Illusions of integration are subjectively impenetrable: Phenomenological experience of Lag 1 percepts during dual-target RSVP

We investigated the relationship between different kinds of target reports in a rapid serial visual presentation task, and their associated perceptual experience. Participants reported the identity of two targets embedded in a stream of stimuli and their associated subjective visibility. In our task, target stimuli could be combined together to form more complex ones, thus allowing participants to report temporally integrated percepts. We found that integrated percepts were associated with high subjective visibility scores, whereas reports in which the order of targets was reversed led to a poorer perceptual experience. We also found a reciprocal relationship between the chance of the second target not being reported correctly and the perceptual experience associated with the first one. Principally, our results indicate that integrated percepts are experienced as a unique, clear perceptual event, whereas order reversals are experienced as confused, similar to cases in which an entirely wrong response was given.     

Attention and cognitive penetrability: The epistemic consequences of attention as a form of metacognitive regulation

A recent approach to the cognitive penetrability of perception, i.e. the possibility that perception is shaped top-down by high-level cognitive states such as beliefs and desires, proposes to understand the phenomenon on the basis of its consequences, among which there is a challenge for the epistemic role of perceptual experience in justifying beliefs (Stokes, 2015). In this paper, I argue that some attentional phenomena qualify as cases of cognitive penetrability under this consequentialist approach. I present a popular theory of attention, the biased-competition theory, on which basis I establish that attention is a form of metacognitive regulation. I argue that attention (as metacognitive regulation) involves the right kind of cognitive-perceptual relation and leads to the same epistemic consequences as other more traditional versions of cognitive penetrability.     

Volume completion in 4.5-month-old infants

In this study, we examined 4.5-month-old infants' visual completion of self-occluding three-dimensional objects. A previous study on this topic reported that 6-month-old, but not 4-month-old infants extrapolate a convex, symmetric prism from a limited view of its surfaces (Soska & Johnson, 2008). As of yet, studies on the development of amodal completion of three-dimensional, self-occluding objects are scarce. Given 4-month-old infants' abilities to derive three-dimensional shape from a variety of visual cues, three-dimensional amodal completion may well depend on the perceptual strength of three-dimensionality in the stimulus displays. The first experiments (1A and 1B) tested this hypothesis by means of a habituation paradigm and showed that 4.5-month-old infants are indeed able to amodally complete the back of a self-occluding object when sufficient three-dimensional cues are available. Further support for volume completion in 4.5-month-old infants was found in a second experiment, again using a habituation paradigm, that measured perceived connectedness between two visually separated, self-occluding, three-dimensional objects.     

Modality differences in timing and temporal memory throughout the lifespan

The perception of time is heavily influenced by attention and memory, both of which change over the lifespan. In the current study, children (8 yrs), young adults (18–25 yrs), and older adults (60–75 yrs) were tested on a duration bisection procedure using 3 and 6-s auditory and visual signals as anchor durations. During test, participants were exposed to a range of intermediate durations, and the task was to indicate whether test durations were closer to the “short” or “long” anchor. All groups reproduced the classic finding that “sounds are judged longer than lights”. This effect was greater for older adults and children than for young adults, but for different reasons. Replicating previous results, older adults made similar auditory judgments as young adults, but underestimated the duration of visual test stimuli. Children showed the opposite pattern, with similar visual judgments as young adults but overestimation of auditory stimuli. Psychometric functions were analyzed using the Sample Known Exactly-Mixed Memory quantitative model of the Scalar Timing Theory of interval timing. Results indicate that children show an auditory-specific deficit in reference memory for the anchors, rather than a general bias to overestimate time and that aged adults show an exaggerated tendency to judge visual stimuli as “short” due to a reduction in the availability of controlled attention.     

Are People Successful at Learning Sequences of Actions on a Perceptual Matching Task?

We report the results of an experiment in which human subjects were trained to perform a perceptual matching task. Subjects were asked to manipulate comparison objects until they matched target objects using the fewest manipulations possible. An unusual feature of the experimental task is that efficient performance requires an understanding of the hidden or latent causal structure governing the relationships between actions and perceptual outcomes. We use two benchmarks to evaluate the quality of subjects' learning. One benchmark is based on optimal performance as calculated by a dynamic programming procedure. The other is based on an adaptive computational agent that uses a reinforcement-learning method known as Q-learning to learn to perform the task. Our analyses suggest that subjects were successful learners. In particular, they learned to perform the perceptual matching task in a near-optimal manner (i.e., using a small number of manipulations) at the end of training. Subjects were able to achieve near-optimal performance because they learned, at least partially, the causal structure underlying the task. In addition, subjects' performances were broadly consistent with those of model-based reinforcement-learning agents that built and used internal models of how their actions influenced the external environment. We hypothesize that people will achieve near-optimal performances on tasks requiring sequences of action-especially sensorimotor tasks with underlying latent causal structures-when they can detect the effects of their actions on the environment, and when they can represent and reason about these effects using an internal mental model.     

A taste of words: linguistic context and perceptual simulation predict the modality of words

Previous studies have shown that object properties are processed faster when they follow properties from the same perceptual modality than properties from different modalities. These findings suggest that language activates sensorimotor processes, which, according to those studies, can only be explained by a modal account of cognition. The current paper shows how a statistical linguistic approach of word co-occurrences can also reliably predict the category of perceptual modality a word belongs to (auditory, olfactory-gustatory, visual-haptic), even though the statistical linguistic approach is less precise than the modal approach (auditory, gustatory, haptic, olfactory, visual). Moreover, the statistical linguistic approach is compared with the modal embodied approach in an experiment in which participants verify properties that share or shift modalities. Response times suggest that fast responses can best be explained by the linguistic account, whereas slower responses can best be explained by the embodied account. These results provide further evidence for the theory that conceptual processing is both linguistic and embodied, whereby less precise linguistic processes precede precise simulation processes.     

Modality switching costs emerge in concept creation as well as retrieval

Theories of embodied cognition hold that the conceptual system uses perceptual simulations for the purposes of representation. A strong prediction is that perceptual phenomena should emerge in conceptual processing, and, in support, previous research has shown that switching modalities from one trial to the next incurs a processing cost during conceptual tasks. However, to date, such research has been limited by its reliance on the retrieval of familiar concepts. We therefore examined concept creation by asking participants to interpret modality-specific compound phrases (i.e., conceptual combinations). Results show that modality switching costs emerge during the creation of new conceptual entities: People are slower to simulate a novel concept (e.g., auditory jingling onion) when their attention has already been engaged by a different modality in simulating a familiar concept (e.g., visual shiny penny). Furthermore, these costs cannot be accounted for by linguistic factors alone. Rather, our findings support the embodied view that concept creation, as well as retrieval, requires situated perceptual simulation.     

Desire satisfaction,death, and time

Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in time. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the timing problem for deprivationism because it locates death’s badness at the same time as both the victim of death and death itself, and it accounts for all of the ways that death is bad for a person. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the problem of temporally locating the benefit of future and past-directed desires because it respects several attractive principles, including the view that the intrinsic value of a time for someone is determined solely by states of affairs that obtain at that time and the view that intrinsically beneficial events benefit a person when they occur.     

Comparing different kinds of words and word-word relations to test an habituation model of priming

Huber and O'Reilly (2003) proposed that neural habituation exists to solve a temporal parsing problem, minimizing blending between one word and the next when words are visually presented in rapid succession. They developed a neural dynamics habituation model, explaining the finding that short duration primes produce positive priming whereas long duration primes produce negative repetition priming. The model contains three layers of processing, including a visual input layer, an orthographic layer, and a lexical-semantic layer. The predicted effect of prime duration depends both on this assumed representational hierarchy and the assumption that synaptic depression underlies habituation. The current study tested these assumptions by comparing different kinds of words (e.g., words versus non-words) and different kinds of word-word relations (e.g., associative versus repetition). For each experiment, the predictions of the original model were compared to an alternative model with different representational assumptions. Experiment 1 confirmed the prediction that non-words and inverted words require longer prime durations to eliminate positive repetition priming (i.e., a slower transition from positive to negative priming). Experiment 2 confirmed the prediction that associative priming increases and then decreases with increasing prime duration, but remains positive even with long duration primes. Experiment 3 replicated the effects of repetition and associative priming using a within-subjects design and combined these effects by examining target words that were expected to repeat (e.g., viewing the target word ‘BACK' after the prime phrase ‘back to'). These results support the originally assumed representational hierarchy and more generally the role of habituation in temporal parsing and priming.     

Familiarity,Priming, and Perception in Similarity Judgments

We present a novel way of accounting for similarity judgments. Our approach posits that similarity stems from three main sources—familiarity, priming, and inherent perceptual likeness. Here, we explore each of these constructs and demonstrate their individual and combined effectiveness in explaining similarity judgments. Using these three measures, our account of similarity explains ratings of simple, color‐based perceptual stimuli that display asymmetry effects, as well as more complicated perceptual stimuli with structural properties; more traditional approaches to similarity solve one or the other and have difficulty accounting for both. Overall, our work demonstrates the importance of each of these components of similarity in explaining similarity judgments, both individually and together, and suggests important implications for other similarity approaches.