Positive emotional attention bias in young children with symptoms of ADHD

Children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) often experience emotional dysregulation. Dysregulation can arise from heightened attention to emotional stimuli. Emotional attention biases are associated with a number of adverse socioemotional outcomes including reward sensitivity and externalizing behaviors. As reward sensitivity and externalizing behaviors are common in children with ADHD, the aim of the current study was to determine whether emotional attention biases are evident in young children with clinically significant ADHD symptoms. To test this, children with (n = 18) and without (n = 15) symptoms of ADHD were tested on a Dot Probe task. Provided recent evidence that emotional attention biases are attenuated by sleep, the task was performed before and after overnight sleep. Children with ADHD symptoms displayed positive, but not negative, attention biases at both time points, whereas typically developing children did not preferentially attend toward or away from positive or negative stimuli. Sleep did not alter attention biases in either group. Collectively, these results indicate that children with ADHD symptoms have stable, positive attention biases.     

Are beliefs signals?

Eric Funkhouser argues that beliefs can function as social signals. I argue that Funkhouser’s argument for this conclusion rests on a problematic definition of “signal,” and that on standard definitions, the imperceptibility of beliefs disqualifies them from counting as signals. However, I also argue that Funkhouser’s insights about the social functions of beliefs can be true even if his claim that beliefs are signals is false.     

Three decades of Cognition & Emotion: A brief review of past highlights and future prospects

Over the past three decades, Cognition & Emotion has been one of the world’s leading outlets for emotion research. In this article, we review past highlights of and future prospects for the journal. Our tour of history covers three periods: The first period, from 1987 to 1999, was a pioneering era in which cognitive theories began to be applied to the scientific analysis of emotion. The second period, from 2000 to 2007, was characterised by a sharp increase in the number of empirical research papers, a lot of which were concerned with automatic processing biases and their implications for clinical psychology. During the third period, from 2008 to 2017, a new focus emerged on self-regulatory processes and their implications for emotion. We then turn to the present profile of Cognition & Emotion and introduce our new editorial team. Finally, we consider how the journal’s future success can be continued and increased by a) providing authors with fast and high-quality feedback; b) offering attractive publication formats, including the newly introduced Registered Reports for pre-registered studies; and c) consolidating key methodological paradigms with reproducible findings.     

When Extremists Win: Cultural Transmission Via Iterated Learning When Populations Are Heterogeneous

How does the process of information transmission affect the cultural or linguistic products that emerge? This question is often studied experimentally and computationally via iterated learning, a procedure in which participants learn from previous participants in a chain. Iterated learning is a powerful tool because, when all participants share the same priors, the stationary distributions of the iterated learning chains reveal those priors. In many situations, however, it is unreasonable to assume that all participants share the same prior beliefs. We present four simulation studies and one experiment demonstrating that when the population of learners is heterogeneous, the behavior of an iterated learning chain can be unpredictable and is often systematically distorted by the learners with the most extreme biases. This results in group‐level outcomes that reflect neither the behavior of any individuals within the population nor the overall population average. We discuss implications for the use of iterated learning as a methodological tool as well as for the processes that might have shaped cultural and linguistic evolution in the real world.     

Biases and Heuristics in Decision Making and Their Impact on Autonomy

Cognitive scientists have identified a wide range of biases and heuristics in human decision making over the past few decades. Only recently have bioethicists begun to think seriously about the implications of these findings for topics such as agency, autonomy, and consent. This article aims to provide an overview of biases and heuristics that have been identified and a framework in which to think comprehensively about the impact of them on the exercise of autonomous decision making. I analyze the impact that these biases and heuristics have on the following dimensions of autonomy: understanding, intentionality, absence of alienating or controlling influence, and match between formally autonomous preferences or decisions and actual choices or actions.     

The illusion of knowledge: When more information reduces accuracy and increases confidence

Intuition suggests that having more information can increase prediction accuracy of uncertain outcomes. In four experiments, we show that more knowledge can decrease accuracy and simultaneously increase prediction confidence. Participants were asked to predict basketball games sampled from a National Basketball Association season. All participants were provided with statistics (win record, halftime score), while half were additionally given the team names. Knowledge of names increased the confidence of basketball fans consistent with their belief that this knowledge improved their predictions. Contrary to this belief, it decreased the participants’ accuracy by reducing their reliance on statistical cues. One of the factors contributing to this underweighting of statistical cues was a bias to bet on more familiar teams against the statistical odds. Finally, in a real betting experiment, fans earned less money if they knew the team names while persisting in their belief that this knowledge improved their predictions.     

Do aggression and rule‐breaking have different interpersonal correlates? A study of antisocial behavior subtypes,negative affect,and hostile perceptions of others

There is mounting evidence that physical aggression and nonaggressive, rule‐breaking delinquency constitute two separable though correlated subtypes of antisocial behavior. Even so, it remains unclear whether these behavioral subtypes have meaningfully different interpersonal correlates, particularly as they are subsumed within the same broad domain of antisocial behavior. To evaluate this, we examined whether hostile perceptions of others (assessed via exposure to a series of neutral unknown faces) were linked to level and type of antisocial behavior aggression vs. rule‐breaking, and moreover, whether this association persisted even when also considering the common association with negative affect (as manipulated via written recollection of one's best and worst life experiences). Analyses revealed that aggression, but not rule‐breaking, was uniquely tied to hostile perceptions of others. Furthermore, this association persisted over and above the common association of both hostile perceptions and aggression with negative affect (at both trait and state levels). Such results provide additional support for clinically meaningful differences between the behavioral subtypes of aggression and nonaggressive rule‐breaking and for the independent role of hostile perceptions in aggressive behavior. Aggr. Behav. 35:453–461, 2009. © 2009 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Better in the (near) future: Group-based differences in forecasting biases

Social identities are an important component of an individual’s self-concept. In the current research, we examine how identification with a group can lead to biased intergroup judgments similar to those made when evaluating the self, relative to others. We compared evaluations of in- and outgroups in order to examine differences in temporal perspective and optimistic evaluations. Our findings suggest that compared to an outgroup, ingroup members more strongly consider the future potential of their group, are more optimistic when considering future ingroup outcomes, and hold a more uniformly positive view of an ingroup’s future. Furthermore, we find that when evaluating ingroups, shifts in temporal perspectives are related to greater optimism. We conclude by discussing theoretical implications and future research related to temporal judgments and social groups.     

Why should we try to think like scientists? Scientific reasoning and susceptibility to epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive biases

This paper examines whether scientific reasoning skills predict people's susceptibility to epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive biases. We used the recently developed Scientific Reasoning Scale (SRS) because it measures the ability to read and evaluate scientific evidence. Alongside the SRS, 317 participants aged 18–30 years completed measures of thinking dispositions and cognitive ability to ascertain whether the SRS contributes specifically to susceptibility to epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive biases. Scientific reasoning correlated positively with dispositions towards analytic thinking and cognitive ability and negatively with dogmatism, epistemically suspect beliefs, and susceptibility to cognitive biases. Most importantly, it emerged as a significant predictor, contributing to susceptibility to both cognitive biases and epistemically suspect beliefs over and above the other cognitive predictors. These results provide the first empirical evidence that scientific reasoning ability is an important factor in protecting against epistemically suspect beliefs and in aiding better decision making among the non-scientific population.     

Interpreting Silent Gesture: Cognitive Biases and Rational Inference in Emerging Language Systems

Natural languages make prolific use of conventional constituent‐ordering patterns to indicate “who did what to whom,” yet the mechanisms through which these regularities arise are not well understood. A series of recent experiments demonstrates that, when prompted to express meanings through silent gesture, people bypass native language conventions, revealing apparent biases underpinning word order usage, based on the semantic properties of the information to be conveyed. We extend the scope of these studies by focusing, experimentally and computationally, on the interpretation of silent gesture. We show cross‐linguistic experimental evidence that people use variability in constituent order as a cue to obtain different interpretations. To illuminate the computational principles that govern interpretation of non‐conventional communication, we derive a Bayesian model of interpretation via biased inductive inference and estimate these biases from the experimental data. Our analyses suggest people's interpretations balance the ambiguity that is characteristic of emerging language systems, with ordering preferences that are skewed and asymmetric, but defeasible.