Are there dead persons?

Schechtman’s ‘Person Life View’ (PLV) offers an account of personal identity whereby persons are the unified loci of our practical and ethical judgment. PLV also recognises infants and permanent vegetative state patients as being persons. I argue that the way PLV handles these cases yields an unexpected result: the dead also remain persons, contrary to the widely-accepted ‘Termination Thesis.’ Even more surprisingly, this actually counts in PLV’s favor: in light of our social and ethical practices which treat the dead as moral patients, PLV gives a more plausible account of the status of the dead than its rival theories.     

Enjeux majeurs de santé publique versus autonomie personnelle : le cas spécifique de l’obligation vaccinale

While the triple individual, altruistic and collective dimension of the preventive vaccination obligation serves a major public health objective, it only prevents such a choice by public authorities, by imposing a constraint on individuals and thus violating several of their fundamental rights, from going against personal freedom. The first question raised is then that of the legitimacy of such a policy. Could less coercive means, and therefore less intrusive on fundamental rights and freedoms, not be deployed? If not, at what risk alert threshold(s) could the vaccination obligation be justified?     

A clean self reduces bribery intent

The present research aimed at investigating the effect of physical cleanliness on bribery intent and the moderating role of personal need for structure (PNS) on this relationship. In Study 1, we used questionnaires to establish the correlation between bodily cleanliness and bribery intent. In Study 2, we examined the effect by priming sense of self‐cleanliness. Study 3 was conducted outside a public bath to test our finding that physical purity decreases bribery intent again; we further found that individuals with high PNS showed no reduction in bribery intent even after cleaning themselves. We thus connected physical cleanliness with the corruption field and improved our understanding of its underlying moderating mechanism.     

马克思每个人自由而全面发展思想的四个维度

马克思每个人自由而全面发展的理论内蕴着四个维度的内涵：人类的历史发展导向每个人自由而全面发展;个人自由发展的普遍性和全面性;从虚幻的集体到真实的集体的发展;建立在“共同占有的基础上”“重新建立个人所有制”的基础上。     

Causalité juridique et imputabilité médicale : l’incidence de l’approche juridique du lien de causalité sur la pratique expertale en droit de la réparation du dommage corporel

Traditionally, a “direct and certain” causal link was required between fault and harm in order to engage an individual's compensatory liability. However, upon reading case law, it is possible to note that causality no longer necessarily has to be either direct or certain. Indeed, although the presence of a previous condition long enabled the exclusion of a direct link between a harmful event and its aftereffects, the French Court of Appeal (Cour de Cassation) now considers that pathological predispositions must no longer be taken into account (in respect of an exclusion or a reduction in the right to compensation) if these were latent, and only revealed by the harmful event. Similarly, on occasion the plaintiffs support their claims with bundles of evidence and arguments that can but force magistrates to set aside the absence of absolute certainty on a scientific level. Presumptions of accountability have even been put forward in some areas of personal injury compensation (traffic accidents and workplace accidents). The conduct and content of forensic expertises are then disrupted, both for the expert and for the victim's lawyer.     

Death and the Self

It is an old philosophical idea that if the future self is literally different from the current self, one should be less concerned with the death of the future self (Parfit, 1984 ). This paper examines the relation between attitudes about death and the self among Hindus, Westerners, and three Buddhist populations (Lay Tibetan, Lay Bhutanese, and monastic Tibetans). Compared with other groups, monastic Tibetans gave particularly strong denials of the continuity of self, across several measures. We predicted that the denial of self would be associated with a lower fear of death and greater generosity toward others. To our surprise, we found the opposite. Monastic Tibetan Buddhists showed significantly greater fear of death than any other group. The monastics were also less generous than any other group about the prospect of giving up a slightly longer life in order to extend the life of another.     

Why Name Generators with a Fixed Number of Alters may be a Pragmatic Option for Personal Network Analysis

Social network analysis has grown exponentially in recent years, giving rise to methodological innovations in different scientific disciplines. In psychology, social network analysis has been incorporated into studies of individual personality differences and has generated novel areas, such as network psychometrics and network interventions. In community psychology, a recent review examined the use of network analysis in American Journal of Community Psychology publications (Neal & Neal, American Journal of Community Psychology, 2017, 60, 279). Based on their study, the authors advise researchers to avoid using the fixed‐choice name generator when possible, as one of the five methodological recommendations proposed. In this essay, I explain how the recent increase of name generators with a fixed number of alters when studying personal networks is originally linked to an interest in describing structural properties. Second, I analyze the pragmatic contributions of this method: establishing a limit of alters a priori can entail advantages in terms of standardization and comparability of personal networks. Finally, to contextualize the methodological debate, I argue that personal networks represent the diversity of contexts in which the individual participates and are naturally integrated into community surveys.     

Folk concepts of person and identity: A response to Nichols and Bruno

Nichols and Bruno (2010) claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article, we evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations, the folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity, but instead rely on different concepts of ‘person’, ‘identity’, and ‘individual’. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no longer categorized as persons. Second, we provide new empirical evidence suggesting that the folk do not consider psychological continuity to be necessary for an individual to be categorized as a person or for ascribing identity over time and through transformations. In this, we assume, along with Nichols and Bruno, that folk judgments about identity can be read off the use of proper names. Furthermore, we raise some doubts about the ability of current experimental designs to adequately distinguish between qualitative and numerical identity judgments. We conclude that these claims give us a good reason to be skeptical about the prospects of using folk intuitions in philosophical theorizing about personal identity.     

The mineness of experience

In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization. Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”, but should be conceived of as a dimension, namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences.