异性交友决策任务上为不同心理距离他人决策的风险偏好

使用中国文化背景下修订的Beisswanger等人的异性交友决策问卷, 采用2种方法操纵自我-他人心理距离, 考察了男女大学生在后果严重性不同的异性交友决策任务上为不同心理距离他人决策风险偏好的差异。实验1发现, 被试为具体和笼统他人决策时的风险偏好无显著差异, 在后果不严重任务上比后果严重任务上更冒险, 男性比女性更冒险。心理距离与决策者性别的交互作用显著：男性为具体他人决策更冒险, 而女性为笼统他人决策更冒险。实验2发现, 被试为不相似他人比为相似他人决策更冒险, 在后果不严重任务上比在后果严重任务上更冒险, 男性比女性更冒险。后果严重性与决策者性别交互作用显著：男性在后果严重和不严重任务上的风险偏好无显著差异, 而女性在后果不严重任务上比后果严重任务上更冒险。综合两个实验的结果, 可以得出以下结论：相对于具体和笼统他人的区分而言, 相似和不相似他人的区分是一种更加稳定和有效的区分自我-他人心理距离的方法。结合相关研究及理论对结果进行了讨论。     

风险决策中的双参照点效应

以预期理论为代表的决策理论认为, 决策者自身的损益状态对风险决策有重要作用, 因此, 将决策者的现状定义为个人参照点。它决定了决策情境是个人获益还是个人损失。个人参照点直接关乎决策者实际的得失, 具有直接性、真实性和绝对性的特征。然而, 社会比较理论认为, 与他人的比较结果同样对风险决策具有不可忽视的意义。因此, 将他人的状态定义为社会参照点。自身的现状与他人状态相比较的结果决定了决策情境是社会获益还是社会损失。社会参照点无关决策者的实际得失, 具有间接性、假设性和相对性的特征。社会参照点通过自我概念、情绪、认知等路径作用于风险决策。更为重要的是, 社会参照点和个人参照点同时存在于风险决策过程中, 决策者对两者的心理感受和行为倾向具有相似性, 因此两者将共同影响决策者的风险选择。基于此, 本文提出风险决策中的双参照点效应。有关双参照点对风险决策过程的影响机制还需进一步的探讨。     

风险偏好、信息完整性对职业决策信息加工的影响

本研究旨在探讨个体风险偏好如何影响信息加工过程;同时呈现信息的完整性是否影响个体信息加工过程。以31名正在求职的大学生为被试,探讨了他们在信息板上进行职业决策的信息加工过程。结果显示：(1) 低风险偏好者比高风险偏好者更关注与概率相关的线索;(2) 当信息不完整时,个体在决策中增加了对概率相关线索的关注;(3) 信息完整性对个体决策信息加工过程并未产生显著的影响。     

Shared knowledge and subgroup influence during decision‐making discussions

It was predicted that preference factions within decision‐making groups would have greater influence to the extent that faction‐member preferences are based on a common pool of decision‐relevant information. Such factions are said to exhibit high informational commonality (IC). Four‐person groups decided how much money to invest in each of two pharmaceutical companies developing new cholesterol‐lowering drugs. Prior to discussion, information about these companies and drugs was distributed among members such that two would initially prefer investing in one company and two would initially prefer investing in the other company. Further, whereas half of the information held by members of one preference faction was held in common between them (high IC), almost none of the information held by those in the other faction was held in common between them (low IC). It was found that groups invested more money in a given company when that company was initially preferred by their high‐IC faction. Additionally, high‐IC factions exerted greater influence on members' private allocation preferences. These effects appear to have been due to the ability of members in the high‐IC factions to work together in a more coordinated manner to argue their position. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What is learned from experience in a probabilistic environment?

Three experiments explored what is learned from experience in a probabilistic environment. The task was a simulated medical decision‐making task with each patient having one of two test results and one of two diseases. The test result was highly predictive of the disease for all participants. The base rate of the test result was varied between participants to produce different inverse conditional probabilities of the test result given the disease across conditions. Participants trained using feedback to predict a patient's disease from a test result showed the classic confusion of the inverse error, substituting the forward conditional probability for the inverse conditional probability when tested on it. Additional training on the base rate of the test result did little to improve performance. Training on the joint probabilities, however, produced good performance on either conditional probability. The pattern of results demonstrated that experience with the environment is not always sufficient for good performance. That natural sampling leads to good performance was not supported. Further, because participants not trained on joint probabilities did, however, know them but still committed the confusion of the inverse error, the hypothesis that having joint probabilities would facilitate performance was not supported. The pattern of results supported the conclusion that people learn all the necessary information from experience in a probabilistic environment, but depending upon what the experience was, it may interfere with their ability to recall to memory the appropriate sample set necessary for estimating or using the inverse conditional probability. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rationality and bounded information in repeated games, with application to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Actions in a repeated game can in principle depend on all previous outcomes. Given this vast policy space, human players may often be forced to use heuristics that base actions on incomplete information, such as the outcomes of only the most recent trials. Here it is proven that such bounded rationality is often fully rational, in that the optimal policy based on some limited information about the game's history will be universally optimal (i.e., within the full policy space), provided that one's opponents are restricted to using this same information. It is then shown how this result allows explicit calculation of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) for any repeated or stochastic game. The technique is applied to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma for the case of 1-back memory. Two classes of SPEs are derived, which exhibit varying degrees of (individually rational) cooperation as a result of repeated interaction.     

Perceptual learning in flavor-aversion learning: Alternating and blocked exposure to a compound of flavors and to an element of that compound

Rats received different schedules of pre-exposure to a compound flavor (AX) and to one element of that compound (X). In Group ALT, exposure consisted of alternating trials with AX and X; Group BLK received a block with all AX trials before a separate block with all X trials (or vice versa). Discrimination between AX and X was assessed then by establishing an aversion to X and measuring the generalization of this aversion to AX. In Experiments 1A and 1B, generalization was less in Group ALT than in Group BLK. In Experiment 2, this latter result was confirmed and furthermore only Group ALT, and not Group BLK, showed less generalization than a group that received exposure to X alone. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for theories of perceptual learning.     

The Pursuit of Epistemic Good

Pace Zagzebski, there is no route from the value of knowledge to a non–reliabilist virtue–theoretic epistemology. Her discussion of the value problem is marred by an uncritical and confused employment of the notion of a "state" of knowledge, an uncritical acceptance of a "knowledge–belief" identity thesis, and an incoherent presumption that the widely held thought that knowledge is more valuable than true belief amounts to the view that knowledge is a state of true belief having an intrinsic property which a state of 'mere" true belief lacks. Her arguments against a "machine–product" conception of knowledge are undermined by these flaws, while the alternative "agent–act" model she recommends is unattractive, at odds with the knowledge–belief identity thesis she favours, and no solution to the problem of the value of knowledge she poses. I end with the observation that her version of virtue–theoretic epistemology points in the direction of cognitive decision–theoretic norms, and I briefly discuss the bearing of this fact upon her viewpoint.     

The role of affect in the WTA/WTP disparity

Four studies demonstrated robust within‐ and between‐subject differences in willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) and willingness‐to‐accept (WTA) measures of the value of lottery tickets. Buyers and sellers attended to different numerical cues and interpreted the same numbers differently when setting these two kinds of monetary values. Affective influences appeared to guide the valuation process. Buyers with stronger positive feelings about owning a ticket were willing to pay more for a ticket; sellers with stronger negative feelings about no longer having a ticket required a greater minimum payment in exchange for their ticket. In addition, the WTA/WTP disparity tended to be greater for more affectively‐laden lottery tickets. The results suggest that WTA and WTP prices are constructed using salient numerical cues and affective feelings. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.