Bartlett's schema theory: The unreplicated “portrait d'homme” series from 1932

In 1932, Frederic Bartlett laid the foundation for the later schema theory. His key assumption of previous knowledge affecting the processing of new stimuli was illustrated in the famous “portrait d'homme” series. Sequenced reproductions of ambiguous stimuli showed progressive object-likeness. As Bartlett pointed out, activation of specific schemata, for instance “the face schema”, biases memory retrieval towards such schemata. In five experiments (Experiment 1, n?=?53; Experiment 2, n?=?177; Experiment 3, n?=?36; Experiment 4, n?=?6; Experiment 5, n?=?2), we tested several factors potentially influencing retrieval biases—for example, by varying the general procedure of reproduction (repeated vs. serial) and by omitting versus providing visual or semantic cues for activating face schemata. Participants inspected face-like stimuli with the caption “portrait of the human” and reproduced them repeatedly under specific conditions. None of the experiments revealed a systematic tendency towards Bartlett's described case, even when the participants were explicitly instructed to draw “a face” like the previously inspected one. In one of the “serial reproduction” experiments, we even obtained contrary effects with decreasing face-likeness over the reproduction generations. A close analysis of the original findings raises questions about the replicability of Bartlett's findings, qualifying the “portrait d'homme” series more or less as an illustrative example of the main idea of reconstructive memory.     

Perceptual biases in processing facial identity and emotion

Normal observers demonstrate a bias to process the left sides of faces during perceptual judgments about identity or emotion. This effect suggests a right cerebral hemisphere processing bias. To test the role of the right hemisphere and the involvement of configural processing underlying this effect, young and older control observers and patients with right hemisphere damage completed two chimeric faces tasks (emotion judgment and face identity matching) with both upright and inverted faces. For control observers, the emotion judgment task elicited a strong left-sided perceptual bias that was reduced in young controls and eliminated in older controls by face inversion. Right hemisphere damage reversed the bias, suggesting the right hemisphere was dominant for this task, but that the left hemisphere could be flexibly recruited when right hemisphere mechanisms are not available or dominant. In contrast, face identity judgments were associated most clearly with a vertical bias favouring the uppermost stimuli that was eliminated by face inversion and right hemisphere lesions. The results suggest these tasks involve different neurocognitive mechanisms. The role of the right hemisphere and ventral cortical stream involvement with configural processes in face processing is discussed.     

Disentangling perceptual and motor components in inhibition of return

Following an abrupt onset of a peripheral stimulus (a cue), the response to a visual target is faster when the target appears at the cued position than when it appears at other positions. However, if the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) is longer than approximately 300 ms, the response to the target is slower at the cued position than that at other positions. This phenomenon of a longer response time to cued targets is called "inhibition of return" (IOR). Previous hypotheses propose contributions of both response inhibition and attentional inhibition at cued position to IOR, and suggest that responding to the cue can eliminate the component of response inhibition. The current study uses tasks either executing or withholding response to the cue to investigate the relative contributions of response and attention components to IOR. A condition with bilateral display of the cue is also chosen as a control condition, and eight different SOAs between 1,000 and 2,750 ms are tested. Compared to the control condition, response delay to the target at a cued position is eliminated by responding to the cue, and a response advantage to the target at an uncued position is not affected by responding to the cue. Furthermore, both response delay at a cued position and response advantage at an uncued position decrease with SOA in the time window tested in these experiments. The results reported here indicate a dominant response inhibition at a cued position and a primary attentional allocation at an uncued position for IOR. Nonsignificant perceptual/attentional suppression at a cued position is argued to be a benefit for visual detection in a changing world.     

The influence of athletic experience and kinematic information on skill-relevant affordance perception

Humans can perceive affordances both for themselves and for others, and affordance perception is a function of perceptual–motor experience involved in playing a sport. Two experiments investigated the enhanced affordance perception of athletes. In Experiment 1, basketball players and nonbasketball players provided perceptual reports for sports-relevant (maximum standing-reach and reach-with-jump heights) and non-sports-relevant (maximum sitting height) affordances for self and other. Basketball players were more accurate at perceiving maximum reach-with-jump for another person than were nonbasketball players, but were no better at perceiving maximum reach or sitting heights. Experiment 2 investigated the informational basis for this enhanced perceptual ability of basketball players by evaluating whether kinematics inform perceivers about action-scaled (e.g., force-production dependent), but not body-scaled (i.e., geometrically determined), affordances for others, and whether basketball experience enhances sensitivity to kinematic information. Only basketball players improved at perceiving an action-scaled affordance (maximum reach-with-jump), but not body-scaled affordances (maximum standing-reach and sit) with exposure to kinematic information, suggesting that action-scaled affordances may be specified by kinematic information to which athletes are already attuned by virtue of their sport experience.     

Using the process dissociation procedure to estimate recollection and familiarity in working memory: An experimental and individual differences investigation

Numerous studies have found that working memory capacity and perceptual speed predict variation in fluid intelligence. Within the cognitive ageing literature, perceptual speed accounts for substantial ageing variance in working memory capacity and fluid intelligence. However, within young adults, the interrelationships among these three abilities are less clear. The current work investigated these relationships via confirmatory factor analyses and structural equation modelling using tasks with verbal, spatial, and numerical content. The results indicate that working memory capacity and perceptual speed were not related in a large, cognitively diverse sample of young adults. However, both working memory capacity and perceptual speed accounted for unique variance in fluid intelligence. The results are discussed in relation to previous research with young and older adults.     

Perceptual and categorical judgements of colour similarity

Consideration is given to the tasks that make judgements of colour similarity based on perceptual similarity rather than categorical similarity. Irrespective of whether colour categories are taken to be universal (Berlin & Kay, 1969) or language induced (Davidoff, Davies, & Roberson, 1999), it is widely assumed that colour boundaries, and hence categorical similarity, would be used when categorising colours. However, we argue that categorical similarity is more reliably used in implicit than in explicit categorisation. Thus, in Experiment 1, we found that category boundaries may be overridden in the explicit task of matching-to-sample: There was a similar strong tendency to ignore colour boundaries and to divide the range of coloured stimuli into two equal groups in both Westerners and in a remote population (Himba). In Experiment 2, we showed that a distinctive stimulus (focal colour) in the range affected the equal division in a matching-to-sample task. Experiment 3 tested the stability of a category boundary in an implicit task (visual search) that assessed categorical perception; only for this task was categorisation largely immune to range effects and largely based on categorical similarity. It is concluded that, even after colour categories are acquired, perceptual rather than categorical similarity is commonly used in judgements of colour similarity.     

The "Perceptual Wedge Hypothesis" as the basis for bilingual babies' phonetic processing advantage: new insights from fNIRS brain imaging

In a neuroimaging study focusing on young bilinguals, we explored the brains of bilingual and monolingual babies across two age groups (younger 4-6 months, older 10-12 months), using fNIRS in a new event-related design, as babies processed linguistic phonetic (Native English, Non-Native Hindi) and nonlinguistic Tone stimuli. We found that phonetic processing in bilingual and monolingual babies is accomplished with the same language-specific brain areas classically observed in adults, including the left superior temporal gyrus (associated with phonetic processing) and the left inferior frontal cortex (associated with the search and retrieval of information about meanings, and syntactic and phonological patterning), with intriguing developmental timing differences: left superior temporal gyrus activation was observed early and remained stably active over time, while left inferior frontal cortex showed greater increase in neural activation in older babies notably at the precise age when babies’ enter the universal first-word milestone, thus revealing a first-time focalbrain correlate that may mediate a universal behavioral milestone in early human language acquisition. A difference was observed in the older bilingual babies’ resilient neural and behavioral sensitivity to Non-Native phonetic contrasts at a time when monolingual babies can no longer make such discriminations. We advance the “Perceptual Wedge Hypothesis” as one possible explanation for how exposure to greater than one language may alter neural and language processing in ways that we suggest are advantageous to language users. The brains of bilinguals and multilinguals may provide the most powerful window into the full neural “extent and variability” that our human species’ language processing brain areas could potentially achieve.     

Partial awareness distinguishes between measuring conscious perception and conscious content: Reply to Dienes and Seth

In their comment on Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, and Cleeremans (2010), Dienes and Seth argue that increased sensitivity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) is a consequence of the scale being less exclusive rather than more exhaustive. According to Dienes and Seth, this is because PAS may measure some conscious content, though not necessarily relevant conscious content, “If one saw a square but was only aware of seeing a flash of something, then one has not consciously seen a square.” In this reply, we claim that there is a difference between conscious visual experience, which may be partial, and the resulting conscious content, which is conceptual. Whereas PAS measures the first, confidence judgments and post-decision wagering measure the second.     

Perceptual simulation in developing language comprehension

We tested an embodied account of language proposing that comprehenders create perceptual simulations of the events they hear and read about. In Experiment 1, children (ages 7–13 years) performed a picture verification task. Each picture was preceded by a prerecorded spoken sentence describing an entity whose shape or orientation matched or mismatched the depicted object. Responses were faster for matching pictures, suggesting that participants had formed perceptual-like situation models of the sentences. The advantage for matching pictures did not increase with age. Experiment 2 extended these findings to the domain of written language. Participants (ages 7–10 years) of high and low word reading ability verified pictures after reading sentences aloud. The results suggest that even when reading is effortful, children construct a perceptual simulation of the described events. We propose that perceptual simulation plays a more central role in developing language comprehension than was previously thought.