The You Turn

This introductory paper sets out a framework for approaching some of the claims about the second person made by the papers collected in the special edition of Philosophical Explorations on The Second Person (2014, 17:3). It does so by putting centre stage the notion of a ‘bipolar second person relation’, and examining ways of giving it substance suggested by the authors of these papers. In particular, it focuses on claims made (and denied) in these papers (a) about the existence and/or nature of second person thought, second person reasons for action and second person reasons for belief and (b) about possible connections among thought-theoretical, ethical and epistemological issues and debates in this area.     

I Think,Therefore I Persist

Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2?+?2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2?+?2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal and the screen in front of you is blank. Then at some point an image of a peach is flashed on the screen. The image isn't up there for long. In fact, it's only on the screen for what seems like an instant—just long enough for you to see it. These two scenarios are a bit mundane. But, as I will show, reflection on them can yield significant results concerning the nature of persons and their persistence through time. First I will show that thought and perception have temporal constraints whereby your thinking or perceiving in the above scenarios implies that you exist through a temporally extended interval. Then I will argue that this allows us to rule out several prominent theories of personal identity.     

Information presentation format moderates the unconscious-thought effect: The role of recollection

The unconscious-thought effect occurs when distraction improves complex decision-making. In two experiments using the unconscious-thought paradigm, we investigated the effect of presentation format of decision information (i) on memory for decision-relevant information and (ii) on the quality of decisions made after distraction, conscious deliberation or immediately. We used the process-dissociation procedure to measure recollection and familiarity. The two studies showed that presenting information blocked per criterion led participants to recollect more decision-relevant details compared to a presentation by option. Moreover, a Bayesian meta-analysis of the two studies provided strong evidence that conscious deliberation resulted in better decisions when the information was presented blocked per criterion and substantial evidence that distraction improved decision quality when the information was presented blocked per option. Finally, Study 2 revealed that the recollection of decision-relevant details mediated the effect of presentation format on decision quality in the deliberation condition. This suggests that recollection contributes to conscious deliberation efficacy.     

True self-alienation positively predicts reports of mindwandering

Two studies assessed the relationship between feelings of uncertainty about who one truly is (i.e., true self-alienation) and self-reported task-unrelated thoughts (i.e., mindwandering) during performance tasks. Because true self-alienation is conceptualized as the subjective disconnect between conscious awareness and actual experience, we hypothesized that greater feelings of true self-alienation would positively relate to subjective reports of mindwandering. Two convergent studies supported this hypothesis. Moreover, this relationship could not consistently be accounted for by the independent influence of other aspects of authenticity, negative mood, mindfulness, or broad personality dimensions. These findings suggest that individual differences in true self-alienation are reliably associated with subjective reports of mindwandering. The implications of these findings for the true self-alienation construct, the ways that personality relates to mindwandering, and future research directions focused on curtailing mindwandering and improving performance and achievement are discussed.     

无意识思维:理论、质疑与回应

Dijksterhuis等人发现在解决复杂问题时,无意识思维的加工结果优于有意识思维,并据此提出了无意识思维理论。本文介绍了支持无意识思维理论的基本实验证据,质疑无意识思维的相关研究及对质疑的回应研究。未来研究应重点关注改进无意识思维研究范式和寻找更多影响无意识思维效应的中介变量,无意识思维加工结果如何上升到有意识层面,无意识思维的加工方式以及其在真实和高风险任务情境中的应用。     

The arms of the chimeras

This article seeks to compare the approach developed in 1974 by Michel de M'Uzan to the concept of the ‘chimera’ with Thomas Ogden's ( 1995 , 2005 ) reflections on ‘the analytic third’. This comparison shows that in spite of the different theoretical approaches, unconscious to unconscious communication – a subject of interest in contemporary psychoanalytic research – makes it possible to grasp the intersubjective data deployed in the field of the session. After reviewing M. de M'Uzan's conception of the ‘chimera’ – a product of the unconsciouses of patient and analyst alike, and which emerges during a process of depersonalization in the analyst – the author proposes her hypothesis of the chimera as a particular intersubjective third whose creation, in a hallucinatory state, makes it possible to gain access to the bodily and emotional basis of the trauma. The author describes the chimera as a mental ‘squiggle’ between the two members of the pair which finds expression in different forms; further, she considers that the chimera that seizes the analyst is underpinned by the unconscious affinities of traumatic zones in both protagonists, which permit the grounding, configuration and sharing of the territories of suffering, as apprehended in this paper.     

The Effect of Positive Emotions with Different Arousal Levels on Thought–Action Repertoires1,2

This study examined whether the induction of different states of arousal via positive emotions broadens thought–action repertoires. Sixty-two Japanese undergraduate and graduate students were randomly assigned to (a) high-arousal positive emotion, (b) low-arousal positive emotion, and (c) neutral groups, after which they watched a 3-min film clip. Participants completed the Affect Grid to confirm their mood state before and after watching the film. Following this, they completed the Twenty Statements Test, which measures thought–action repertoires. A one-way analysis of variance was conducted on the Twenty Statements Test score. The results showed that high-arousal positive emotion broadened thought–action repertoires to a greater extent than did low-arousal positive emotion and the neutral state, while low-arousal positive emotion broadened such repertoires to a greater extent than did the neutral state. We discuss the different effects of high- and low-arousal positive emotions on thought–action repertoires.     

The experimental critique and philosophical practice

Some experimental philosophers have criticized the standard intuition-based methodology in philosophy. One worry about this criticism is that it is just another version of the general skepticism toward the evidential efficacy of intuition, and is thereby subject to the same difficulties. In response, Weinberg provides a more nuanced version of the criticism by targeting merely the philosophical use of intuition. I contend that, though Weinberg’s approach differs from general skepticism about intuition, its focus on philosophical practices gives rise to a new difficulty. Most extant experimental surveys investigate intuitions about particular cases through vignettes giving little contextual information. However, philosophical practices crucially depend on intuitions about general claims and typically provide more contextual background. I argue that, due to these two differences between surveys’ and philosophers’ appeals to intuition, Weinberg’s critique lacks enough support from current experimental data. I conclude that experimental philosophers who engage in the negative program should pay more attention on testing philosophers’ use of general intuitions and context-rich intuitions.