Visual problem solving in the absence of lexical semantics: Evidence from dementia

A case of dissociation between visual and praxic skills and linguistic, referential, and semantic skills is described in a case of dementia. Testing revealed that her visual processing was intact and that she was capable of a wide range of visually based tasks. These included copying geometric figures and block designs; matching items on the basis of number, color, or relative size, matching upper and lower case letters, sequencing numerals, orienting pictures, coins, and letters appropriately, and solving problems based on the identification of geometric patterns or on the identification of logical sequences based on pattern alternation, number, and size increases. In contrast, she was completely incapable of matching pictures on the basis of their semantic or referential meaning; similarly she had lost all comprehension of language. It was argued that this case demonstrates the capacities of a visual system cut off from all symbolic and semantic processes. When examined with other case studies this case provides information about the nature of and interaction between modality-specific perceptual processing and semantic processing, and information about the various cognitive factors involved in visual gnosis. The CT scan indicated frontal atrophy and marked anterior temporal atrophy, a pattern that is consistent with Pick's disease. The case was discussed in terms of the correlation between the pattern of observed strengths and deficits and the neurological pattern of atrophy.     

Perspectival representation and fallacies in metaethics

Abstract

The prevailing theoretical framework for theorising about representation construes all representation as involving objective representational contents. This classic framework has tended to drive philosophers either to claim that evaluative judgements are representations and therefore objective, or else to claim that evaluative judgements are not really representations, because they are not objective. However, a more general, already well-explored framework is available, which will allow theorists to treat evaluative judgements as full-fledged representations (thus doing justice to their representational aspects) while leaving open whether they are objective. Such a more general conception of representational content is exemplified, e.g. by Lewis’s ‘centred contents’ and Gibbard’s framework of ‘contents of judgement’, thus it is not new. I shall start in §1 by introducing the more general framework of perspectival contents and then illustrate in §2 how awareness of it can help expose the fallaciousness of certain widely used forms of argumentation in metaethics.     

META‐HUMANS AND METANOIA: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF EXTRATERRESTRIALS

Abstract. Although we do not know whether intelligent extraterrestrials exist, they are a permanent fixture of literature and philosophical argument. Part of their appeal is that they watch us from above and thus serve as a metaphor for human self‐reflexivity. This makes fictional aliens especially useful when moral issues are at stake. In order to evaluate stories about aliens with respect to moral conclusions two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the stories have to be detailed enough that we can understand the circumstances of the aliens' moral choices. Therefore science fiction often is more useful than arguments involving aliens in short technical papers. Second, their fictional lives need to be possible in our own universe, or very nearly so, in order to be relevant for our own moral conduct. Taking as an example the unfallen aliens in C. S. Lewis's novels Out of the Silent Planet (1938) and Perelandra (1943), we can acknowledge the theological interest and literary subtlety. Nonetheless, the stories fail as moral parables in one important respect: The aliens depicted could not be a product of evolution in our universe, at least as we currently understand its scientific laws. This realization has important consequences for our self‐understanding and thus underlines how fictional aliens can be useful in making sense of the complexities involved in moral argumentation.     

Criminal Attempts and the Penal Lottery

In most penal systems, success is punished more than failure. For example, murder is punished more severely than attempted murder. But success or failure is often determined by luck. It thus appears that punishment is allotted on the basis of arbitrary factors. The problem of criminal attempts is the question of how to best resolve this apparent tension. One particularly sophisticated attempt at resolution, first developed by David Lewis, holds that such differential punishment is not unjust when understood as a natural penal lottery. What is most interesting about this view is that it does not appear to involve a commitment to resultant moral luck. I argue that the natural penal lottery fails to deliver justice. Upon analysis, it carries the same implication that it sought to avoid—namely, a commitment to resultant moral luck. I then argue that there can be, in principle, no penal lottery that delivers justice, natural or otherwise.     

Absence Causation and a Liberal Theory of Causal Explanation

For the framework of event causation—i.e. the framework according to which causation is a relation between events—absences or omissions pose a problem. Absences, it is generally agreed, are not events; so, under the framework of event causation, they cannot be causally related. But, as a matter of fact, absences are often taken to be causes or effects. The problem of absence causation is thus how to make sense of causation that apparently involves absences as causes or effects. In an influential paper, Helen Beebee offers a partial solution to the problem by giving an account of causation by absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be causes). I argue that Beebee's account can be extended to cover causation of absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be effects) as well. More importantly, I argue that the extended Beebeeian account calls for a major modification to David Lewis's theory of causal explanation, usually taken as standard. Compared to the standard theory, the result of this modification, which I shall call ‘the liberal theory of causal explanation’, has, among other things, the advantage of being able to accommodate causal explanations in which the explananda are not given in terms of events.     

Visual attention at three months as a predictor of cognitive functioning at two years of age

The purpose of the present study was to examine the predictive power of various cognitive skills at 3 months of age in terms of later cognitive functioning. Habituating to redundant and recovering to novel stimuli at 3 months of age were found to predict later intellectual functioning at 24 months better than 3-month global intelligence or object permanence scores. In terms of information processing skills, recovery predicted later intelligence test scores better than habituation. It is suggested that changes in cognitive functioning may be viewed as a transformation of skills from one age to another rather than as a continuum of the same skills. With regard to the cognitive abilities of the 3-month-old, it is suggested that information processing may be central to cognitive functioning at this age.     

Neonates' heart rate,sucking rhythm,and sucking amplitude as a function of the sweet taste

In previous studies of human newborn sucking, the effects of increasing fluid sweetness and/or volume included a decrease in sucking rate within sucking bursts and, paradoxically, an increase in heart rate. To determine whether the heart rate increase can be attributed to increased sucking amplitude for sweeter fluids, sucking and heart rates of 20 full-term infants were studied. Half sucked for three consecutive 2-min periods, first receiving small drops of water for each suck, then no fluid, then 15% sucrose. The other half experienced the reverse order. The results for sucking and heart rate were consistent with previous studies; sucking rates within bursts were slowest for sucrose and fastest for no fluid. Heart rate was higher for sucrose than for the other fluid conditions, however, only in the water-first group. The heart rate increase was significant on statistical tests which controlled for sucking amplitude as well as for several other motor variables. Sucking amplitude itself varied with fluid sweetness in the water-first group only, in which it was highest for water. There were more total sucks, longer sucking bursts, and less time between successive bursts under the sucrose condition. Multivariate statistics helped establish a set of dependent variables—sucking rate within bursts, total number of sucks, and heart rate—which most parsimoniously describes the effects of fluid sweetness. A hedonic explanation of the response of newborns to sweetness is thus reiterated.     

Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy

Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth should probably be abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof invalid. My conclusion is that no reductio of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.

A better best system account of lawhood

Perhaps the most significant contemporary theory of lawhood is the Best System (/MRL) view on which laws are true generalizations that best systematize knowledge. Our question in this paper will be how best to formulate a theory of this kind. We’ll argue that an acceptable MRL should (i) avoid inter-system comparisons of simplicity, strength, and balance, (ii) make lawhood epistemically accessible, and (iii) allow for laws in the special sciences. Attention to these problems will bring into focus a useful menu of novel MRL theories, some of which solve problems the original MRL theory could not. Hence we conceive of the paper as moving toward a better Best System theory of laws.