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51.
  总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
John N Williams 《Synthese》2008,165(1):107-125
This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist in propositional knowledge. The second part defends an analysis of know-how inspired by Katherine Hawley’ (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, pp. 19–31, insightful proposal that know-how requires counterfactual success. I conclude by showing how this analysis helps to explain why know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist of propositional knowledge.  相似文献   
52.
    
Antje Jackeln 《Zygon》2006,41(4):955-974
Unique epistemological challenges arise whenever one embarks on the critical and self‐critical reflection of the nature of time and the end of time. I attempt to construct my preference for an eschatological distinction between time and eternity from within a middle way, avoiding both the hubris that claims complete comprehension and the resignation that concedes readily to know nothing. Surveying the history of reflection on this multifaceted question of time, with its ephemeral and everlasting dimensions, I argue that the eschatological interplay between the “already” and the “not yet” has much to offer: promise for the religion‐science dialogue as well as hope for humanity, especially for those on society's bleakest edges. But understandings of time, to be authentically theological, must be also informed by cosmology and the physics of relativity. My proposal seeks to respect the theological and scientific interpretations of the nature of time, serving the ongoing, creative interaction of these disciplines. Between physics and theology I identify four formal differences in analyzing eschatology, all grounded in the one fundamental difference between extrapolation and promise. Discussion of what I term deficits in both the scientific and theological approaches leads to further examination of the complex relationship between time and eternity. I distinguish three models of such relationships, which I label the ontological, the quantitative, and the eschatological distinction between time and eternity. Because of the way it embraces a multiplicity of times, especially relating to the culmination and the consummation of creation, I opt for the eschatological model. The eschatological disruption of linear chronology relates well to relativ‐istic physics: This model is open, dynamic, and relational, and it may add a new aspect to the debate over the block universe.  相似文献   
53.
    
Lewis rats have been shown to make more impulsive choices than Fischer 344 rats in discrete-trial choice procedures that arrange fixed (i.e., nontitrating) reinforcement parameters. However, nontitrating procedures yield only gross estimates of preference, as choice measures in animal subjects are rarely graded at the level of the individual subject. The present study was designed to examine potential strain differences in delay discounting using an adjusting-amount procedure, in which distributed (rather than exclusive) choice is observed due to dynamic titration of reinforcer magnitude across trials. Using a steady-state version of the adjusting-amount procedure in which delay was manipulated between experimental conditions, steeper delay discounting was observed in Lewis rats compared to Fischer 344 rats; further, delay discounting in both strains was well described by the traditional hyperbolic discounting model. However, upon partial completion of the present study, a study published elsewhere (Wilhelm & Mitchell, 2009) demonstrated no difference in delay discounting between these strains with the use of a more rapid version of the adjusting-amount procedure (i.e., in which delay is manipulated daily). Thus, following completion of the steady-state assessment in the present study, all surviving Lewis and Fischer 344 rats completed an approximation of this rapid-determination procedure in which no strain difference in delay discounting was observed.  相似文献   
54.
    
My aim is to rekindle interest in David Lewis's (1983 ) infamous but neglected Mixed Theory of mental states. The Mixed Theory is a mix of physicalism and functionalism designed to capture the intuitions that both Martians and abnormal human Madmen can be in pain. The Mixed Theory is widely derided. But I offer a new development of the Mixed Theory immune to its most prominent objections. In doing so, I uncover a new motivation for the Mixed Theory: its unique ability to explain cases in which it is plausibly indeterminate whether something is in pain. The Mixed Theory, whether or not it is ultimately correct, at least deserves renewed attention.  相似文献   
55.
    
This paper focuses on the offer by the art writer Adrian Stokes to commission and pay for a portrait of the psychoanalyst Melanie Klein by the artist William Coldstream. It details some of the precursors of this offer in Stokes's preceding involvement first with Klein and then with Coldstream; her response to this offer; and its outcome and aftermath in Stokes's subsequent writing about Klein and Coldstream.  相似文献   
56.
Rachel Cooper 《Metaphilosophy》2015,46(4-5):495-514
What would my life have been like if I had been born more intelligent? Or taller? Or a member of the opposite sex? Or a non‐biological being? It is plausible that some of these questions make sense, while others stretch the limits of sense making. In addressing questions of how I might have been, genetic essentialism is popular, but this article argues that genetic essentialism, and other versions of origin essentialism for organisms, must be rejected. It considers the prospects for counterpart theory and shows how counterpart theory can be used to illuminate volitional accounts of identity as proposed by Harry Frankfurt. This enables one to make sense of claims that, say, being gay, or Deaf, or Black, can be essential to someone's identity. The discussion is then extended to show how it can be made applicable to the transworld identity theorist who denies that individuals possess essential properties.  相似文献   
57.
    
Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg‐raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not‐p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency to equivocate in arguments for the enthymematicity of arguments (e.g., Lewis Carroll's paradox, Hume's problem) as well as in arguments for the enthymematicity of action explanations (e.g., arguments for psychologism and for explanatory individualism). The article concludes with a warning, because the equivocation is often helpful in teaching and because neg‐raising verbs include philosophically vital verbs: desire, want, intend, think, suppose, imagine, expect, feel, seem, appear.  相似文献   
58.
    
ObjectivesThe purpose of this study was to create and provide validity evidence for the Processes of Change in Psychological Skills Training Questionnaire (PCPSTQ).DesignThe current study used a cross-sectional research design.MethodsFive hundred fifty nine NCAA Division I, professional, and Olympic level athletes participated in the current study. To create the PCPSTQ, an initial pool of 114 items was generated by the research team. After a content validity process, 65 items were retained for analysis. Exploratory structural equation modeling was used as an analytic strategy to identify the most appropriate factor structure for the PCPSTQ. Decisions about the most appropriate model were made using multiple fit indices. To examine the construct validity of the PCPSTQ, a series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine differences in processes of change use across stage of change.ResultsIn the current study, validity evidence provided support for a 7-factor process of change measure (χ2 = 325.84, p < .001; Comparative Fit Index = .971; Tucker Lewis Index = .945; Root Mean Square Error of Approximation = .037; Standard Root Mean Square Residual = .020). Results also supported the construct validity of the scale as a significant difference in process of change use across stage of change was reported for all seven processes.ConclusionsResults of the current study support the factor structure and construct validity of the PCPSTQ. It appears that the processes of behavior change reported across multiple behavior change domains might also be viable for sport psychology professionals.  相似文献   
59.
    
David Lewis famously defends a counterfactual theory of causation and a non‐causal, similarity‐based theory of counterfactuals. Lewis also famously defends the possibility of backward causation. I argue that this combination of views is untenable—given the possibility of backward causation, one ought to reject Lewis's theories of causation and counterfactuals.  相似文献   
60.
    
ABSTRACT

If it seems unquestionable that C. I. Lewis is a Kantian in important respects, it is more difficult to determine what, if anything, is original about his Kantianism. For it might be argued that Lewis’ Kantianism simply reflects an approach to the a priori which was very common in the first half of the twentieth century, namely, the effort to make the a priori relative. In this paper, I will argue that Lewis’ Kantianism does present original features. The latter can be detected by focusing on Lewis’ account of the method of philosophy in the first chapter of Mind and the World Order. In that context, Lewis argues that the method of philosophy should be reflective and critical. It will be my contention that this understanding of philosophy involves a therapeutic perspective, which bears important resemblances to Kant’s account of transcendental reflection in the Amphiboly of the Critique of Pure Reason. I will illustrate how this therapeutic application of reflection works in Lewis’ metaphysics. In this context, reflection can correct errors of reasoning that occur when we are operating within a particular conceptual scheme and use the criteria of reality that are appropriate in another.  相似文献   
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