Effect size, power, and sample size determination for structured means modeling and mimic approaches to between-groups hypothesis testing of means on a single latent construct

While effect size estimates, post hoc power estimates, and a priori sample size determination are becoming a routine part of univariate analyses involving measured variables (e.g., ANOVA), such measures and methods have not been articulated for analyses involving latent means. The current article presents standardized effect size measures for latent mean differences inferred from both structured means modeling and MIMIC approaches to hypothesis testing about differences among means on a single latent construct. These measures are then related to post hoc power analysis, a priori sample size determination, and a relevant measure of construct reliability.I wish to convey my appreciation to the reviewers and Associate Editor, whose suggestions extended and strengthened the article's content immensely, and to Ralph Mueller of The George Washington University for enhancing the clarity of its presentation.     

Belief-Ful Realism and Scientific Realism

Despite tensions between Tillich's category of belief-ful realism and a view of science that embraces metaphysical and epistemological realism, a constructive relationship can be developed between the two. Both are based on common understandings about reality. Belief-ful or theonomous realism thus affirms scientific realism. On the other hand, scientific realism is open to the ecstatic, self-transcending elements of belief-ful realism. Finally, Tillich's formulation of the relationship between culture and religion can be reformulated specifically to include scientific and technological culture.     

相似性判断和差异性判断的不对称性及其机制探索

本文阐述了相似性判断和差异性判断不对称性的相关研究。首先介绍了不对称性的发展及理论解释。其次,根据事件相关电位的研究结果,阐述了图-词信息的双编码模型对相似性判断的影响。接着分析和介绍了相似性判断的双编码过程及其时间进程。最后,作者提出有待深入研究的几个问题：（1）差异性策略在分类和推理中的应用;（2）相似性双编码过程的实证研究及其应用;（3）从发展认知神经科学的角度探讨不对称的认知神经机制。     

识字能力的单维性检验研究

本研究以义务教育阶段学生识字量测验为工具,综合运用探索性结构方程建模(ESEM)以及非参数项目反应理论中的摩根量表(Mokken量表)和DETECT分析方法,探讨了识字能力的维度。探索性结构方程建模结果显示,识字的单维性模型优于多维模型,多维的结果更多的体现出一个难度维度的特征,即字频的作用。Mokken量表分析结果显示,1~2年级和3~9年级测验更倾向于单维量表的特征。DETECT分析结果显示,两个测验的D值趋近于零,表明识字能力是单维能力。结合三种分析方法,识字能力具有单维性。     

Can Rawls’ Constructivism Avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma? In Reply to Shafer-Landau

In this essay, I consider two challenges implicit in Russ Shafer-Landau’s criticism of constructivists: the realism challenge and the relativism challenge, respectively. I do not try to offer a decisive set of objections to the challenges; instead I argue that some objective versions of constructivism, especially Rawls’s constructivism, are not susceptible to the criticisms.     

Is Intuition Necessary for Defending Platonism?

G?del asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of G?del’s conceptual realism’s basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, G?del asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too na?ve to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. G?del and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, G?del thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of G?del’s conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from na?ve, despite what some philosophers have claimed.     

结构实在论评析

The epistemological version of structural realism, proposed by Cao Tianyu, has great influence in the philosophy of science. Syntheses has published a special volume discussing the topic. Cao criticizes anti-realism, as well as the epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism. From the concepts of structure, ontology, and construction, he analyzes the objectivity of scientific theories as having five aspects: construction, historicity, holism, revision, and revolution. This paper systematically analyzes and comments on Cao's structural realism. The author agrees with his criticism of the under-determination thesis, is neutral to his argument against ontological discontinuity, and questions his universal language argument. Translated by Yu Jinlong from Ziran Bianzhengfa Yanjiu 自然辩证法研究 (Studies in Dialectics of Nature), 2006, (11): 34–38     

The Graded Response Differential Discrimination Model Accounting for Extreme Response Style

Extreme response style or, more generally, individual differences in response spacing have been shown to be an influential bias when analyzing questionnaire data. Recently a promising model adjusting for this bias — the differential discrimination model — has been proposed. An advantage to other related approaches is that the model can be fitted using standard structural equation modeling software. However, the model is designed for analyzing continuous item responses, whereas graded response formats are certainly more prominent in behavioral sciences. To resolve this limitation, the present article extends the differential discrimination model to analyzing graded responses. Empirical examples as well as a small simulation study are presented.     

Ethical Pragmatism

Beginning with a thought experiment about a mysterious Delphic oracle, this article motivates, explains, and attempts to defend a view it calls Ethical Pragmatism. Ethical Pragmatism is the view that we can and should carry on our practice of moral deliberation without reference to moral truths, or more broadly, without reference to metaethics. The defense the article mounts tries to show that neither suspicions about the tenability of fact‐value distinctions, nor doubts about the viability of global pragmatism, nor worries about the “force” of ethical injunctions without reference to moral truths constitute good reason to reject Ethical Pragmatism.     

Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane,Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson

In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.