The simplicity principle in human concept learning

How do we learn concepts and categories from examples? Part of the answer might be that we induce the simplest category consistent with a given set of example objects. This seemingly obvious idea, akin to simplicity principles in many fields, plays surprisingly little role in contemporary theories of concept learning, which are mostly based on the storage of exemplars, and avoid summarization or overt abstraction of any kind. This article reviews some evidence that complexity minimization does indeed play a central role in human concept learning. The chief finding is that subjects' ability to learn concepts depends heavily on the concepts' intrinsic complexity; more complex concepts are more difficult to learn. This pervasive effect suggests, contrary to exemplar theories, that concept learning critically involves the extraction of a simplified or abstracted generalization from examples.     

Tendencies of Possibility: A Peircean Consideration of Kauffman's Cosmic Mind

Stuart Kauffman speculatively proposes a panpsychic interpretation of quantum mechanics, where a cosmic mind makes measurements to change quantum possibilities into classical actuals. However, in response, Charles S. Peirce's understanding of existence simplifies Kauffman's triadic ontology and accounts for an evolving cosmos. Peirce's objective idealism confirms possibility as fundamental to ontological existence, clarifies actuality as specifically related to space-time's extent, and revises Kauffman's broad panpsychism to a narrow but pervasive role for law-like, dispositional tendencies. Theological implications include bridging Arthur Peacocke's Divine Becoming with a neo-Aristotelian, scientifically plausible potential for existence.     

Reverse-engineering ‘esotericism': how to prepare a complex cultural concept for the cognitive science of religion

The article introduces a framework for preparing complex cultural concepts for the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and applies it to the field of Western esotericism. The research process (‘reverse engineering') rests on a building block approach that, after problematic categories have been deconstructed, seeks to reconstruct new scholarly objects in generic terms that can be operationalized in interdisciplinary contexts like CSR. A four-step research process is delineated, illustrated by a short discussion of previous work on ‘Gnosticism,' ‘magic,' and ‘religion,' before applying it to ‘esotericism.' It is suggested that the implicit scholarly objects of esotericism scholarship can be reconstituted in generic terms as concerned with processes of creating and disseminating ‘special knowledge.' Five definitional clusters are identified in the literature; these provide a basis for formulating research programs on the psychological and cognitive level, drawing on metarepresentational processes, event cognition, and psychological dispositions for altering experience.     

Counterintuitive Religious Ideas and Metaphoric Thinking: An Event‐Related Brain Potential Study

It has been shown that counterintuitive ideas from mythological and religious texts are more acceptable than other (non‐religious) world knowledge violations. In the present experiment we explored whether this relates to the way they are interpreted (literal vs. metaphorical). Participants were presented with verification questions that referred to either the literal or a metaphorical meaning of the sentence previously read (counterintuitive religious, counterintuitive non‐religious and intuitive), in a block‐wise design. Both behavioral and electrophysiological results converged. At variance to the literal interpretation of the sentences, the induced metaphorical interpretation specifically facilitated the integration (N400 amplitude decrease) of religious counterintuitions, whereas the semantic processing of non‐religious counterintuitions was not affected by the interpretation mode. We suggest that religious ideas tend to operate like other instances of figurative language, such as metaphors, facilitating their acceptability despite their counterintuitive nature.     

Psychopathy and internalism

Do psychopaths make moral judgments but lack motivation? Or are psychopaths’ judgments are not genuinely moral? Both sides of this debate seem to assume either externalist or internalist criteria for the presence of moral judgment. However, if moral judgment is a natural kind, we can arrive at a theory-neutral criterion for moral judgment. A leading naturalistic criterion suggests that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for moral judgment; the capacity is neither fully present nor fully absent. Psychopaths are therefore not counterexamples to internalism. Nonetheless, internalism is empirically problematic because it is unable to explain psychopaths’ moral deficits.     

Philosophical Methodology and Conceptions of Evil Action

There is considerable philosophical dispute about what it takes for an action to be evil. The methodological assumption underlying this dispute is that there is a single, shared folk conception of evil action deployed amongst culturally similar people. Employing empirical research the authors undertook, this article suggests that this assumption is false. There exist, amongst the folk, numerous conceptions of evil action. Hence, the authors argue, philosophical research is most profitably spent in two endeavours. First, in determining which (if any) conception of evil action we have prudential or moral (or both) reason to deploy and, second, in determining whether we could feasibly come to adopt that conception as the single shared conception given our psychological make‐up and the content of the conceptions currently deployed.     

纳西族亲属词的概念结构——兼与汉族亲属词概念结构比较

运用自然分类和多维标度方法,研究了纳西族亲属词的概念结构。被试是63名纳西族大学生。结果表明,纳西族亲属词概念结构由6个类别构成：（1）父母;（2）与父母同辈的长辈;（3）兄弟姐妹;（4）同辈的姻亲兄弟姐妹;（5）媳妇和女婿;（6）祖父母、子孙、旁系或姻亲子侄。纳西族亲属词的概念结构有两个维度：（1）同辈/异辈;（2）照顾者/被照顾者。纳西族亲属词概念结构与汉族亲属词概念结构具有明显差异,这与两个民族的家庭婚姻制度和文化有关,也与语言有关。     

情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉的相互影响

通过3个实验探讨情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉是否存在相互影响, 以及加工深度对两者关系的影响。实验1采用情绪面孔启动范式, 探讨较深的情绪概念加工层面对情绪概念与情绪面孔的关系的影响。实验2更改概念任务, 探讨较浅的概念加工层面对两者关系的影响。实验3缩短启动面孔呈现时间, 探讨较浅的面孔知觉层面对两者关系的影响。通过研究主要得出以下结论：(1)情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉确实存在相互影响; (2)概念加工深度影响两者关系的方向性, 在较深的概念加工层面, 两者的关系是双向的, 在较浅的概念加工层面, 两者的关系是单向的; (3)知觉加工深度也影响两者关系的方向性, 在较深的知觉加工层面, 两者的关系是双向的, 在较浅的知觉加工层面, 没有发现两者的相互影响。本研究为抽象概念的具身表征提供了实证支持。     

Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness

A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).