Inference and the taking condition

It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rule‐following, or by finding an innocuous role for the taking‐belief. Finally, I propose an alternative account of taking, according to which it is not a separate belief, but rather an aspect of the attitude of believing: Believing that p implies not only taking p to be true and taking oneself to believe that p, but also taking one's reasons q to support p, when the belief in question is held on account of an inference.     

Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism

Externalist representationalism is touted as a superior rival to naïve realism, and yet a careful analysis of the externalist representationalist's analysis of our ordinary perceptual experiences shows the view to be far closer to naïve realism than we might have expected. One of the central advertised benefits of representationalist views in general is that they are compatible with the idea that ordinary, illusory and hallucinatory perceptual experiences are of the same fundamental kind. Naïve realists are forced to deny the ‘common fundamental kind claim’ and adopt disjunctivism. However, I argue that externalist representationalism is also a version of disjunctivism. Consequently, one of the main rivals to naïve realism turns out not to be a rival at all.     

When preview information starts to matter: Development of the perceptual span in German beginning readers

How is reading development reflected in eye-movement measures? How does the perceptual span change during the initial years of reading instruction? Does parafoveal processing require competence in basic word-decoding processes? We report data from the first cross-sectional measurement of the perceptual span of German beginning readers (n = 139), collected in the context of the large longitudinal PIER (Potsdamer Intrapersonale Entwicklungsrisiken/Potsdam study of intra-personal developmental risk factors) study of intrapersonal developmental risk factors. Using the moving-window paradigm, eye movements of three groups of students (Grades 1–3) were measured with gaze-contingent presentation of a variable amount of text around fixation. Reading rate increased from Grades 1–3, with smaller increases for higher grades. Perceptual-span results showed the expected main effects of grade and window size: fixation durations and refixation probability decreased with grade and window size, whereas reading rate and saccade length increased. Critically, for reading rate, first-fixation duration, saccade length and refixation probability, there were significant interactions of grade and window size that were mainly based on the contrast between Grades 3 and 2 rather than Grades 2 and 1. Taken together, development of the perceptual span only really takes off between Grades 2 and 3, suggesting that efficient parafoveal processing presupposes that basic processes of reading have been mastered.     

A Duet for one

This paper considers communication in terms of inference about the behaviour of others (and our own behaviour). It is based on the premise that our sensations are largely generated by other agents like ourselves. This means, we are trying to infer how our sensations are caused by others, while they are trying to infer our behaviour: for example, in the dialogue between two speakers. We suggest that the infinite regress induced by modelling another agent – who is modelling you – can be finessed if you both possess the same model. In other words, the sensations caused by others and oneself are generated by the same process. This leads to a view of communication based upon a narrative that is shared by agents who are exchanging sensory signals. Crucially, this narrative transcends agency – and simply involves intermittently attending to and attenuating sensory input. Attending to sensations enables the shared narrative to predict the sensations generated by another (i.e. to listen), while attenuating sensory input enables one to articulate the narrative (i.e. to speak). This produces a reciprocal exchange of sensory signals that, formally, induces a generalised synchrony between internal (neuronal) brain states generating predictions in both agents. We develop the arguments behind this perspective, using an active (Bayesian) inference framework and offer some simulations (of birdsong) as proof of principle.     

Why Higher Working Memory Capacity May Help You Learn: Sampling,Search, and Degrees of Approximation

Algorithms for approximate Bayesian inference, such as those based on sampling (i.e., Monte Carlo methods), provide a natural source of models of how people may deal with uncertainty with limited cognitive resources. Here, we consider the idea that individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) may be usefully modeled in terms of the number of samples, or “particles,” available to perform inference. To test this idea, we focus on two recent experiments that report positive associations between WMC and two distinct aspects of categorization performance: the ability to learn novel categories, and the ability to switch between different categorization strategies (“knowledge restructuring”). In favor of the idea of modeling WMC as a number of particles, we show that a single model can reproduce both experimental results by varying the number of particles—increasing the number of particles leads to both faster category learning and improved strategy‐switching. Furthermore, when we fit the model to individual participants, we found a positive association between WMC and best‐fit number of particles for strategy switching. However, no association between WMC and best‐fit number of particles was found for category learning. These results are discussed in the context of the general challenge of disentangling the contributions of different potential sources of behavioral variability.     

Cognitive Task Analysis for Implicit Knowledge About Visual Representations With Similarity Learning Methods

Visual representations are prevalent in STEM instruction. To benefit from visuals, students need representational competencies that enable them to see meaningful information. Most research has focused on explicit conceptual representational competencies, but implicit perceptual competencies might also allow students to efficiently see meaningful information in visuals. Most common methods to assess students’ representational competencies rely on verbal explanations or assume explicit attention. However, because perceptual competencies are implicit and not necessarily verbally accessible, these methods are ill‐equipped to assess them. We address these shortcomings with a method that draws on similarity learning, a machine learning technique that detects visual features that account for participants’ responses to triplet comparisons of visuals. In Experiment 1, 614 chemistry students judged the similarity of Lewis structures and in Experiment 2, 489 students judged the similarity of ball‐and‐stick models. Our results showed that our method can detect visual features that drive students’ perception and suggested that students’ conceptual knowledge about molecules informed perceptual competencies through top‐down processes. Furthermore, Experiment 2 tested whether we can improve the efficiency of the method with active sampling. Results showed that random sampling yielded higher accuracy than active sampling for small sample sizes. Together, the experiments provide the first method to assess students’ perceptual competencies implicitly, without requiring verbalization or assuming explicit visual attention. These findings have implications for the design of instructional interventions that help students acquire perceptual representational competencies.     

The informative value of type of repetition: Perceptual and conceptual fluency influences on judgments of truth

We contrast the effects of conceptual and perceptual fluency resulting from repetition in the truth effect. In Experiment 1, participants judged either verbatim or paraphrased repetitions, which reduce perceptual similarity to original statements. Judgments were made either immediately after the first exposure to the statements or after one week. Illusions of truth emerged for both types of repetition, with delay reducing both effects. In Experiment 2, participants judged verbatim and paraphrased repetitions with either the same or a contradictory meaning of original statements. In immediate judgments, illusions of truth emerged for repetitions with the same meaning and illusions of falseness for contradictory repetitions. In the delayed session, the illusion of falseness disappeared for contradictory statements. Results are discussed in terms of the contributions of recollection of stimulus details and of perceptual and conceptual fluency to illusions of truth at different time intervals and judgmental context conditions.     

A differing bidirectional impact on the recognition accuracy of facial expression

This study explored a bidirectional impact on the recognition accuracy of various facial expressions deriving from both the observer and sender in a sample of Chinese participants. A facial manipulation task was used to examine the ability of an observer's facial feedback to modulate the recognition of various facial expressions. Furthermore, the effect of a sender's facial expression with an open or closed mouth on recognition accuracy was investigated. The results showed that only recognition accuracy of a sad facial expression was influenced simultaneously by bidirectional sources from a sender and observer. Moreover, the impact of the unidirectional cue of a sender's facial feature (i.e., mouth openness) on happy and neutral faces was found to influence the recognition accuracy of these faces, but not the observer's bodily state. These findings indicate that the bidirectional impact derived from an observer and sender on facial expression recognition accuracy differs for emotional and neutral expressions.