The Feasibility OF Collectives' Actions

Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be incommensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. According to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents are irrational. Experience shows, however, that incomplete preferences are ubiquitous in ordinary life. In this paper, we aim to do two things: (1) show that there is a good case for revising decision theory so as to allow it to apply non-vacuously to agents with incomplete preferences, and (2) to identify one substantive criterion that any such non-standard decision theory must obey. Our criterion, Competitiveness, is a weaker version of a dominance principle. Despite its modesty, Competitiveness is incompatible with prospectism, a recently developed decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences. We spend the final part of the paper showing why Competitiveness should be retained, and prospectism rejected.     

An appreciative response to Niels Henrik Gregersen's JKR research conference lecture

Abstract

Using human embryos in research remains a controversial issue, especially in Christian bioethics. Although the official Catholic stance rejects human embryonic stem cell research, Christian thinkers T. Peters, K. Lebacqz and G. Bennett support it. They endorse the 14-day Rule and argue that ex vivo embryos lack moral worth. I examine and challenge the 14-day Rule and location argument (in vivo/ex vivo). I develop a theory of holistic anthropology and intrinsic moral value for human embryos. I conclude that intrinsic moral value is not equal to full moral value, and therefore use of embryos in biomedical research is morally permissible.     

Failure to exploit learned spatial value information during visual search

ABSTRACT

In recent years there has been rapid proliferation of studies demonstrating how reward learning guides visual search. However, most of these studies have focused on feature-based reward, and there has been scant evidence supporting the learning of space-based reward. We raise the possibility that the visual search apparatus is impenetrable to spatial value contingencies, even when such contingencies are learned and represented online in a separate knowledge domain. In three experiments, we interleaved a visual choice task with a visual search task in which one display quadrant produced greater monetary rewards than the remaining quadrants. We found that participants consistently exploited this spatial value contingency during the choice task but not during the search task – even when these tasks were interleaved within the same trials and when rewards were contingent on response speed. These results suggest that the expression of spatial value information is task specific and that the visual search apparatus could be impenetrable to spatial reward information. Such findings are consistent with an evolutionary framework in which the search apparatus has little to gain from spatial value information in most real world situations.     

The relationship between reward and probability: Evidence that exploration may be intrinsically rewarding

ABSTRACT

The probability of an event occurring and the reward associated with the event can both modulate behaviour. Response times are decreased to stimuli that are either more rewarding or more likely. These two factors can be combined to give an Expected Value (EV) associated with the event (i.e., probability of the event x reward magnitude). In four experiments we investigate the effect of reward and probability on both saccadic and manual responses. When tested separately we find evidence for both a reward and probability effect across response types. When manipulations of reward magnitude and probability of the event were combined, the probability modulations dominated and these data were not well accounted for by the EV. However, a post-hoc model that included an additional intrinsic reward associated with responding provided an excellent account for the data. We argue that reward consists of both an explicit and intrinsic component. In our task, the saccadic and manual responses are linked to the information provided by the targets and the goals of the task, and successful completion of these is in itself rewarding. As a result, targets associated with a higher probability of being presented have a higher intrinsic reward.     

How does higher in‐group social value lead to positive mental health? An integrated model of in‐group identification and support

Previous research has indicated that the effects of in‐group social value on mental health are mediated by the extent to which individuals identify with their in‐group. Other research has shown that in‐group identification leads to positive mental health because it provides in‐group members with a psychological basis for social support. We examine how the individual's perception of the social value of the in‐group leads to positive mental health, integrating the effects of identification with and support from the in‐group. As predicted, the relationship between higher social value and decreased mental health (e.g. depression, perceived stressful events) is mediated by higher in‐group identification, which in turn leads the members to expect support from the in‐group but not the out‐group. An integrated model of the effects of perceived in‐group social value, identification, and support on mental health is proposed, and the implications are discussed.     

Influencing value priorities and increasing well-being: The effects of reflecting on intrinsic values

A four-week experimental study (N?=?113) examined the effects of reflecting on intrinsic values. In the experimental group, participants learned about the distinction between intrinsic (e.g. having close relationships) and extrinsic (e.g. being popular) values, wrote about two personal intrinsic values, and then reflected on these values weekly for four weeks. In the control group, participants completed parallel exercises related to the daily details of their lives. Results revealed that participants in the intrinsic values group experienced greater well-being immediately following the written reflection than participants in the control group. Four weeks later, the more engaged participants felt in the reflection exercises, the more they prioritized intrinsic over extrinsic values and the greater their well-being. These effects occurred only for participants in the intrinsic values condition. The implications for changing value priorities and improving well-being are discussed.     

Food pleasantness affects visual selective attention

Fundamental to adaptive behaviour is the ability to select environmental objects that best satisfy current needs and preferences. Here we investigated whether temporary changes in food preference influence visual selective attention. To this end, we exploited the fact that when a food is eaten to satiety its motivational value and perceived pleasantness decrease relative to other foods not eaten in the meal, an effect termed sensory-specific satiety. A total of 26 hungry participants were fed until sated with one of two palatable foods. Before and after selective satiation, participants rated the pleasantness of the two foods and then viewed the same as stimuli on a computer screen while attention was assessed by a visual probe task. Results showed that the attentional bias for the food eaten decreased markedly from pre- to postsatiety, along with the subjective pleasantness for that food. By contrast, subjective pleasantness and attentional bias for the food not eaten did not show any such decrease. These findings suggest that the allocation of visual selective attention is flexibly and rapidly adjusted to reflect temporary shift in relative preference for different foods.     

The Intrinsic Value of Sport: A Reply to Culbertson

Leon Culbertson's recent contribution, ‘Does Sport Have Intrinsic Value?’ objects to the account of the value of sport as intrinsic value I had developed in my Sport, Rules and Values; in particular, as this occurs in my argument that the value of some sports resided in the possibility of their functioning as a moral laboratory. He identifies two accounts of intrinsic value; and shows that neither would fit my purposes seamlessly. He urges that my account of the place of normative reasons cannot generate intrinsic value: rather, the person whose reasons they are somehow imports that value. Yet he has misunderstood my particularist conception of values; and the place occupied by my contextualism – these, rather than a residual commitment to essentialism, are what generates an apparent inconsistency he identifies. But they also explain it away. As a result, much of his concern to find some exact account of the term ‘intrinsic’ is misplaced: we need to look contextually. Further, the project of my discussion was limited to showing, first, how the moral laboratory idea might explain the value of some sport (on the assumption that sport had intrinsic value); and, second, how failures of realisation of that intrinsic value might be traced to the distinction between motivating reasons and normative ones.     

The Function, Mechanism, And Evolution Of Learning: A Review Of Sara J. Shettleworth’s Cognition, Evolution, And Behavior.

Behavior is a property of living animals and is therefore a biological phenomenon. This book shows us what it looks like to have a truly biological science of behavior. Such a science needs to discover the laws that control behavior as it is occurring, and it is this that behavior analysts and other psychologists interested in animal behavior and learning have done so well. The science also needs to explain, however, the role that behavior plays in the life of the individual and in the existence of the species, and this has not been part of the agenda for most psychologists. Shettleworth addresses all of these questions about behavior. She views learning in terms of what it accomplishes for the individual and then provides insight into its causal laws and its evolution. All of this is accomplished with a critical eye and unremitting rigor. These accomplishments occur in the context of a theory based on a unique combination of domain‐general and domain‐specific processes that takes a major step in the direction of showing what students of animal behavior and animal learning have to offer each other.     

Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy

In the past thirty years environmental ethics has emerged as one of the most vibrant and exciting areas of applied philosophy. Several journals and hundreds of books testify to its growing importance inside and outside philosophical circles. But with all of this scholarly output, it is arguably the case that environmental ethics is not living up to its promise of providing a philosophical contribution to the resolution of environmental problems. This article surveys the current state of the field and offers an alternative path for the future development of environmental ethics toward a more publicly engaged model of applied philosophy.