Lost in the crowd: Entitative group membership reduces mind attribution

This research examined how and why group membership diminishes the attribution of mind to individuals. We found that mind attribution was inversely related to the size of the group to which an individual belonged (Experiment 1). Mind attribution was affected by group membership rather than the total number of entities perceived at once (Experiment 2). Moreover, mind attribution to an individual varied with the perception that the individual was a group member. Participants attributed more mind to an individual that appeared distinct or distant from other group members than to an individual that was perceived to be similar or proximal to a cohesive group (Experiments 3 and 4). This effect occurred for both human and nonhuman targets, and was driven by the perception of the target as an entitative group member rather than by the knowledge that the target was an entitative group member (Experiment 5).     

The many faces of assumed similarity in perceptions of personality

We propose that most coefficients of assumed similarity in acquaintance ratings are based on actual similarity between observer and target rather than any bias to project self onto other. We assessed assumed similarity, actual similarity, and rater accuracy in 62 university roommate dyads who rated each other on 74 personality-related variables. Our findings indicate that our roommates (a) were actually alike on many variables, (b) knew this, rather than assumed it, and (c) applied this knowledge to enhance the accuracy of their ratings. We outline a model of judgment that urges three distinct concepts: true assumed similarity, known similarity, and spurious similarity. We conclude that personality ratings among acquaintances reflecting true assumed similarity are probably rare.     

Processing style and person recognition: Exploring the face inversion effect

It has frequently been reported that recognition performance is impaired when faces are presented in an inverted rather than upright orientation, a phenomenon termed the face inversion effect (FIE). Extending previous work on this topic, the current investigation explored whether individual differences in global precedence—the propensity to process nonfacial stimuli in a configural manner—impacts memory for faces. Based on performance on the Navon letter-classification task, two experimental groups were created that differed in relative global precedence (i.e., strong global precedence [SGP] and weak global precedence [WGP]). In a subsequent face-recognition task, results revealed that while both groups demonstrated a reliable FIE, this effect was attenuated among participants displaying WGP. These findings suggest that individual differences in general processing style modulate face recognition.     

Short report: The impact of measurement conditions on the validity of self-assessment in a selection setting

Two experimental studies investigated the impact of format and instructions on the validity of SAs, using participants applying for junior management positions in a public sector organization. In Study 1 (607 participants) self-assessments (SAs) were valid when applicants rated overall competencies or the same competencies broken down into discrete elements, but not when providing behavioural evidence prior to rating competencies. The effect of social comparison instructions was also explored but found to have no impact on validity. Study 2 used a subset of 193 candidates from the previous study who attended the next stage of the selection process. Consistent with predictions it was found that unbalanced, positively toned scales were more valid than conventional scales, and highest validities were achieved when used with instructions requesting a realistic SA of strengths and weaknesses. Interestingly, gender differences were found in both studies. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for both research and practice.     

Meta-perception for pathological personality traits: do we know when others think that we are difficult?

The self allows us to reflect on our own behavior and to imagine what others think of us. Clinical experience suggests that these abilities may be impaired in people with personality disorders. They do not recognize the impact that their behavior has on others, and they have difficulty understanding how they are seen by others. We collected information regarding pathological personality traits--using both self and peer report measures--from groups of people who knew each other well (at the end of basic military training). In previous papers, we have reported that agreement between self-report and peer-report is only modest. In this paper, we address the question: Do people know that others disagree with their own perceptions of themselves? We found that expected peer scores predicted variability in peer report over and above self-report for all 10 diagnostic traits. People do have some incremental knowledge of how they are viewed by others, but they do not tell you about it unless you ask them to do so; the knowledge is not reflected in ordinary self-report data. Among participants who expect their peers to describe them as narcissistic, those who agree with this assessment are viewed as being less narcissistic by their peers than those who deny being narcissistic. It therefore appears that insight into how one is viewed by others can moderate negative impressions fostered by PD traits.     

How Should What Economists Call “Social Values” Be Measured?

Most economists and some philosophers distinguish individual utilities from interpersonal social values. Even if challenges to that conceptual distinction can be met, further philosophically interesting questions arise. I pursue three in this paper, using, as context for the discussion, health economics and its attempt to discern empirically a social welfare function to help guide rationing decisions. (1) To discern these utilities and values in a manner that is morally appropriate if they are to influence rationing decisions, who should be queried? To discern individual health state utilities, persons in precisely those states should be asked (generically, “patients”), but for social values, representatives of the general public should be. (2) To discern social values, what should representatives of the public be asked? They should be asked “person trade-off” (PTO) questions that encompass their own self-interest, not PTO questions that focus only on others. (3) What must public representatives understand before they respond to such questions? Despite the philosophically complex problem of patient adaptation, they should understand (among other things) the health state utilities elicited from actual patients with the conditions at issue.     

Perceptions of daily sacrifice motives: Accuracy,bias, outcomes,and moderators

The current study examined accuracy and bias in perceptions of a partner’s daily approach and avoidance sacrifice motives, associations of bias with daily sacrificer and perceiver relationship quality, and moderators of accuracy (gender, relationship length, daily stress). 94 cohabiting couples completed daily measures of sacrifice (N = 375 days), stress, relationship satisfaction, and closeness. People showed evidence of accuracy for partner sacrifice motives, but accuracy for approach sacrifice depended on relationship length. People underperceived partner sacrifice motives; underperception of approach sacrifice was associated with greater sacrificer closeness, while overperception of approach sacrifice and overperception of avoidance sacrifice was associated with greater perceiver closeness, although these effects were small. Gender and stress did not moderate tracking accuracy or mean-level bias.     

The categorical structure of knowledge for famous people (and a novel application of Centre-Surround theory)

Knowledge of familiar people is essential to guide social interaction, yet there is uncertainty about whether semantic knowledge for people is stored in a categorical structure as for objects. Four priming experiments using hard-to-perceive primes investigated whether occupation forms a category connecting famous persons in semantic memory. Primes were famous faces exposed for 17ms with masking, resulting in severely restricted awareness and thus precluding expectancy-based priming effects. Targets were consciously perceptible famous faces (Experiments 1-3), famous names (Experiment 3), or occupations (Experiment 4) representing either the same or different occupation to the prime. Significant priming demonstrated the operation of automatic processes, including spreading activation, among persons sharing a common occupation; this supports the categorical view. The direction of priming (faster/slower responses to same-occupation than different-occupation targets) was dependent on prime-target stimulus onset asynchrony (Experiments 1-3) and type of target (Experiment 4). This pattern of results is attributed to the Centre-Surround mechanism proposed by Carr and Dagenbach [Carr, T. H., & Dagenbach, D. (1990). Semantic priming and repetition priming from masked words: evidence for a centre-surround attentional mechanism in perceptual recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 16, 341-350]. These results support (a) the categorical structure of semantic knowledge for famous people and (b) the application of the Centre-Surround mechanism to the domain of person recognition.     

Keeping up impressions: Inferential rules for impression change across the Big Five

Not all first impressions have equal longevity. Which kinds of impression have the greatest mobility—downward and upward—over the course of acquaintanceships? In this article, we propose an inferential account of impression maintenance across Big Five trait domains. With data from field and laboratory studies, we provide evidence that positive impressions of agreeableness (A), conscientiousness (C), and emotional stability (ES) are especially vulnerable to small amounts of contrary evidence, whereas positive first impressions of extraversion (E) and openness (O) are more resistant to contrary information. Impressions of E and O demonstrated minimal susceptibility to negativity effects in a longitudinal study of college roommate impressions (Study 1), in a study of perceivers’ implicit theories about different trait domains (Study 2), and in an experimental study of manipulated impression change (Study 3).     

A theology of pastoral multiplicity

The contemporary moment is characterized by liquidity and difference. “Liquidity” means rapidly changing social structures, accelerations in consumption, and constantly changing personal and group identities. In this increasingly diverse context, encounters with difference are not only inevitable, they are essential—and can be transformative for our understandings of our multiple selves, for our pastoral encounters with others, and for our theological imagination, as well. Viewing the self, especially the pastor's self, as a collection of multiple selves, identities, and performances illumines pastoral leadership; pastors who claim their multiplicity more wholly meet “others” when encountering difference. The triune God reveals divine multiplicity, so pastors who claim their multiplicity as their identity thereby make a theological claim.