Embodied and disembodied cognition: Spatial perspective-taking

Although people can take spatial perspectives different from their own, it is widely assumed that egocentric perspectives are natural and have primacy. Two studies asked respondents to describe the spatial relations between two objects on a table in photographed scenes; in some versions, a person sitting behind the objects was either looking at or reaching for one of the objects. The mere presence of another person in a position to act on the objects induced a good proportion of respondents to describe the spatial relations from that person’s point of view (Experiment 1). When the query about the spatial relations was phrased in terms of action, more respondents took the other’s perspective than their own (Experiment 2). The implication of action elicits spontaneous spatial perspective-taking, seemingly in the service of understanding the other’s actions.     

The role of anxiety and perspective-taking strategy on affective empathic responses

Empathy is an important pro-social behaviour critical to a positive client–therapist relationship. Therapist anxiety has been linked to reduced ability to empathise and lower client satisfaction with therapy. However, the nature of the relationship between anxiety and empathy is currently unclear. The current study investigated the effect of experimentally-induced anxiety on empathic responses elicited during three different perspective-taking tasks. Perspective-taking was manipulated within-subjects with all participants (N = 52) completing imagine-self, imagine-other and objective conditions. A threat of shock manipulation was used to vary anxiety between-subjects. Participants in the threat of shock condition reported higher levels of anxiety during the experiment and lower levels of empathy-related distress for the targets than participants in the control condition. Perspective-taking was associated with higher levels of empathy-related distress and concern compared to the objective condition. The present results suggest that perspective-taking can to a large extent mitigate the influence of heightened anxiety on an individual’s ability to empathise.     

Intersubjectivity and egocentrism: Insights from the relational perspectives of Piaget, Mead, and Wittgenstein

Beginning with Piaget’s concept of egocentrism, we explicate a view of differentiating and coordination perspectives on which language and cognition are based by also drawing on insights from Mead and Wittgenstein. The concept of egocentrism is linked to Piaget’s view of knowledge and development. In overcoming egocentrism, infants differentiate the world from their action. We extend a Piagetian approach to overcoming egocentrism with regard to children’s social knowledge by drawing on Mead’s view that minds and selves emerge from the social process. Children must take the role of others for selves to emerge, a process that is rooted in interaction, requiring sufficient experience with others to be able to anticipate others’ response or attitude to their act. Then the self can respond to one’s own act as the other would. From Piaget’s perspective, these are schemes or patterns of action that develop with repeated experience. From Wittgenstein’s perspective, these patterns are embedded in forms of life; natural ways of reacting to and interacting with others that are characteristic of our species. Overcoming egocentrism or developing perspective taking is required for understanding and for human forms of cognition.     

Changing views: the effect of explicit perception-focus instructions on perspective-taking

In two experiments, we examined whether explicit attention to another’s perspective fosters perspective-taking. In the first experiment, we attempted to replicate previous findings showing that a mind-set focusing on self-other differences incites speakers to adopt another’s viewpoint in a subsequent task. However, our results showed that speakers focusing on self-other differences were just as likely to describe an object’s location from their egocentric perspective as speakers focusing on self-other similarities. In the second experiment, we intensified speakers’ awareness of perspectives by explicitly instructing them to regard their own (self-focus) or another’s (other-focus) viewpoint during the perspective-taking task. Participants allocated to the baseline did not receive explicit focus instructions. Findings revealed that other-focused speakers were more likely to adopt another’s perspective than self-focused speakers. However, compared to the baseline, an explicit other-focus did not foster perspective-taking. We conclude that an explicit awareness of perspective differences does not attenuate speakers’ egocentricity bias.     

Callous-unemotional traits and empathy deficits: Mediating effects of affective perspective-taking and facial emotion recognition

Although empathy deficits are thought to be associated with callous-unemotional (CU) traits, findings remain equivocal and little is known about what specific abilities may underlie these purported deficits. Affective perspective-taking (APT) and facial emotion recognition may be implicated, given their independent associations with both empathy and CU traits. The current study examined how CU traits relate to cognitive and affective empathy and whether APT and facial emotion recognition mediate these relations. Participants were 103 adolescents (70 males) aged 16–18 attending a residential programme. CU traits were negatively associated with cognitive and affective empathy to a similar degree. The association between CU traits and affective empathy was partially mediated by APT. Results suggest that assessing mechanisms that may underlie empathic deficits, such as perspective-taking, may be important for youth with CU traits and may inform targets of intervention.     

Putting action in perspective

Embodied approaches to cognition propose that our own actions influence our understanding of the world. Do other people's actions also have this influence? The present studies show that perceiving another person's actions changes the way people think about objects in a scene. In Study 1, participants viewed a photograph and answered a question about the location of one object relative to another. The question either did or did not call attention to an action being performed in the scene. Studies 2 and 3 focused on whether depicting an action in a scene influenced perspective choice. Across all studies, drawing attention to action, whether verbally or pictorially, led observers to encode object locations from the actor's spatial perspective. Study 4 demonstrated that the tendency to adopt the actor's perspective might be mediated by motor experience.     

Changing Perspective: Building Creative Mindsets

The search for new ideas often frustratingly cycles back to old ones, a phenomenon known as fixation. Recent research has shown ways to kick-start finding new uses for familiar objects, a prototypical creativity task: wandering in the mind or the world or working on a messy desk. Those techniques seem to succeed by helping break fixation, but do not guide the search for new ideas. The perspective-taking or human-centric or empathic mindset championed by many in HCI and in design firms does provide a search strategy. We compared the mind-wandering mindset to a perspective-taking mindset, the latter priming thinking of ways that people in different roles (gardener, artist, etc.) might use the objects. In two studies, the Perspective-Taking mindset yielded more ideas and more original ideas than Mind-Wandering, which did not differ from a No-Mindset control. Original ideas came late, rewarding persistence. The perspective-taking mindset is productive for problem-solving, forecasting, and social interactions as well as innovation.     

Keeping the reader's mind in mind: Development of perspective-taking in children's dictations

This study investigated when children can take the perspective of their reader if the information-processing demands of writing are removed by means of dictation to a scribe. Participants (N = 96) aged 5, 6 and 7 years dictated letters to an addressee who possessed requisite content knowledge, and then revised the letter or dictated a new letter to an addressee who lacked this knowledge (counterbalanced). Results showed that 19% of 5-year-olds, 41% of 6-year-olds, and 72% of 7-year-olds considered their reader's missing knowledge. Children's awareness of their reader's knowledge was neither related to performance on higher-order theory of mind tasks, nor to measures of executive function. Significantly greater perspective-taking was demonstrated in children's new letters than revised letters. However, although revision is considered a late-developing skill, half of even the 5-year-olds were able to make revisions (albeit few revisions demonstrated actual perspective-taking). Findings have significant implications for the emergent-literacy curriculum.     

Are social prediction errors universal? Predicting compliance with a direct request across cultures

Previous research conducted in the United States has demonstrated that help-seekers fail to appreciate the embarrassment and awkwardness (i.e., social costs) targets would experience by saying “no” to a request for help. Underestimation of such social costs leads help-seekers to underestimate the likelihood that others will comply with their requests. We hypothesized that this error would be attenuated in a collectivistic culture. We conducted a naturalistic help-seeking study in the U.S. and China and found that Chinese help-seekers were more accurate than American help-seekers at predicting compliance. A supplementary scenario study in which we measured individual differences in collectivistic and individualistic orientations within a single culture provided converging evidence for the association between collectivism and expectations of compliance. In both cases, the association between collectivism (culturally defined or measured) and predicted compliance was mediated by participants' ratings of the social costs of saying “no”.     

Ignorance is no excuse: moral judgments are influenced by a genetic variation on the oxytocin receptor gene

Perspective-taking has become a main focus of studies on moral judgments. Recent fMRI studies have demonstrated that individual differences in brain activation predict moral decision making. In particular, pharmacological studies highlighted the crucial role for the neuropeptide oxytocin in social behavior and emotional perception. In the present study N=154 participants were genotyped for a functional polymorphism (rs2268498) in the promoter region of the OXTR gene. We found a significant difference between carriers and non-carriers of the C-allele in exculpating agents for accidental harms (F((1,152))=11.49, p=.001, η(2)=.07) indicating that carriers of the C-allele rated accidentally committed harm as significantly more blameworthy than non-carriers. This is the first study providing evidence for a genetic contribution to moral judgments.