Let there be no mistake! On assessment mode and the transference effect in social perception

We examined the possibility that assessment regulatory mode orientation affects the tendency to exhibit transference effects in social perception. Based on a social cognitive methodological paradigm devised by Andersen and colleagues [e.g., Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1996], we find that the transference effect is more pronounced when individuals’ (chronic) assessment orientation is low (vs. high). These results suggest that transference is more likely to occur when less attention is directed towards the target of perception.     

Money can’t buy love: Asymmetric beliefs about gift price and feelings of appreciation

Across three studies, we identify an asymmetry between gift-givers’ and gift-recipients’ beliefs about the link between gift price and feelings of appreciation. Gift-givers expected a positive correlation between how much they spent on a gift and the extent to which gift-recipients would appreciate the gift because gift-givers assume that more expensive gifts convey a higher level of thoughtfulness. Gift-recipients, in contrast, reported no such association between gift price and their actual feelings of appreciation. This effect occurred regardless of whether the individual’s role and the magnitude of the gift were manipulated or measured in the field. Taken together, these findings cast doubt on whether gift-givers can draw on their personal experience as gift-recipients in order to identify meaningful gifts for others.     

Trait expectancies and stereotype expectancies have the same effect on person memory

Two studies examined whether trait expectancies and stereotype expectancies similarly affected memory for expectancy-relevant behaviors. The results of both studies showed that, when activated in identical ways, trait expectancies and stereotype expectancies had similar effects on recall. Better recall was obtained for expectancy-incongruent items when expectancies were activated in relatively overt ways, while better recall for expectancy-congruent items was obtained when expectancies were activated in less overt ways. Additional analyses examining the order of events that emerged in the recall protocols provided little evidence that participants attempted to reconcile the items, as would be predicted by some earlier models of person memory (e.g., Srull, 1981). The implications of these findings for how social expectancies guide social information processing are discussed.     

JUMPING TOGETHER: A WAY FROM SOCIOBIOLOGY TO BIO‐SOCIO‐HUMANITIES

Sociobiology is a grand narrative of evolutionary biology on which to build unified knowledge. Consilience is a metaphorical representation of that narrative. I take up the same metaphor but apply it differently. I evoke the image of jumping together, not on solid ground but on the strong, flexible canvas sheet of a trampoline, on which natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities jump together. This image overlaps with the traditional East Asian way of understanding—that is, the “Heaven‐Earth‐Person Triad.” Using recent insights from cognitive science—metaphor, embodiment, and conceptual blending—I propose the alternative way of “bio‐socio‐humanities” to understand and experience the world.     

When actions speak volumes: The role of inferences about moral character in outrage over racial bigotry

Inferences about moral character may often drive outrage over symbolic acts of racial bigotry. Study 1 demonstrates a theoretically predicted dissociation between moral evaluations of an act and the person who carries out the act. Although Americans regarded the private use of a racial slur as a less blameworthy act than physical assault, use of a slur was perceived as a clearer indicator of poor moral character. Study 2 highlights the dynamic interplay between moral judgments of acts and persons, demonstrating that first making person judgments can bias subsequent act judgments. Privately defacing a picture of Martin Luther King, Jr. led to greater moral condemnation of the agent than of the act itself only when the behavior was evaluated first. When Americans first made character judgments, symbolically defacing a picture of the civil rights leader was significantly more likely to be perceived as an immoral act. These studies support a person‐centered account of outrage over bigotry and demonstrate that moral evaluations of acts and persons converge and diverge under theoretically meaningful circumstances. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

薛中离图书易学思想浅析——以《图书质疑》为中心

本文以明代岭南思想家薛中离的《图书质疑》为中心,对薛中离的图书易学思想进行初步探讨,指出薛氏沿着"图书明——太极明——一体之学明"的理路,由驳斥析补说开始,重释图书易理,发挥诠释其"心外无物"、"主一立极"之心性思想,有着较强的浑一性和践履性的特征。     

The efficiency of binding spontaneous trait inferences to actors’ faces

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that the process of binding spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) to actors’ representations is relatively independent of attentional resources. Participants were presented with faces paired with single behaviors. Binding of STIs to actors was revealed by a higher false recognition of implied traits paired with actors’ faces than of implied traits randomly paired with other familiar faces. This effect replicated when each face-behavior pair was presented for 2 s (Experiment 1), when the processing of the information was shallow (Experiment 2), and when participants performed a secondary task during the presentation of behaviors (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that explicit on-line trait judgments of the actor, but not explicit behavior judgments, predicted the false recognition of implied traits in the context of the actor. The possibility that the process of binding STIs to actors’ representations is automatic is discussed.     

Re-reading Anscombe on ‘I’

According to a ‘Straight’ reading of Elizabeth Anscombe’s (1975 Anscombe, E. 1975. “The First Person.” In her Mind and Language, edited by S. Guttenplan, 45–65. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]) ‘The First Person’, she holds a radically non-referring view of ‘I’. Specifically, ‘I’ is analogous to the expletive ‘it’ in ‘It’s raining’. I argue that this is not her conclusion. Her substantive view, rather is that if what you mean by ‘reference’ is a certain rich and recherché notion tracing to Frege, then ‘I’ is not a referring term. Her methodological point is that one shouldn’t be ‘bewitched by language’ into thinking that ‘I’, because of its syntax, must exhibit ‘reference’ in this sense.     

Confidence of social judgments is not just error: Individual differences in the structure,stability, and social functions of perceptual confidence

The present research uses a Social Relations Model approach to focus on individual differences in perceptual confidence – a person’s confidence in her or his impressions of others. Across two samples of group interactions, we found that the majority of variance in perceptual confidence was explained by individual differences in how people tended to perceive others (i.e., perceiver effects). A smaller percentage of variance was explained by differences in how people tended to be perceived by others (i.e., target effects). Both these individual differences were stable over time, were related to relevant personality measures, and group outcomes. Together, these results demonstrate that although perceptual confidence may not be substantially related to accuracy, it exists as a stable individual difference dimension that has important consequences for social interactions.