Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects

This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within‐subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high‐NC, compared to low‐NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Risk preferences in young children: early evidence of individual differences in reaction to potential gains and losses

New methods were developed for studying risky decision making in children as young as age five. Each child was given a block of ‘gain’ trials, for example, a choice between a sure gain of one prize and a 50:50 chance of gaining either two prizes or no prize, and a block of ‘loss’ trials, for example, a choice between a sure loss of one prize and a 50:50 chance of losing either two prizes or no prize. We were thus able to compare risky choice for gains and losses at the level of the individual child. In each of two experiments a variety of individual difference variables were measured, including in Experiment 2, the child's parent's scores on the same task. Across experiments, the preponderance of choices was of the risky option. However, most children and adults made more risky choices in the domain of losses than in the domain of gains. Predictors of individual differences in children included shyness, impulsivity, and the risk taking of the child's parent. We suggest that methods are now in place to encourage further studies of decision processes in young children. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How effortful decisions get enacted: the motivating role of decision processes,desires, and anticipated emotions

Building on recent research examining the influence of decision making on subsequent goal striving and decision enactment, we consider and elaborate on the mechanisms through which effortful decisions are made, maintained, and enacted. Our proposed framework builds on the Dholakia and Bagozzi ( 2002 ) model, distinguishes between two important types of intentions and desires, and shows that the motivation‐mustering function of the decision process is mediated by goal and implementation desires. In addition to decision processes, the roles of goal feasibility, anticipated emotions, attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control are also elaborated on. Through a two‐wave field study tracking real decisions and their pursuit by participants, we find empirical support for our model of effortful decision making and enactment. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

10‐month‐old infants’ inference of invisible agent: Distinction in causality between object motion and human action1

Abstract: Two habituation experiments investigated 10‐month‐old infants’ interpretation of events where a stationary object began to move without any visible causes. During habituation, infants saw that an object partly hidden by an occluder began to move away from the occluder. Then, they were tested with three test events without the occluder: the ?rst event showed a hand pushing the object, the second event showed a hand failing to touch the object, and the last event had no agent. The objects were a ball in Experiment 1, and a person in Experiment 2. The test event that the infants looked at for the shortest duration in Experiment 1 was where the hand pushed the ball, whereas they looked at the three test events almost equal amounts of time in Experiment 2. These results indicate that 10‐month‐old infants responded to the events in terms of causality and could infer the presence of the agent behind the occluder only when they saw the habituation event featuring the ball.     

Make‐or‐Break: Chasing Risky Goals or Settling for Safe Rewards?

Humans regularly pursue activities characterized by dramatic success or failure outcomes where, critically, the chances of success depend on the time invested working toward it. How should people allocate time between such make‐or‐break challenges and safe alternatives, where rewards are more predictable (e.g., linear) functions of performance? We present a formal framework for studying time allocation between these two types of activities, and we explore optimal behavior in both one‐shot and dynamic versions of the problem. In the one‐shot version, we illustrate striking discontinuities in the optimal time allocation policy as we gradually change the parameters of the decision‐making problem. In the dynamic version, we formulate the optimal strategy—defined by a giving‐up threshold—which adaptively dictates when people should stop pursuing the make‐or‐break goal. We then show that this strategy is computationally inaccessible for humans, and we explore boundedly rational alternatives. We compare the performance of the optimal model against (a) a myopic giving‐up threshold that is easier to compute, and even simpler heuristic strategies that either (b) only decide whether or not to start pursuing the goal and never give up or (c) consider giving up at a fixed number of control points. Comparing strategies across environments, we investigate the cost and behavioral implications of sidestepping the computational burden of full rationality.     

Model-based recursive partitioning of extended redundancy analysis with an application to nicotine dependence among US adults

Extended redundancy analysis (ERA) is used to reduce multiple sets of predictors to a smaller number of components and examine the effects of these components on a response variable. In various social and behavioural studies, auxiliary covariates (e.g., gender, ethnicity) can often lead to heterogeneous subgroups of observations, each of which involves distinctive relationships between predictor and response variables. ERA is currently unable to consider such covariate-dependent heterogeneity to examine whether the model parameters vary across subgroups differentiated by covariates. To address this issue, we combine ERA with model-based recursive partitioning in a single framework. This combined method, MOB-ERA, aims to partition observations into heterogeneous subgroups recursively based on a set of covariates while fitting a specified ERA model to data. Upon the completion of the partitioning procedure, one can easily examine the difference in the estimated ERA parameters across covariate-dependent subgroups. Moreover, it produces a tree diagram that aids in visualizing a hierarchy of partitioning covariates, as well as interpreting their interactions. In the analysis of public data concerning nicotine dependence among US adults, the method uncovered heterogeneous subgroups characterized by several sociodemographic covariates, each of which yielded different directional relationships between three predictor sets and nicotine dependence.     

Representing decision-makers using styles of behavior: An approach designed for group decision support systems

Supporting decision-making processes when the elements of a group are geographically dispersed and on a tight schedule is a complex task. Aiming to support decision-makers anytime and anywhere, Web-based group decision support systems have been studied. However, the limitations in the decision-makers’ interactions associated to this scenario bring new challenges. In this work, we propose a set of behavioral styles from which decision-makers’ intentions can be modelled into agents. The goal is that, besides having agents represent typical preferences of the decision-makers (towards alternatives and criteria), they can also represent their intentions. To do so, we conducted a survey with 64 participants in order to find homogeneous operating values so as to numerically define the proposed behavioral styles in four dimensions. In addition, we also propose a communication model that simulates the dialogues made by decision-makers in face-to-face meetings. We developed a prototype to simulate decision scenarios and found that agents are capable of acting according to the decision-makers’ intentions and fundamentally benefit from different possible behavioral styles, just as a face-to-face meeting benefits from the heterogeneity of its participants.     

The Impact of Cognitive Diversity on Crisis Negotiations

This paper reports on a series of experiments designed to assess the impact of grouping decision makers by level of cognitive complexity on the outcomes they attain in crisis negotiations. The participants—University of Maryland undergraduates who took roles in a simulated international hostage crisis—used a computer decision support system and a controlled network environment for communications. The goal of the experiments was to better understand the dynamics that lead certain types of groupings to have greater success in negotiations, and that lead certain groups of adversaries to achieve more mutually beneficial outcomes such as compromise and agreement. The findings point to a positive relationship between the level of homogeneity in cognitive complexity among decision makers and the achievement of positive outcomes in crisis negotiations.     

The excess choice effect: The role of outcome valence and counterfactual thinking

Contrary to economic theory, psychological research has demonstrated increased choice can undermine satisfaction. When and why this ‘excess choice effect’ (ECE) occurs remains unclear. Building on theories of counterfactual thinking we argue the ECE is more likely to occur when people experience counterfactual thought or emotion and that a key trigger is a negative versus positive task outcome. Participants either selected a drink (Experiment 1) or chocolate (Experiment 2) from a limited (6) versus extensive (24) selection (Experiment 1) or were given no choice versus extensive (24) choice (Experiment 2). In both experiments, however, the choice was illusory: Half the participants tasted a ‘good’ flavour, half a ‘bad’ flavour. As predicted, extensive choice was only detrimental to satisfaction when participants tasted the ‘bad’ drink or chocolate, and this was mediated by the experience of counterfactual thought (Experiment 1) or emotion (Experiment 2). When outcomes were positive, participants were similarly satisfied with limited versus extensive and no choice versus extensive choice. Implications for our theoretical understanding of the ECE and for the construction of choice architectures aimed at promoting individual satisfaction and well‐being are discussed.