Selling Yourself: Titmuss's Argument Against a Market in Blood

This article defends Richard Titmuss's argument, and PeterSinger's sympathetic support for it, against orthodoxphilosophical criticism. The article specifies thesense in which a market in blood is ``dehumanising' ashaving to do with a loss of ``imagined community' orsocial ``integration', and not with a loss of valued or``deeper' liberty. It separates two ``domino arguments'– the ``contamination of meaning' argument and the``erosion of motivation' argument which support, indifferent but interrelated ways, the claim that amarket in blood is ``imperialistic.' Concentrating onthe first domino argument the article considers theview that monetary and non-monetary meanings of thesame good can co-exist given the robustness of certainkinds of relationship and joint undertakings withinwhich gifts can figure. It argues that societalrelationships are vulnerable or permeable to theeffects of the market in a way that those constitutiveof the personal sphere are not.General, more broadly political questions remainunanswered but the core of Titmuss's original andchallenging argument remains and can be presented ina defensible form.     

Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Sanity and Weakness of Will

This essay evaluates John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza'smature semi-compatibilist account of moral responsibility, focusingon their new theory of moderate reasons-responsiveness as a model of``moral sanity.' This theory, presented in Responsibility andControl, solves many of the problems with Fischer's earlier weakreasons-responsiveness model, such as its unwanted implication thatagents who are only erratically responsive to bizarre reasons can beresponsible for their acts. But I argue that the new model still facesseveral problems. It does not allow sufficiently for non-psychoticagents (who are largely reasons-responsive) with localized beliefsand desires incompatible with full responsibility. Nor does it take intoaccount that practical ``fragmentation of the self' over time may alsoreduce competence, since moral sanity requires some minimum level ofnarrative unity in our plans and projects. Finally, I argue that actual-sequenceaccounts cannot adequately explain sane but weak-willed agency. This isbecause without libertarian freedom, such accounts have no way to modelthe perverse agent's determination to be irrational or weak.     

Wendy's Story: analytic perspectives on J. M. Barrie's Peter and Wendy

This essay is a study of Peter and Wendy, J. M. Barrie's 1911 novel based on his 1904 play Peter Pan. Utilizing Jungian and Kleinian theory, the tale is treated as an expression of Wendy's psyche in transformation, tracking her passage into puberty and the transition from omnipotent narcissism towards depressive concern which accompanied her differentiation from idealized identification with her mother. The resultant changes in Wendy's parental imagos are given particular emphasis, especially the moves towards the integration of her split paternal imago, symbolized by Peter Pan and Captain Hook. This enables Wendy's fuller engagement with the Oedipus situation, resulting in her assimilation of unconscious aspects of the instinctual feminine. In turn, she opens to a conception of parental intercourse which is more reality orientated and allows an internal sense of coupledom vital for her own capacity to form adult relationships.     

On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness

According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he regards as arbitrariness, this does not yet mean that he confronts it with a sound objection.     

Citizen Vermigli

Abstract

Peter Martyr Vermigli’s flight from Italy in 1542 left him divested of his Catholic religious heritage, but the same is not to be asserted for his Florentine republicanism. Vermigli has been viewed either as a republican (Bravi) or inclined to monarchism (Kingdon and Kirby) consonant with his time in England. This essay treats Vermigli’s presuppositions on what the human animal is, and what polity best suits such a creature. This essay engages Vermigli the Humanist in light of his Christian anthropology, and in particular his thinking about the ultimate end for humans created in the image and likeness of God, as well as what this likeness tell us about the human ability to reach its telos faced with the reality of the Fall.     

Peter Martyr Vermigli,history, and the Anabaptist menace

Abstract

This article demonstrates Peter Martyr Vermigli’s use of historical perspective in his exegesis in his opposition to Anabaptists, taking as a test case the subject of prophecy. By contrasting the material on prophecy found in Vermigli’s Loci communeswith his handling of a number of key Pauline passages, the essay also seeks to make a point about our understanding of the man and his genius, namely, that one fails to obtain a full sense of the latter if one restricts oneself to the Loci communes. For while Vermigli’s loci on prophecy contain mostly standard medieval fare, his expositions of Paul exhibit originality and ingenuity.     

Church discipline and excommunication

Abstract

A perspective of the Reformed conception of church discipline in the sixteenth century has highlighted two models: the disciplinarian one associated with Geneva and the magistratical one identified with Zurich. This essay argues that a simple binary distinction between the Geneva and Zurich models of church discipline is inadequate to account for the complexity and diversity of sixteenth-century Reformed theological positions, particularly as represented in the articulations of the influential reformer, Peter Martyr Vermigli.     

The Church in an age of human rights

Abstract

This article reviews the complex origins of modern human rights discourse, and the diversity of views hidden within that discourse. It suggests that the Christian Church should locate itself within this complexity by way of four basic categories: as beneficiary of human rights; as object of human rights obligations; as promoter of public justice; and as exemplar of a community of human flourishing. In each case, there needs to be a careful appropriation and critique of the language and reasoning of human rights.     

Parallel,additional or alternative histories of philosophy? Questions on the theory and methodology of the history of philosophy

ABSTRACT

Methodologies and theories for writing histories of philosophy are particularly relevant today due to the abounding challenges to the discipline that have emerged: e.g. the problem concerning the precise mode of the inclusion of non-Western philosophies in the history of philosophy, the response to postcolonial considerations at large, the transformative impact of new media and the question whether the history of philosophy is primarily a philosophical, rather than merely historical, enterprise. À propos the relative scarcity that is to be witnessed in explicit articulations of methodologies and theories for writing histories of philosophy, in this note I focus on certain spontaneous, rather than theoretically planned, responses that have emerged to the above challenges – in particular, Peter Adamson’s History of Philosophy without any gaps – and in conclusion, as an example of methodological development, I touch on some of the problems we encounter in the case of the inclusion of Byzantine philosophy in the history of philosophy.     

The dynamic lexicon in a truth-conditional framework; or how to have Your cake and eat it

A fundamental principle of all truth-conditional approaches to semantics is that the meanings of sentences of natural language can be compositionally specified in terms of truth conditions, where the meanings of the sentences’ parts (words/lexical items) are specified in terms of the contribution they make to such conditions their host sentences possess. Thus, meanings of words fit the meanings of sentences at least to the extent that the stability of what a sentence might mean as specified in a theory is in accord with the stability of what a word might mean as similarly specified. In this paper, I shall be concerned with Ludlow’s (2014) idea that, in fact, there need be no such sympathy between words and sentences. He proposes that we can square what he calls a dynamic lexicon, where word meaning is not stable at all, with a traditional truth-conditional approach of the kind indicated, where sentence meaning is delivered via ‘absolute truth conditions’. I share Ludlow’s aspiration to accommodate dynamic features of word meaning with a truth conditional approach, but not his belief that the marriage is an easy deal. Thus, I shall present a problem for Ludlow’s position and show how resolving this problem leads to an alternative picture of how the meaning of a sentence may be truth-conditionally specified with all relevant dynamic features of the lexicon retained.