper concludes that renewed attention now needs to be paid to his profound debt to late-medieval Augustinian scholasticism and its global impact on his theology.     

Justice Between Generations: Investigating a Sufficientarian Approach

A key concern of global ethics is the equitable distribution of benefits and burdens amongst persons belonging to different populations. Until recently, the philosophical literature on global distribution was dominated by the question of how benefits and burdens should be divided amongst contemporaries. Recent years, however, have seen an increase in research on the scope and content of our duties to future generations. This has led to a number of innovative attempts to extend principles of distribution across time while retaining a focus on the entitlements of the existing poor. In this article, I examine a key aspect of intergenerational justice, namely, the appropriate ‘pattern’ of well-being that should be obtained across generations. With the aid of research into the impacts of global climate change, I evaluate a number of rival accounts of the pattern of justice and go on to explore the merits of a ‘global sufficientarian’ ethic, which holds that as many persons as possible should enjoy a satisfactory level of well-being regardless of when or where they live.     

Teaching Elder: Erik H. Erickson

A renowned child psychoanalyst, Erik H. Erikson (1902–1994) is perhaps best known for his work on developmental theory (Childhood and Society, 1950) and his studies of the lives of Martin Luther (Young Man Luther, 1958) and Gandhi (Gandhi's Truth, 1969). Twice he found himself intensely engaged in the role of teacher – once as a young artist who had been called by a friend to help in the progressive school formed for the children of Sigmund and Anna Freud's patients in Vienna (1927–1932), and years later (1960–1970) as a tenured professor at Harvard. This essay describes Erickson's teaching experience in both settings and suggests some of the reasons he was honored by Harvard in 1980 as a “humane teacher.” Implications from Erikson's educational practice are drawn that demonstrate how Erikson moved beyond the rote memorization and authoritarian educational practice he experienced as a youth. The essay suggests Erikson's teaching stance at Harvard fits the author's theological tradition's use of the term “teaching elder.”     

‘Do to Me According to What Has Gone Out of Your Mouth’*: A Reformation Debate on the Tragedy of Jephthah and his Daughter

A challenging biblical passage is the narrative of Jephthah and his daughter in the Book of Judges. The consensus of the exegetical tradition is that in fulfillment of a rash vow, Jephthah sacrificed his daughter as a burnt offering. Yet some early Reformation exegetes argued instead that she entered into a life of dedication to the Lord. They argued on the basis of the grammar of Jephthah’s vow, a point which they found in one strand of rabbinical tradition. However, there developed a counter-argument reaffirming the patristic and medieval consensus, and that appealed to an alternative rabbinical tradition. The present essay will examine the competing arguments found in Protestant commentaries published between c.1530 and c.1650. In the end, the patristic and medieval consensus prevailed, and the alternative reading was rejected; but both sides agreed that the one noble character in this tale was the nameless daughter of Jephthah.     

Changing One’s Mind on Moral Matters

Contemporary moral philosophy assumes an account of what it means to legitimately change one’s mind in ethics, and I wish to challenge this account by enlarging the category of the legitimate. I am just as eager to avoid illegitimate mind-changing brought on by deceit or brainwashing, but I claim that legitimacy should be defined in terms of transparency of method. A social reformer should not be embarrassed to admit that he acquired many beliefs about justice while reading Dickens. As such, appeals to the heart and the imagination are just as legitimate, within limits, as appeals to the mind; and showing can be as legitimate as telling. To demonstrate this, I consider the example of a vegetarian trying to ‘convert’ a carnivore. I then ask what it means when the carnivore claims to have been previously mistaken.