Does recognition memory improve with age?

In order to test the hypothesis that recognition is a developmentally stable component of the memory system, age differences in recognition of faces were examined while controlling for nonmemory factors that might contribute to differences between the groups. Three groups of children (mean ages: 3 years, 4 months; 4 years, 9 months; and 6 years, 11 months) and a group of college students were tested on a recognition task and a similar matching task. The results indicated no change in recognition across the preschool years but an improvement from the later preschool period to the first grade. Further analyses indicated that this improvement was not due to changes in decision criteria or perceptual skills. These findings call into question the view that recognition is a developmentally invariant component of the memory system.     

Self-focused attention and reactions to fear

Two studies were conducted to study the effect of self-focused attention on behavioral responses to fear. In Experiment 1, phobics and nonphobics were asked to approach and hold a snake either in the presence of a mirror or with no mirror. In Experiment 2, high and low private self-conscious subjects were asked to submit to a series of either mild or strong electric shock for humanitarian reasons. In each case, self-directed attention caused increased responsivity to the fearful affect and made subjects more likely to withdraw from the situation, regardless of the fact that a behavioral standard existed which called for an opposite response. The theoretical and behavioral implications of the findings were discussed.     

A case of adult onset of stuttering

A 36-yr-old adult male was treated for stuttering after a “sudden onset” of disfluency according to the client, 3 yr before. The treatment method and results are described and the “awareness” feature of stuttering onset is discussed.     

A partial resolution of the paradox of interference: The role of integrating knowledge

It has been noted that models of memory that posit retrieval interference imply that the more one knows about a topic, the harder it is to retrieve any one of these facts. Smith, Adams, and Schorr (Cognitive Psychology, 1978, 10, 438–464) regard this to be a paradox and postulate that people use world knowledge to integrate various facts about a concept and thereby avoid interference. Exploring this issue further in two experiments we discovered that integration of facts alleviates interference only when a person can perform his memory task by simply making a consistency judgment and can avoid the need to retrieve a specific fact. When foils force subjects to retrieve the specific assertion, the interference occurs among integrated facts as among unrelated facts. It appears that, when possible, subjects will judge whether they have seen a fact simply by judging if it is related to (consistent with) a theme they have studied. In other words, people judge themes rather than facts. Consistent with this interpretation, we found interference among themes; that is, the more themes were associated with a concept, the greater the interference.     

Evaluating the stage learning hypothesis

A procedure for evaluating the Genevan stage learning hypothesis is illustrated by analyzing Inhelder, Sinclair, and Bovet's (Learning and the development of cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1974) guided learning experiments. The method is a chi-square-based model fitting strategy which enables comparisons to be made among different models. The method eschews critical measurement problems and is easily implemented. There appears little evidence for the Genevan position, although failure to report critical data and sample size considerations makes definitive evaluation of the Genevan position difficult. Suggestions for future research are proposed.     

The roles of expectancy and aftereffects in alternation

In each of three experiments rats were pretreated in straight alleys to discriminate the brightness of an alley as signal for the magnitude of reward. Then the rats were tested in E-shaped mazes in which reward varied across trials and in which the brightness of the stem signaled the magnitude of reward. In all three experiments the rats alternated more on trials following a small reward on the previous trial, and in the third experiment the rats alternated more on those trials where a small reward was signaled. Rats choice responses on Trial n were also affected by the stimulus/reward and choice on Trial n − 2 and by the relationship between stimuli/rewards on Trials n − 2 and n. These results were interpreted as a tendency by the rat to change a less satisfactory situation by varying its response, and to retain a more satisfactory situation by perseverating in its choice response.