Estimates of shape by eye, or, The little invariant that could

Five experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that observers apprehend specific constancies under change in perspective. The constancies were projective properties of ellipses pictured to slant and tilt in depth. Observers were asked to reproduce the static upright view of a moving pair of ellipses, using a computer graphics display and interface. Projective invariants for pairs of conics were computed on the observers’ productions. A few experimental conditions revealed near-perfect performance. When pairs of coplanar ellipses were viewed under dynamic transformation in perspective, then invariants calculated on the observers’ productions were a match – in value on average – to the invariants of the transforming ellipse pairs. It is proposed that measures of projective properties afford a family of techniques that can be applied to gauge acuity for complex shapes in the study of visual form perception.     

Labels can override perceptual categories in early infancy

An extensive body of research claims that labels facilitate categorisation, highlight the commonalities between objects and act as invitations to form categories for young infants before their first birthday. While this may indeed be a reasonable claim, we argue that it is not justified by the experiments described in the research. We report on a series of experiments that demonstrate that labels can play a causal role in category formation during infancy. Ten-month-old infants were taught to group computer-displayed, novel cartoon drawings into two categories under tightly controlled experimental conditions. Infants were given the opportunity to learn the two categories under four conditions: Without any labels, with two labels that correlated with category membership, with two labels assigned randomly to objects, and with one label assigned to all objects. Category formation was assessed identically in all conditions using a novelty preference procedure conducted in the absence of any labels. The labelling condition had a decisive impact on the way infants formed categories: When two labels correlated with the visual category information, infants learned two categories, just as if there had been no labels presented. However, uncorrelated labels completely disrupted the formation of any categories. Finally, consistent use of a single label across objects led infants to learn one broad category that included all the objects. These findings demonstrate that even before infants start to produce their first words, the labels they hear can override the manner in which they categorise objects.     

Predictive coding explains binocular rivalry: an epistemological review

Binocular rivalry occurs when the eyes are presented with different stimuli and subjective perception alternates between them. Though recent years have seen a number of models of this phenomenon, the mechanisms behind binocular rivalry are still debated and we still lack a principled understanding of why a cognitive system such as the brain should exhibit this striking kind of behaviour. Furthermore, psychophysical and neurophysiological (single cell and imaging) studies of rivalry are not unequivocal and have proven difficult to reconcile within one framework. This review takes an epistemological approach to rivalry that considers the brain as engaged in probabilistic unconscious perceptual inference about the causes of its sensory input. We describe a simple empirical Bayesian framework, implemented with predictive coding, which seems capable of explaining binocular rivalry and reconciling many findings. The core of the explanation is that selection of one stimulus, and subsequent alternation between stimuli in rivalry occur when: (i) there is no single model or hypothesis about the causes in the environment that enjoys both high likelihood and high prior probability and (ii) when one stimulus dominates, the bottom-up, driving signal for that stimulus is explained away while, crucially, the bottom-up signal for the suppressed stimulus is not, and remains as an unexplained but explainable prediction error signal. This induces instability in perceptual dynamics that can give rise to perceptual transitions or alternations during rivalry.     

Beyond perceptual symbols: A call for representational pluralism

Recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that certain cognitive processes employ perceptual representations. Inspired by this evidence, a few researchers have proposed that cognition is inherently perceptual. They have developed an innovative theoretical approach that rests on the notion of perceptual simulation and marshaled several general arguments supporting the centrality of perceptual representations to concepts. In this article, I identify a number of weaknesses in these arguments and defend a multiple semantic code approach that posits both perceptual and non-perceptual representations.     

Orientation perception in Williams Syndrome: Discrimination and integration

Williams Syndrome (WS) is a rare neurodevelopmental disorder, which stems from a genetic deletion on chromosome 7 and causes a profound weakness in visuospatial cognition. Our current study explores how orientation perception may contribute to the visuospatial deficits in WS. In Experiment 1, we found that WS individuals and normal 3–4 year olds had similar orientation discrimination thresholds and had similar prevalence of mirror-reversal errors for diagonal targets (±45 deg). In Experiment 2, we asked whether this immaturity in orientation discrimination would also be reflected in a task requiring integration of oriented elements. We found that sensitivities of WS individuals for detecting orientation-defined contours were higher than sensitivities of normal 3–4 year olds, and were not significantly different from sensitivities of normal adults. Together, these results suggest that orientation discrimination and orientation integration have different maturational trajectories in normal development and different susceptibilities to damage in WS. These may reflect largely separate visuospatial mechanisms.     

Perception with compensatory devices: from sensory substitution to sensorimotor extension

Sensory substitution devices provide through an unusual sensory modality (the substituting modality, e.g., audition) access to features of the world that are normally accessed through another sensory modality (the substituted modality, e.g., vision). In this article, we address the question of which sensory modality the acquired perception belongs to. We have recourse to the four traditional criteria that have been used to define sensory modalities: sensory organ, stimuli, properties, and qualitative experience ( Grice, 1962 ), to which we have added the criteria of behavioral equivalence ( Morgan, 1977 ), dedication ( Keeley, 2002 ), and sensorimotor equivalence ( O'Regan & Noë, 2001 ). We discuss which of them are fulfilled by perception through sensory substitution devices and whether this favors the view that perception belongs to the substituting or to the substituted modality. Though the application of a number of criteria might be taken to point to the conclusion that perception with a sensory substitution device belongs to the substituted modality, we argue that the evidence leads to an alternative view on sensory substitution. According to this view, the experience after sensory substitution is a transformation, extension, or augmentation of our perceptual capacities, rather than being something equivalent or reducible to an already existing sensory modality. We develop this view by comparing sensory substitution devices to other "mind-enhancing tools" such as pen and paper, sketchpads, or calculators. An analysis of sensory substitution in terms of mind-enhancing tools unveils it as a thoroughly transforming perceptual experience and as giving rise to a novel form of perceptual interaction with the environment.     

Nature versus nurture: The simple contrast

We respond to the commentary of Franklin, Wright, and Davies (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology,102, 239-245 [2009]) by returning to the simple contrast between nature and nurture. We find no evidence from the toddler data that makes us revise our ideas that color categories are learned and never innate.     

抑制控制能力衰退对知觉组织老年化的影响

通过比较注意线索对老年人和年轻人共线性和相似性知觉组织的影响,探讨了知觉组织老年化的原因。研究发现,注意线索对年轻人的助益更大,对老年人的助益较小,符合抑制控制理论的研究假设,同时本文还对加工速度、基本感觉能力等可能引起认知老年化的因素进行了分析。此外,还发现了知觉组织中与阅读习惯一致的方向偏好,无论在有无注意线索的条件下,135°方向上的知觉组织都快于45°方向上的知觉组织。     

Perceptual interactions in a minimalist virtual environment

How in real-life or through the use of technical devices can we recognize the presence of other persons and under what conditions can we differentiate them from objects? In order to approach this question, in the study reported here we explored the most basic conditions necessary for participants to recognize the presence of another person during a perceptual interaction. We created a mini-network of two minimalist devices and investigated whether participants were able to differentiate the perception of another person from the perception of a fixed and a mobile object even when the pattern of sensory stimulation was reduced to a bare minimum. We show that participants can recognize when the all-or-none tactile stimulation they experienced was attributable to an encounter with the other participant's avatar or the mobile object rather than with a fixed object. Participants were also able to establish different strategies in order to favor the situations of mutual perception. Thus, in the minimalist conditions of our experiment, the perception of another intentional subject was not based purely on any particular shape or objective trajectories of displacement; it was also based on properties that are intrinsic to the joint perceptual activity itself.     

Inattentional blindness for ignored words: Comparison of explicit and implicit memory tasks

Inattentional blindness is described as the failure to perceive a supra-threshold stimulus when attention is directed away from that stimulus. Based on performance on an explicit recognition memory test and concurrent functional imaging data Rees, Russell, Frith, and Driver [Rees, G., Russell, C., Frith, C. D., & Driver, J. (1999). Inattentional blindness versus inattentional amnesia for fixated but ignored words. Science, 286, 2504–2507] reported inattentional blindness for word stimuli that were fixated but ignored. The present study examined both explicit and implicit memory for fixated but ignored words using a selective-attention task in which overlapping picture/word stimuli were presented at fixation. No explicit awareness of the unattended words was apparent on a recognition memory test. Analysis of an implicit memory task, however, indicated that unattended words were perceived at a perceptual level. Thus, the selective-attention task did not result in perfect filtering as suggested by Rees et al. While there was no evidence of conscious perception, subjects were not blind to the implicit perceptual properties of fixated but ignored words.