The influence of visual short-term memory on size perception

We show that perceived size of visual stimuli can be altered by matches between the contents of visual short-term memory and stimuli in the scene. Observers were presented with a colour cue (to hold in working memory or to merely identify) and subsequently had to indicate which of the two different-coloured objects presented simultaneously on the screen appeared bigger (or smaller). One of the two objects for size judgements had the same colour as the cue (matching stimulus) and the other did not (mismatching stimulus). Perceived object size was decreased by the reappearance of the recently seen cue, as there were more size judgement errors on trials where the matching stimulus was physically bigger (relative to the mismatching stimulus) than on trials where the matching stimulus was physically smaller. The effect occurred regardless of whether the visual cue was actively maintained in working memory or was merely identified. The effect was unlikely generated by the allocation of attention, because shifting attention to a visual stimulus actually increased its perceived size. The findings suggest that visual short-term memory, whether explicit or implicit, can decrease the perceived size of subsequent visual stimuli.     

Even better than the real thing: Alternative outcome bias affects decision judgements and decision regret

Three experiments demonstrated that decisions resulting in considerable amounts of profit, but missed alternative outcomes of greater profits, were rated lower in quality and produced more regret than did decisions that returned lesser (or equal) amounts of profit but either did not miss or missed only slightly better alternatives. These effects were mediated by upward counterfactuals and moderated by participants’ orientation to the decision context. That decision evaluations were affected by the availability and magnitude of alternative outcomes rather than the positivity of actual outcomes is counter to the outcome bias effect—a bias in which decisions are rated more positively when they led to more positive outcomes (despite a priori probabilities associated with the decision outcomes). Experiment 3 demonstrated that these effects represent a bias that occurs even when it is clear that the process by which decisions were made followed rational decision processes. This research suggests that when alternative worlds are even better than the desirable outcomes experienced, affect and cognition may be more strongly linked to the magnitude of alternative realities than to obtained outcomes.     

Procedural and interpersonal fairness moderate the relationship between outcome fairness and acceptance of merit pay

An organizational field study (N = 257) investigated employees' acceptance of a new merit pay system as involving an assessment of whether merit pay can make their earnings more fair, compared to their earnings in the current, seniority-based pay system. We expected that improvement of unfair earnings, and consequently acceptance of merit pay, is considered likely when existing procedures that produce these earnings are unfair, because merit pay improves such procedures. We also expected improvement of unfair earnings, and increased merit pay acceptance, to be likely when employees anticipate fair performance evaluation in a new system, as indicated by fair interpersonal treatment by their supervisor. Results showed that procedural and interpersonal fairness in the existing pay system indeed moderated the relationship between fairness of current outcomes and merit pay acceptance as predicted. Implications for the introduction of merit pay in organizations and for our understanding of the different roles of procedural and interpersonal fairness in outcome evaluations are discussed.     

Visual experience is not necessary for efficient survey spatial cognition: Evidence from blindness

This study investigated whether the lack of visual experience affects the ability to create spatial inferential representations of the survey type. We compared the performance of persons with congenital blindness and that of blindfolded sighted persons on four survey representation-based tasks (Experiment 1). Results showed that persons with blindness performed better than blindfolded sighted controls. We repeated the same tests introducing a third group of persons with late blindness (Experiment 2). This last group performed better than blindfolded sighted participants, whereas differences between participants with late and congenital blindness were nonsignificant. The present findings are compatible with results of other studies, which found that when visual perception is lacking, skill in gathering environmental spatial information provided by nonvisual modalities may contribute to a proper spatial encoding. It is concluded that, although it cannot be asserted that total lack of visual experience incurs no cost, our findings are further evidence that visual experience is not a necessary condition for the development of spatial inferential complex representations.     

Independent effects of colour on object identification and memory

We examined the effects of colour on object identification and memory using a study–test priming procedure with a coloured-object decision task at test (i.e., deciding whether an object is correctly coloured). Objects were selected to have a single associated colour and were either correctly or incorrectly coloured. In addition, object shape and colour were either spatially integrated (i.e., colour fell on the object surface) or spatially separated (i.e., colour formed the background to the object). Transforming the colour of an object from study to test (e.g., from a yellow banana to a purple banana) reduced priming of response times, as compared to when the object was untransformed. This utilization of colour information in object memory was not contingent upon colour falling on the object surface or whether the resulting configuration was of a correctly or incorrectly coloured object. In addition, we observed independent effects of colour on response times, whereby coloured-object decisions were more efficient for correctly than for incorrectly coloured objects but only when colour fell on the object surface. These findings provide evidence for two distinct mechanisms of shape–colour binding in object processing.     

Masked priming effect reflects evidence accumulated by the prime

In the same–different match task, masked priming is observed with the same responses but not different responses. Norris and Kinoshita's (2008) Bayesian reader account of masked priming explains this pattern based on the same principle as that explaining the absence of priming for nonwords in the lexical decision task. The pattern of priming follows from the way the model makes optimal decisions in the two tasks; priming does not depend on first activating the prime and then the target. An alternative explanation is in terms of a bias towards responding “same” that exactly counters the facilitatory effect of lexical access. The present study tested these two views by varying both the degree to which the prime predicts the response and the visibility of the prime. Unmasked primes produced effects expected from the view that priming is influenced by the degree to which the prime predicts the response. In contrast, with masked primes, the size of priming for the same response was completely unaffected by predictability. These results rule out response bias as an explanation of the absence of masked priming for different responses and, in turn, indicate that masked priming is not a consequence of automatic lexical access of the prime.     

Negative priming of unattended part primes: Implications for models of holistic and analytic processing in object recognition

The “hybrid” model of object recognition (Hummel, 2001) proposes that unattended objects are processed holistically, while attended objects are processed both holistically and analytically. Supporting evidence for this claim was reported by Thoma, Hummel, and Davidoff (2004) who showed that, unlike whole object primes, unattended split object parts (presumed to require analytic processing) do not elicit repetition priming. Here we tested the generality of this finding by contrasting priming for whole and part prime stimuli as a function of prime informativeness and by modifying the design so that both unattended whole and part prime displays contained a single perceptual object. Unlike Thoma et al. (2004) the results showed negative (rather than an absence of) priming for unattended half object primes. These findings place new constraints on theoretical models of the role of attention in object recognition.     

Are transposition effects specific to letters?

Recent research has consistently shown that pseudowords created by transposing two letters are perceptually similar to their corresponding base words (e.g., jugde–judge). In the framework of the overlap model (Gomez, Ratcliff, & Perea, 2008), this effect is due to a noisy process in the localization of the “objects” (e.g., letters, kana syllables). In the present study, we examine whether this effect is specific to letter strings or whether it also occurs with other “objects” (namely, digits, symbols, and pseudoletters). To that end, we conducted a series of five masked priming experiments using the same–different task. Results showed robust effects of transposition for all objects, except for pseudoletters. This is consistent with the view that locations of familiar objects (i.e., letters, numbers, and symbols) can be best understood as distributions along a dimension rather than as precise points.     

Selective impairment of masked priming in dual-task performance

This study investigated the impact of divided attention on masked priming. In a dual-task setting, two tasks had to be carried out in close temporal succession: a tone discrimination task and a masked priming task. The order of the tasks was varied between experiments, and attention was always allocated to the first task—that is, the first task was prioritized. The priming task was the second (nonprioritized) task in Experiment 1 and the first (prioritized) task in Experiment 2. In both experiments, “novel” prime stimuli associated with semantic processing were essentially ineffective. However, there was intact priming by another type of prime stimuli associated with response priming. Experiment 3 showed that all these prime stimuli can reveal significant priming effects during a task-switching paradigm in which both tasks were performed consecutively. We conclude that dual-task specific interference processes (e.g., the simultaneous coordination of multiple stimulus–response rules) selectively impair priming that is assumed to rely on semantic processing.