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11.
Mark Graves 《Theology & Science》2016,14(1):65-77
Stuart Kauffman speculatively proposes a panpsychic interpretation of quantum mechanics, where a cosmic mind makes measurements to change quantum possibilities into classical actuals. However, in response, Charles S. Peirce's understanding of existence simplifies Kauffman's triadic ontology and accounts for an evolving cosmos. Peirce's objective idealism confirms possibility as fundamental to ontological existence, clarifies actuality as specifically related to space-time's extent, and revises Kauffman's broad panpsychism to a narrow but pervasive role for law-like, dispositional tendencies. Theological implications include bridging Arthur Peacocke's Divine Becoming with a neo-Aristotelian, scientifically plausible potential for existence. 相似文献
12.
Timm Lampert 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2017,25(2):389-400
Newton claims to have proven the heterogeneity of light through his experimentum crucis. However, Olaf Müller has worked out in detail Goethe’s idea that one could likewise prove the heterogeneity of darkness by inverting Newton’s famous experiment. Müller concludes that this invalidates Newton’s claim of proof. Yet this conclusion only holds if the heterogeneity of light and the heterogeneity of darkness is logically incompatible. This paper shows that this is not the case. Instead, in Quine’s terms, we have two logically compatible theories based on mutually irreducible theoretical terms. From a Quinean point of view, this does no harm to the provability of the corresponding statements. 相似文献
13.
Polycarp Ikuenobe 《Argumentation》2004,18(2):189-211
I argue in a non-reductive sense for a plausible epistemic principle, which can (1) theoretically and instrumentally unify or systematize all fallacies, and (2) provide a justification for using such a principle for characterizing an erroneous argument as a fallacy. This plausible epistemic principle involves the idea of an error in the method of justification, which results in a failure to provide relevant evidence to satisfy certain standards of adequate proof. Thus, all fallacies are systematically disguised failures to provide substantive proof: a failure in the attempt to persuade rationally, as opposed to emotionally or rhetorically. I argue that the epistemic idea of begging the question is essential to this idea of a fallacy as an inadequate proof. 相似文献
14.
Gregor Betz 《Synthese》2008,163(1):25-44
This paper shows how complex argumentation, analyzed as dialectical structures, can be evaluated within a Bayesian framework
by interpreting them as coherence constraints on subjective degrees of belief. A dialectical structure is a set of arguments
(premiss-conclusion structure) among which support- and attack-relations hold. This approach addresses the observation that
some theses in a debate can be better justified than others and thus fixes a shortcoming of a theory of defeasible reasoning
which applies the bivalence principle to argument evaluations by assigning them the status of being either defeated or undefeated.
Evaluation procedures which are based on the principle of bivalence can, however, be embedded as a special case within the
Bayesian framework. The approach developed in this paper rests on the assumptions that arguments can be reconstructed as deductively
valid and that complex argumentation can be reconstructed such that premisses of arguments with equivalent conclusions are
pairwise independent. 相似文献
15.
Eveline T. Feteris 《Argumentation》2008,22(3):335-353
The author gives an analysis of the strategic manoeuvring in the justification of legal decisions from a pragma-dialectical
perspective by showing how a judge tries to reconcile dialectical and rhetorical aims. On the basis of an analysis and evaluation
of the argumentation given by the US Supreme Court in the famous Holy Trinity case, it is shown how in a case in which the
judge wants to make an exception to a legal rule for the concrete case tries to meet the dialectical reasonableness norm by
seeing to it that his standpoint is sufficiently defended according to the requirements of the burden of proof of a judge
in a rational critical discussion and how he tries at the same time to be rhetorically convincing for the legal audience by
presenting the decision as a choice that is in line with the argumentation schemes and starting points that can be considered
as accepted by the legal community in the US and by the US community as a whole.
相似文献
Eveline T. FeterisEmail: |
16.
Richard Woodward 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):273-288
Gideon Rosen’s [1990 Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99, 327–354] Modal Fictionalist aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other
than our own. Rosen [1993 A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds. Analysis, 53, 71–81] and Stuart Brock [1993 Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen. Mind, 102, 147–150] both argue that fictionalism is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of
a plurality of worlds. In this paper, I develop a new strategy for the fictionalist to pursue in response to the Brock–Rosen
objection. I begin by arguing that modal fictionalism is best understood as a paraphrase strategy that concerns the propositions
that are expressed, in a given context, by modal sentences. I go on to argue that what is interesting about paraphrastic fictionalism
is that it allows the fictionalist to accept that the sentence ‘there is a plurality of worlds’ is true without thereby committing
her to the existence of a plurality of worlds. I then argue that the paraphrastic fictionalist can appeal to a form of semantic
contextualism in order to communicate her status as an anti-realist. Finally, I generalise my conception of fictionalism and
argue that Daniel Nolan and John O’Leary-Hawthorne [1996 Reflexive fictionalisms. Analysis, 56, 26–32] are wrong to suggest that the Brock-Rosen objection reveals a structural flaw with all species of fictionalism.
相似文献
Richard WoodwardEmail: |
17.
Hilbert's ε-calculus is based on an extension of the language of predicate logic by a term-forming operator e x . Two fundamental results about the ε-calculus, the first and second epsilon theorem, play a rôle similar to that which the cut-elimination theorem plays in sequent calculus. In particular, Herbrand's Theorem is a consequence of the epsilon theorems. The paper investigates the epsilon theorems and the complexity of the elimination procedure underlying their proof, as well as the length of Herbrand disjunctions of existential theorems obtained by this elimination procedure. 相似文献
18.
Manfred Kraus 《Argumentation》2007,21(1):3-19
In Roman rhetoric, contrarium was variably considered either a figure of speech or an argument. The paper examines the logical pattern of this type of
argument, which according to Cicero is based on a third Stoic indemonstrable syllogism: The persuasiveness of this type of argument, however, vitally depends on the validity of the alleged ‹incompatibility’ forming
its major premiss. Yet this appears to be the argument’s weak point, as the ‹incompatibilities’ employed generally hold for
the most part only, and are reducible to topical argument schemes. This is why in practical usage such arguments are most
often phrased as rhetorical questions, the persuasive force of which, enhanced by certain strategical maneuverings and fallacies,
makes the audience swallow the argument. 相似文献
19.
The Argument from Moral Experience 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Don Loeb 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):469-484
It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality,
has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according
to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according
to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in
this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically
claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact,
we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I
take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B)
epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I
argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.
相似文献
Don LoebEmail: |
20.
Gregor Betz 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2009,38(3):283-312
This paper develops concepts and procedures for the evaluation of complex debates. They provide means for answering such questions
as whether a thesis has to be considered as proven or disproven in a debate or who carries a burden of proof. While being
based on classical logic, this framework represents an (argument-based) approach to non-monotonic, or defeasible reasoning.
Debates are analysed as dialectical structures, i.e. argumentation systems with an attack- as well as a support-relationship.
The recursive status assignment over the arguments is conditionalised on proponents in a debate. The problem of multiple status
assignments arising on circular structures is solved by showing that uniqueness can be guaranteed qua reconstruction of a
debate. The notion of burden of proof as well as other discursive aims rational proponents pursue in a debate is defined within
the framework. 相似文献