Quasi-truth,paraconsistency, and the foundations of science

In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, but which still preserves some (partial) relations between old and new theories. The existence of these relations help to explain why the break between different theories is never too radical as to make it impossible for one to interpret the process in perfectly rational terms. We then defend the view that if scientific theories are taken to be quasi-true, and if the underlying logic is paraconsistent, it’s perfectly rational for scientists and mathematicians to entertain inconsistent theories without triviality. As a result, as opposed to what is demanded by traditional approaches to rationality, it’s not irrational to entertain inconsistent theories. Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that the view advanced here provides a new way of thinking about the foundations of science. In particular, it extends in important respects both coherentist and foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without the troubles that plague traditional views of scientific rationality.     

A logical calculus for controlled monotonicity

In this paper we introduce a new deductive framework for analyzing processes displaying a kind of controlled monotonicity. In particular, we prove the cut-elimination theorem for a calculus involving series-parallel structures over partial orders which is built up from multi-level sequents, an interesting variant of Gentzen-style sequents. More broadly, our purpose is to provide a general, syntactical tool for grasping the combinatorics of non-monotonic processes.     

Dialetheism and the Impossibility of the World

This paper first offers a standard modal extension of dialetheic logics that respect the normal semantics for negation and conjunction, in an attempt to adequately model absolutism, the thesis that there are true contradictions at metaphysically possible worlds. It is shown, however, that the modal extension has unsavoury consequences for both absolutism and dialetheism. While the logic commits the absolutist to dialetheism, it commits the dialetheist to the impossibility of the actual world. A new modal logic AV is then proposed which avoids these unsavoury consequences by invalidating the interdefinability rules for the modal operators with the use of two valuation relations. However, while using AV carries no significant cost for the absolutist, the same isn't true for the dialetheist. Although using AV allows her to avoid the consequence that the actual world is an impossible world, it does so only on the condition that the dialetheist admits that she cannot give a dialetheic solution to all self-referential semantic paradoxes. Thus, unless there are any further available modal logics that don't commit her to the impossibility of the actual world, the dialetheist is faced with a dilemma. Either admit that the actual world is an impossible world, or admit that her research programme cannot give a comprehensive solution to the self-referential paradoxes.     

机器学习在解决过拟合现象中的作用

过拟合现象是心理学走向预测科学的重要阻碍。文章综述了机器学习在解决过拟合现象中的价值和实现途径：（1）介绍了过拟合的两种表现形式和现状;（2）分析过拟合的根因,即“高解释力≠高预测力”;（3）厘清机器学习的建模逻辑与核心技术在解决过拟合中的作用;（4）利用样例数据和代码说明机器学习统计思想在模型拟合中的具体应用过程。文章指出心理学应从解决实际问题的角度出发,借鉴机器学习的分析思想,避免过拟合,进而提供更准确更稳定的结论和预测模型。     

New Concepts for New Dynamics: Generating Theory for the Study of Religious Innovation and Social Change

The Emerging Church movement (ECM) is sociologically interesting—not due to the size of its membership or the centrality of its congregations. Rather, the ECM is significant because it provides an opportunity to generate new concepts for the study religious innovation and social change. Using theoretical language, the ECM consists of institutional entrepreneurs who drive their religiously concerned movement by continually deconstructing and reframing beliefs, practices, and identities from “mainstream” Christianity while at the same time promoting newly formulated and broadly resonant religious imperatives. As Emerging Christians cultivate new or altered religious practices, these must be continually legitimized. Furthermore, their renegotiated beliefs (heterodoxies) require new forms of organization (alternative congregations). Such action is not the work of isolated individuals, nor is it independent of societal conditions. Ultimately, the ECM consists of Emerging Christians who creatively operate through diffuse network structures across wide geographic spaces and among disparate social groups to enact a collective institutional entrepreneurship that seeks to reimagine the assumptions of conventional Christian congregational life.     

Axiomatizing hybrid products: How can we reason many-dimensionally in hybrid logic?

The aim of this paper is to propose a two-dimensional hybrid logic in order to formalize inferences containing both spatial and temporal propositions. The semantic idea behind the proposal is to name both horizontal and vertical lines in a 2D-plane by two kinds of nominals. This is a generalization of the idea of naming a point in one-dimensional hybrid logic. I give an axiomatization of the proposed two-dimensional hybrid logic and show that it enjoys a general completeness result (called pure completeness) with respect to product Kripke frames. Moreover, in order to capture $T\times W$-frames studied by R.H. Thomason (1984), I introduce the notion of a dependent product frame, which enables us to represent the dependence of space over time. I also give a complete axiomatization of this dependent two-dimensional hybrid logic, and, as a corollary, reveal that a hybridization of $T\times W$-logic enjoys strong completeness.     

Gentzen Calculi for the Existence Predicate

We introduce Gentzen calculi for intuitionistic logic extended with an existence predicate. Such a logic was first introduced by Dana Scott, who provided a proof system for it in Hilbert style. We prove that the Gentzen calculus has cut elimination in so far that all cuts can be restricted to very simple ones. Applications of this logic to Skolemization, truth value logics and linear frames are also discussed.