Guest Editorial: The Resistance to Belief

William James's essay The Will to Believe proposed that we are sometimes justified, even obligated, to believe from our strong emotional or passional nature that something is true, even though there may not be total logical, evidential proof—which he also wrote is not to be found in this world. This essay explores situations, using a recent dear-death experience (NDE) example, in which there are reasonable evidence and logic, and yet belief seems to be withheld. I postulate and discuss nonrational influences producing resistance to belief, including the fear of being in error, the fear of rejection from the scientific community, irrational requirements of logicality, avoidance of consequences, and paradigm fixation. I also discuss issues in philosophy of science and epistemology in regard to proof.     

Representation and misrepresentation: Tufte and the Morton Thiokol engineers on the Challenger

This paper examines the role of the Morton Thiokol engineers in the decisions surrounding the launch of the Challenger, particularly with reference to an analysis of this event by Edward Tufte. The engineers at Morton Thiokol recommended against the launch of Challenger because the projected launch temperature between 26°F to 29°F was far outside their field database of successful launches. The engineers had asked for, but not received, data necessary to determine the cause of massive blow-by on the launch the previous January, and they had informed their managers and NASA that continuing flights could be catastrophic if the cause of the problems with the launches was not discovered. The authors conclude that the engineers thus did what they were ethically as well as professionally obligated to do. This paper came about as a result of an experimental class called ‘The Challenger’ at the Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) which drew faculty from four different disciplines, teaching about various aspects of the Challenger disaster. Wade Robison was one of those professors, and David Hoeker and Stefan Young were members of the class in their freshman year as engineering students. We all owe thanks to the other professors in the class—Dominique LePoutre (Language and Interpreting Education, National Technical Institute for the Deaf), Erhan Mergen (College of Business), and Rose Marie Toscano (Liberal Arts Support, National Technical Institute for the Deaf). We also need to thank Stan McKenzie, Provost at RIT, and Kit Mayberry, Associate Provost, for their conceiving of the program that supported the class and for their financial and moral support. The paper has been presented at three conferences and circulated widely. We want to thank those who forced us to rework the paper because of their cogent queries, especially Michael Pritchard, David Suits, Steve Warshaw, and an anonymous reviewer.     

Children's reasoning about physics within and across ontological kinds

Reasoning about seven physics principles within and across ontological kinds was examined among 188 5- and 7-year-olds and 59 adults. Individuals in all age groups tended to appropriately generalize what they learned across ontological kinds. However, children also showed sensitivity to ontological kind in their projections: when learning principles with reference to people they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another person than to an inanimate object, and when learning with reference to an inanimate object they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another inanimate object than to a person. Five-year-olds, but not 7-year-olds, projected concepts learned about people to a greater extent than principles learned about inanimate objects, closely paralleling the findings of Carey for the biological domain (Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Results from a separate sample of 22 5-year-olds suggest that the primary findings cannot be explained by response perseveration. The present findings indicate that children understand physics principles that apply to both animate and inanimate objects, but distinguish between these ontological kinds.     

Tableaux for Łukasiewicz Infinite-valued Logic

In this work we propose a labelled tableau method for ukasiewicz infinite-valued logic L . The method is based on the Kripke semantics of this logic developed by Urquhart [25] and Scott [24]. On the one hand, our method falls under the general paradigm of labelled deduction [8] and it is rather close to the tableau systems for sub-structural logics proposed in [4]. On the other hand, it provides a CoNP decision procedure for L validity by reducing the check of branch closure to linear programming     

V.A. Smirnov’s Results in the Field of Modern Formal Logic

This paper is a survey of V.A. Smirnovs main results in modern logic.     

Arithmetic and geometry: Some remarks on the concept of complementarity

This paper explores the classical idea of complementarity in mathematics concerning the relationship of intuition and axiomatic proof. Section I illustrates the basic concepts of the paper, while Section II presents opposing accounts of intuitionist and axiomatic approaches to mathematics. Section III analyzes one of Einstein's lecture on the topic and Section IV examines an application of the issues in mathematics and science education. Section V discusses the idea of complementarity by examining one of Zeno's paradoxes. This is followed by presenting a few more programmatic suggestions and a brief summary.     

Les “règles de la discussion légitime” dans la logique de Port-Royal

In the XVIIth century the conflict which opposed the jansenists to the jesuits involved the problem of the due process in theological matter. The jesuits heralded the thesis that the infallibility of the Church has to be extended from dogmatics (quaestio iuris) to the historical facts (quaestio facti). On the opposite side Arnauld maintained that such an opinion was monstruous: also in religious matters the fact has to be proved according to the principles of a due process, and not by authority. In this article the thesis pleaded by the jansenists is considered in connection with the model of argumentative procedure offered by the Port-Royal logic.The Logique ou Art de penser (1622) by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole seems to have rediscovered the classical principles of the theory of argumentation: from the burden of proof to the idea of probable truth. But really a new model of adversary-system has been introduced into the modern mind, which is very different in concept from the topical tradition. The basic metaphor of combat, implying that the truth will prevail in the fight, is compatible with the epistemological premises of the modern logic (as the separation between fact and value). Therefore the problem of the fact-finding seems to be attracted into the area of the logic of information, and not of the theory of argumentation.

     

Justification,excuse, and proof beyond reasonable doubt

The law requires criminal guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. There are two different approaches to construing this legal rule. On an epistemic approach, the rule is construed in terms of justified belief or knowledge; on a probabilistic approach, the rule is construed in terms of satisfying a probabilistic threshold. An epistemic construction of the rule has this advantage over a probabilistic construction: the former can while the latter cannot excuse the state from blame for a false conviction. This claim rests on an understanding of legal rules, legal justification for a finding of guilt and the central purpose of a criminal trial.     

The Human Condition and the Gift: Towards a Theoretical Perspective on Close Relationships

Hannah Arendt’s exposition of the human condition provides the basic framework for a theoretical perspective on close relationships. According to Arendt, the human condition is comprised of three modes of activity: labor, work, and action. Labor is need-driven behavior, work concerns goal-directed activity and the fabrication of things, and action involves the mutual validation of unique individuals. Within this framework, the gift is the means by which relational ties are made concrete. I propose a model of gift-giving organized by two axes: whether or not the partner is singularized by the gift and whether or not the gift is given with an expectation of a return gift. I then apply this model to the three modes of the human condition.