Erikson’s Schedule of Human Strengths and the Church’s Self-Images

This article focuses on Erik H. Erikson’s schedule of human strengths presented in his essay, “Human Strength and the Cycle of Generations” (Erikson 1964) and suggests that certain images of the church support these human strengths. In supporting these human strengths, they also contribute to our understanding of the importance of the fact that the church is an intergenerational body.     

The myth of open concepts: Meehl’s analysis of construct meaning versus black box essentialism

Two views of theoretical concepts in psychology are compared. Meehl’s “open concept” account holds that theoretical concepts are implicitly defined by theories but that empirical criteria can be changed over time (e.g., added or dropped, weightings changed, exchanged for theoretical reductions). This account confuses concepts and theories, does not reflect how diagnostic concepts actually work in medicine and psychology, leads to theory incommensurability, and is unclear about when concepts are the same or different. I propose that an alternative “black box essentialist” account of theoretical concepts, drawn from recent philosophical work on natural kind concepts, better explains how we manage to refer to the same construct even as our theories and criteria change. One implication is that Meehl is incorrect to claim that a reason for psychology’s lack of progress is that its concepts are inherently different from those in the hard sciences.     

Paul’s “Thorn in the Flesh” and Christian Mission to People with Disabilities

This article attempts a holistic theological analysis of what the mission of the church to people living with disabilities (PLWDs) should be. The article pays attention to Paul’s reference to a “thorn in his flesh” using the theory of complex embodiment. It counters the emphasis in some churches on healing as the proper response to the needs of PLWDs. Rather, the article seek to present a theology that gives PLWDs greater knowledge of and control over their bodies to live meaningful lives even with their disabilities. The article argues that Paul lived with a disability and that although he sought to have it healed, he later accepted it and lived fully and meaningfully with it. It concludes that, from the example of Paul, the church’s mission to PLWDs should not necessarily be the healing of disabilities but their empowerment and integration in our societies.     

CAN PERSONALITY UNDERPIN ATTITUDES TO BOTH SCIENCE AND RELIGION?

Drawing on Peter Harrison's argument that individuals should be attributed a central role in analyses of the relationship between science and religion, this article proposes that an understanding of personality can help us better appreciate a person's attitudes to both science and religion. Rather than seeing an individual's attitudes to these two topics as separate, if sometimes overlapping, parts of their lives, it is suggested that both may result from psychological drives and sometimes from the same psychological drive. Two contrasting case studies are employed to illustrate this proposal. First, Paul Dirac who, it is argued, was on the autistic spectrum, a personality profile that is often linked to both mathematical physics and atheism. By contrast, Michael Faraday's scientific practice and his commitment to a specific form of Christianity were underpinned by his need for security, as assured by the God‐given laws that operated in both the physical and moral domains.     

Managing Frustration for Children (MFC) Group Intervention for ADHD: An Open Trial of a Novel Group Intervention for Deficient Emotion Regulation

Deficient emotion regulation is a common and impairing area of difficulty among children with ADHD. Few interventions specifically address deficient emotion regulation. The Managing Frustration for Children With ADHD (MFC) group treatment was developed to specifically target deficient emotion regulation deficits common to children with ADHD. The MFC was developed as a 12-week multisystemic intervention for emotion regulation deficits among children with ADHD. An open trial assessed the effectiveness of the MFC as an adjunctive treatment for deficient emotion regulation among children with ADHD. Fifty-two children with ADHD ages 9–11 (42 boys, 10 girls) were enrolled in the MFC, with 44 completing treatment. The majority (71.2%) of participants had at least one comorbid internalizing, externalizing, or learning disorder. Intent-to-treat repeated-measures ANCOVA suggested significant decreases in emotion regulation deficits, mood difficulties, and externalizing difficulties following completion of treatment. More than half (53%) of children who completed treatment experienced reliable and clinically significant improvement in at least one area of functioning. The MFC demonstrated promising initial effectiveness in addressing the emotion regulation deficits of children with ADHD.     

Pathologies of Desire and Duty: Freud, Ricoeur, and Castoriadis on Transforming Religious Culture

This article emphasizes an underappreciated aspect of Freud’s critique of religion taken up in the writings of Ricoeur and Castoriadis: the degree to which pathologies of desire and duty imbue our relation to shared cultural forms, i.e., narratives, ideals, and values. Both thinkers find in Freud’s anti-religious polemic a valuable attempt to address the intransigence, fanaticism, and violence that can result from an unreflected affirmation of Tradition. Alongside developing a respect and acceptance of other cultures, they argue for the need to establish a critical relation to ‘sacred’meaning structures, one that mirrors interpretive strategies within the psychoanalytic process. Ricoeur and Castoriadis critique Freud’s accentuation of neurosis while extending his thinking into personal-philosophical and social-political contexts.

Who is the Lifelong Learner? Globalization, Lifelong Learning and Hermeneutics

The aim of this essay is to elaborate on the inner connection between three such diverse entities as lifelong learning, globalization and hermeneutics. After placing lifelong learning in a societal context framed by globalization, my intention is to reflect on the prerequisites for introducing a hermeneutical contribution to the understanding of lifelong learning. First, it is stated that globalization is the most profound horizon today for explaining the current interest we experience in both lifelong learning and hermeneutics. Second, from these links to on globalization, we can also expect to find new links between lifelong learning and hermeneutics. Third, the predominant configuration of lifelong learning according to the logics of globalization and virtues of flexibility is demonstrated, and thereafter criticized mainly from the perspectives of philosophical anthropology. Finally, an alternative configuration of meaning and identity formation in lifelong learning is proposed by utilizing a reformulated theory of interpretation made possible thanks to recent metamorphosis inside the hermeneutical tradition itself.

Believing one’s reasons are good

Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to that latter belief as well. While such principles and their close relatives figure centrally in a wide variety of recent epistemological discussions, there is confusion in the literature about what, precisely, Inferential Internalism commits one to and whether it is so much as coherent. This paper (1) articulates a broader framework for understanding the notion of epistemic responsibility, (2) motivates Inferential Internalism on the basis of considerations about the basing relation, epistemic responsibility, and parallels with practical deliberation, (3) defends Inferential Internalism against charges of incoherence leveled by James Van Cleve and Paul Boghossian, and (4) shows that contrary to a currently widespread view, Inferential Internalism is coherent even if foundationalism and the a priori are rejected. The paper closes with a preliminary argument for an affirmative answer to the initiating question about the requirements of epistemic responsibility.     

THE DUALISTIC,DISCARNATE PICTURE THAT HAUNTS THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

A dualistic, discarnate picture haunts contemporary cognitive science of religion (CSR). Cognitive scientists of religion generally assert or assume a reductive physicalism, primarily through unconscious mental mechanisms that detect supernatural agency where none exists and a larger purpose to life when none exists. Accompanying this focus is a downplaying of conscious reflection in religious belief and practice. Yet the mind side of dualism enters into CSR in interesting ways. Some cognitive scientists turn practitioners of religion into dualists who allegedly believe in disembodied spirits. By emphasizing supernatural agency, CSR neglects nonpersonal powers and meanings in religion, both in terms of magical thinking and practice and of nonpersonal conceptions of divinity. Additionally, some cognitive scientists of religion declare that all humans are innate dualists. They use this alleged dualism to explain beliefs about both an afterlife and transfers of consciousness. Finally, some call on this dualism to serve a salvific function, trying to salvage some meaning to human life.     

Depiction and plastic perception. A critique of Husserl’s theory of picture consciousness

In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such as Goodman’s, I submit that his overall theory is unacceptable, especially when it is applied to works of art. Regarding art, the main problem of Husserl’s theory is the assumption that pictures are constituted primarily as a conflict between perception/physical picture thing and imagination/picture object. Against this mentalist claim, I maintain, from a hermeneutic point of view, that pictures are the result of perceptual formations [Bildungen]. I then claim that Husserl’s theory fails, since it does not take into account what I call “plastic perception” [Bildliches Sehen], which plays a prominent role not only within the German tradition of art education but also within German art itself. In this connection, “plastic thinking” [Bildliches Denken] was prominent especially in Klee, in Kandinsky, and in Beuys, as well as in the overall doctrine of the Bauhaus. Ultimately, I argue that Husserl’s notion of picture consciousness and general perceptive imaginary consciousness must be replaced with a more dynamic model of the perception of pictures and art work that takes into account (a) the constructive and plastic moment, (b) the social dimension and (c) the genetic dimension of what it means to see something in something (Wollheim).