Basic Personal Values,Core Political Values,and Voting: A Longitudinal Analysis

We theorize that political values express basic personal values in the domain of politics. We test a set of hypotheses that specify how the motivational structure of basic values constrains and gives coherence to core political values. We also test the hypothesis that core political values mediate relations of basic personal values to voting demonstrated in previous research. We measured the basic personal values, core political values, and vote of Italian adults both before (n = 1699) and after (n = 1030) the 2006 national election. Basic values explained substantial variance in each of eight political values (22% to 53%) and predicted voting significantly. Correlations and an MDS projection of relations among basic values and political values supported the hypothesized coherent structuring of core political values by basic values. Core political values fully mediated relations of basic values to voting, supporting a basic values—political values—voting causal hierarchy.     

Infant's perception of goal-directed actions performed by a mechanical device

The present work investigated whether by the end of the first year, infants interpret actions performed by a mechanical device as goal-directed and why they would do so. Using a modified version of the Woodward (1998) habituation paradigm, 9- and 12-month-old infants were tested in a condition in which they saw a mechanical claw performing an action (Study 1). When infants viewed the claw grasping and transporting objects to the back of a stage, 12-month-old but not 9-month-old infants interpreted the action as goal-directed. In Study 2, 9-month-olds received prior to habituation an information phase showing infants how a human held and operated the claw. This enrichment of infants’ knowledge enabled 9-month-old infants to interpret the action display as goal-directed. The role of the developing means-end understanding and tool-use for infants’ interpretation of actions performed by a mechanical device is discussed.     

儿童移情指向性的发展及不同语言提示的作用

采用图片故事和情境实验,对3到9岁儿童移情指向性的发展及不同语言提示对助人行为的作用进行了探讨。研究表明,3～5岁幼儿自我指向的个人悲伤体验占优势,5岁以后他人指向的移情担心开始超过个人悲伤而占优势;他人关注组的助人行为优于自我关注组和控制组,自我关注组和控制组前后测成绩差异不显著,他人关注组后测成绩优于前测成绩。     

SPIRIT AND CREATION

Abstract. The theology of the Third Person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, is not only a rather neglected but also a very diffuse subject. The neglect stems from the priority that was given in the early centuries to Christology. The diffuseness of pneumatology may well be a result of the bewildering variety of ways in which “spirit” or “Spirit” (Hebrew ruach, Greek pneuma) appears in the Bible. I attempt to bring the various activities ascribed to the Spirit under one heading, transmission of information, and then to see what can be learned from modern science about the role of the Spirit in creation. I suggest a distinct role of the Spirit in creation, jointly with but different from that of the Logos. Other occasions of a concerted action of Spirit and Logos are seen in the birth of Christ and the eschatological event. All of this leads to a trinitarian definition of creation.     

Tutors’ stories of personal development training – attempting to maximize the learning potential

This paper uses a narrative approach to examine some of the dilemmas that counselling trainers face when designing and running personal development activities as part of a Diploma in Counselling training programme. The research emerges from a focus group discussion by the tutors involved in piloting and evaluating an experimental personal development training programme. The themes examined include: the strengths and weaknesses of unstructured group work; whether structured activities helped quieter members to participate and learn more; how trainers can evaluate and assess students learning in relation to personal development in order to maximize student learning potential. The aim is to invite debate and further re‐tellings from other counselling trainers and practitioners in the field.     

Mind perception of God in Japanese children

There is a theoretical debate regarding whether children represent God with reference to a human. Most previous studies have assessed this issue focusing on knowledge/omniscience in western children. This study used a theoretical framework characterising mental capacities in terms of motivational/emotional (experience) and cognitive (agency) mental capacities and tested whether Japanese children discriminated between God, a human, a baby and an invisible agent according to these capacities. Three‐ to 6‐year‐old children were asked about the experience and agency of the agents. The results revealed that children discriminated God from a human in terms of mental capacities including experience and agency in 3‐year‐old children. On the other hand, 4‐ to 6‐year‐old children, but not 3‐year‐old children, discriminated a human from a baby and an invisible person. The results suggest that the Japanese children's representations of God differed from their representation of a human during preschool years.     

Personal trust extends cooperation beyond trustees: A Mexican study

We studied 2 groups of workers from Oaxaca (Mexico) with different levels of income and education to investigate the role that the affective‐based psychological mechanism of personal trust, as evolutionarily acquired, plays on group cooperation. We measured trust levels through some questionnaires and cooperative behaviour through an iterated prisoner's dilemma under different conditions and analysed trust networks of group members. While these groups did not differ in trust levels or cooperation among trustees, they did differ in terms of cooperation with other group members. Such differences are related to dissimilarities in the trust network topology—as a measure of group cohesion. These results suggest that some personal trust networks extend cooperation within a group beyond trustees in a way that complements the role of the reputation for indirect reciprocity.     

Personality and personal network type

The association between personality and personal relationships is mostly studied within dyadic relationships. We examined these variables within the context of personal network types. We used Latent Class Analysis to identify groups of students with similar role relationships with three focal figures. We performed Latent Class Logistic Regression to explore the relationships of the latent classes with the Big Five personality factors. Personality was assessed with the Five Factor Personality Inventory. We found three personal network types: a primarily family oriented network, a primarily peer oriented network, and a mixed family/peer oriented network. We found significant associations between personality and personal network type. Extraverted students were more likely to have a primarily peer oriented network relative to a primarily family oriented network. Autonomous students were more likely to have a primarily family oriented network relative to a primarily peer oriented network. Autonomous students were also more likely to have a mixed family/peer oriented network relative to a primarily peer oriented network. Conscientious students were more likely to have a primarily family oriented network relative to a mixed family/peer oriented network.     

Room for a view: on the metaphysical subject of personal identity

Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians” such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of personal identity, including Derek Parfit, have either completely distorted or not understood Locke’s actual view. Shoemaker’s defense, which uses a “package deal” definition that relies on internal relations of synchronic and diachronic unity and employs the Ramsey–Lewis account to define personal identity, leaves far less room for psychological continuity views than for my own view, which, independently of its radical implications, is that (a) consciousness makes personal identity, and (b) in consciousness alone personal identity consists—which happens to be also Locke’s actual view. Moreover, the ubiquitous Fregean conception of borders and the so-called “ambiguity of is” collapse in the light of what Hintikka has called the “Frege trichotomy.” The Ramsey–Lewis account, due to the problematic way Shoemaker tries to bind the variables, makes it impossible for the neo-Lockean ala Shoemaker to fulfill the uniqueness clause required by all such Lewis style definitions; such attempts avoid circularity only at the expense of mistaking isomorphism with identity. Contrary to what virtually all philosophers writing on the topic assume, fission does not destroy personal identity. A proper analysis of public versus perspectival identification, derived using actual case studies from neuropsychiatry, provides the scientific, mathematical and logical frameworks for a new theory of self-reference, wherein “consciousness,” “self-consciousness,” and the “I,” can be precisely defined in terms of the subject and the subject-in-itself.     

Changing the subject: on the subject of subjectivity

In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (1) the lack of logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing one person from another should imply neither that there is only one person nor that personhood is not individuative; and (2) the lack of such universally applicable identity criteria should not imply that the term ‘person’ is a folk term with no real application. In other words, lack of reductionist analysis does not entail lack of existence.