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Byeong D. Lee 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2020,28(1):56-74
ABSTRACTAccording to a Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the use of a concept requires that the concept-user be sensitive to the relevant conceptual norms. Recently, Ginsborg raises two important objections against this view. According to her, the normativity Brandom ascribes to concepts lacks the internalist or first-person character of normativity that Kant’s view demands, and the relevant normativity belongs properly not to concepts as such, but rather to belief or assertion. The purpose of this paper is to defend a Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts against these objections. 相似文献
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Matthew Lindauer 《Ratio》2020,33(3):155-162
In the burgeoning philosophical literature on conceptual engineering improving our concepts is typically portrayed as the hallmark activity of the field. However, Herman Cappelen has challenged the idea that we can know how and why conceptual changes occur well enough to actively intervene in revising our concepts; the mechanisms of conceptual change are typically inscrutable to us. If the ‘inscrutability challenge’ is correct, the practical aspect of conceptual engineering may seem to be undermined, but I argue that endorsing such pessimism would be a mistake. Even if the inscrutability challenge is correct, conceptual engineers often have good reasons to try to preserve existing concepts. I examine several cases where concept preservation is important and draw lessons about this activity for conceptual engineers. 相似文献
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AbstractIncreasingly remote concepts and behaviors have been primed, which have come under increasing criticism. In this present experiment, we take a step back and try to strengthen the roots of priming research. In this experiment, we systematically varied the activation or priming of a concept in six experiments (N?=?1285). We then measured accessibility for semantic concepts using a word stem completion task. Across the six experiments, our investigations showed that the activation of semantic concepts is possible through greater accessibility of semantically congruent words (with only one experiment failing to reach a conventional level of significance). These results provide a prerequisite for further investigation into behavioral priming. The present experiment showed that the basal priming mechanisms are robust effects. The meta-analytic integration showed that women reliably had access to more baby-related words. A possible explanation is that social role stereotypes associate women more with the reproductive sphere than men and that women, to a certain extent, internalize these societal views. Other explanations and potential future applications are discussed. 相似文献
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In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities. 相似文献