Discussions

Summary  In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor” ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy and that instead of concocting more “recherché” thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical. In this comment I will argue that Peijnenburg’s and Atkinson’s view on thought experiments is based on a misleading characterization of both, the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a considerably different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments.

For I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering that an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. We are already at the present time, in my opinion, in possession of methods which make any such conflict in principle unnecessary. What is now required is their resolute application. (Schlick, ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy’, 1930/1959, p. 54).

     

浅议辩证思维方法在高血压预防及治疗中的应用

辩证思维方法是最普遍适用、最重要的科学思维方法之一。高血压的预防及治疗中的各个方面无不渗透着丰富的哲学思想,理解和把握哲学思想对高血压的防治具有重要的指导意义。     

肝癌时间生物学研究的启示

在临床一线工作中发现肝癌病人就诊率有一定的时间现象,而在时间生物学理论启发下开拓了肝癌时间生物学研究的创新思路,体会到新科学理论是一把开启科学思维的金钥匙,但还必须善于用在科学实践上。在“对立统一”哲学原理的启发下,根据爱因斯坦“弯曲时空”原理找到气候差异很大的不同经纬度区域的肝癌临床时间生物学特征是否为同一性的论证方法。根据“对立统一”哲学原理,对肝癌细胞内正/负向癌基因进行对应表达实验研究,探索肝癌时间生物学特征的分子机制。对肝癌时间生物学研究最终目标进行了哲理性思考。     

5～9岁儿童对心理过程差异的理解

对心理过程差异的理解是学龄后儿童心理理论发展的一部分。本文主要探讨5-9岁儿童对心理过程差异的理解,即理解两个体在看到同样的物体时思维过程是否相同。采用“思想泡泡”的方法给5岁、7岁、9岁各20名儿童讲述故事,考察故事中人物背景知识的有无、对象的不同(自我-他人/他人-他人)及对象间关系的不同(朋友/陌生人)对儿童判断心理过程差异的影响。结果发现,有无背景信息对儿童理解心理过程差异有显著影响,而故事中对象不同及对象之间关系的不同对儿童理解心理过程差异无显著影响。同时还发现,随着年龄的增长,儿童逐渐意识到两个体的思维过程是不同的且能提供比较充分的解释,对心理过程差异的理解使学龄后儿童对个体独特性有更深的了解。     

Poverty Among Adults with Disabilities: Barriers to Promoting Asset Accumulation in Individual Development Accounts

Adults with disabilities disproportionally experience poverty. We examine one novel strategy to promote economic well-being among adults with disabilities living in or near poverty, namely Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). IDAs are designed to help individuals save money and subsequently accumulate assets. Although adults with disabilities account for the majority of IDA participants, scant attention has been paid to their IDA saving performance. We describe the significance of accumulating assets, particularly as it relates to adults with disabilities. We then map the nature of IDA programs and analyze barriers to participation in IDAs and asset accumulation related to conflicting federal policies and a lack of sensitivity to disability-specific needs. We conclude by offering policy recommendations from our analysis, including the need to eliminate the means-tests used in welfare policies, de-linking participation in IDAs from employment status, and involving people with disabilities in designing and evaluating asset accumulation policies and programs.     

Distinguishing rumination from worry in clinical insomnia

Research has found that repetitive thought processes, such as worry and rumination, play an important role in several disorders; however, these cognitive processes have not yet been examined in insomnia. This study explores rumination and worry in insomnia by examining: 1) whether those high and low on rumination and worry differ on subjective sleep measures, and 2) whether rumination and worry are distinct processes in insomnia. Participants (N = 242) were diagnosed with an insomnia disorder by sleep experts. Participants completed measures of worry and rumination and maintained a 2-week daily sleep log. Results of a multivariate analysis of variance found no main effect of worry; although high and low ruminators differed on several sleep log indices, including sleep efficiency, wakefulness after sleep onset and sleep quality. Factor analysis supported the idea that rumination and worry are separate constructs. Whereas previous research has focused on worry in insomnia, these findings suggest that rumination is important for understanding sleep disturbance. Further, although rumination and worry are both repetitive thought processes, these results indicate that they are distinct processes within insomnia and should be treated as such. The results are discussed with respect to treatment implications for Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Insomnia.     

Inferential Transitions

This paper provides a naturalistic account of inference. We posit that the core of inference is constituted by bare inferential transitions (BITs), transitions between discursive mental representations guided by rules built into the architecture of cognitive systems. In further developing the concept of BITs, we provide an account of what Boghossian [2014] calls ‘taking’—that is, the appreciation of the rule that guides an inferential transition. We argue that BITs are sufficient for implicit taking, and then, to analyse explicit taking, we posit rich inferential transitions (RITs), which are transitions that the subject is disposed to endorse.     

The effects of a wisdom intervention in a Christian congregation*

Psychological research on the topic of wisdom is limited in its incorporation of religion and spirituality. This gap in psychological literature may serve to limit a thorough understanding of wisdom. Positive psychology may allow for some rapprochement in wisdom and spirituality. In collaboration with leaders of a local Friends (Quaker) congregation, two studies investigated the effects of a spiritually informed wisdom intervention delivered in the context of a faith community. Participants for Study 1 consisted of 27 young adults (24 completed both the pre and post questionnaire) and a comparison group consisting of 32 young adults. The intervention was designed to increase participants’ abilities in cognitive, affective and moral domains. Significant group by time interaction effects were found among measurements of practical wisdom, post-formal thinking and subjective well-being, with those in the experimental group showing changes in the expected direction. Study 2 involved qualitative analyses of interviews with 15 of the wisdom participants regarding their changing views of wisdom. Themes emerging from the interviews included a multiple-perspectives view of wisdom, the relational nature of learning wisdom, the importance of taking a reflective perspective, and congruence between what one knows and how one lives. Implications for studying wisdom alongside religion and spirituality are considered.     

Integration and authority: rescuing the ‘one thought too many’ problem

Four decades ago, Bernard Williams accused Kantian moral theory of providing agents with ‘one thought too many’. The general consensus among contemporary Kantians is that this objection has been decisively answered. In this paper, I reconstruct the problem, showing that Williams was not principally concerned with how agents are to think in emergency situations, but rather with how moral theories are to be integrated into recognizably human lives. I show that various Kantian responses to Williams provide inadequate materials for solving this ‘integration problem’, and that they are correspondingly ill-positioned to account for the authority of morality, as Williams suspected all along.     

The unity of moral attitudes: recipe semantics and credal exaptation*

Abstract

This paper offers a noncognitivist characterization of moral attitudes, according to which moral attitudes count as such because of their inclusion of moral concepts. Moral concepts are distinguished by their contribution to the functional roles of some of the attitudes in which they can occur. They have no particular functional role in other attitudes, and should instead be viewed as evolutionary spandrels. In order to make the counter-intuitive implications of the view more palatable, the paper ends with an account of the evolution of normative judgments as exaptations of the cognitive structures that underlie beliefs.