Confidence in own and others' knowledge

A person's confidence judgement of a statement reflects his/her degree of belief in the correctness of that statement. Deficient ability to assess the correctness of statements (or beliefs) can have serious consequences in many situations. This study compares the realism (calibration) of subjects' confidence ratings in two situations ( n = 64). The first situation was when the subjects confidence rated their own answers to general knowledge questions. The second was when the subjects gave confidence ratings of another person's answers to general knowledge questions. The results show that subjects were more poorly calibrated and were more overconfident in the second situation, i.e. when they gave confidence ratings of answers given by another person, compared with when they rated their own answers. The data further indicates that the results can not be explained in terms of the amount of cognitive processes invested when making the confidence judgements. For example, the subjects rated the other person's answers to questions they had answered themselves, and to questions they had not seen before. No differences in confidence or in calibration and other measures of judgmental realism were found between these two categories of questions. Nor did instructions to imagine the thought process of the other person improve any of these measures. The subjects disagreed with the other person's answer on 23% of all occasions. Significantly poorer calibration was shown where subjects disagreed with the other person than where they agreed. Contents of a social nature attended to by the subjects may have affected the results. The results, when related to previous research in the area, give rise to the question of how the social situation can be arranged to achieve the best calibration.     

Classical test theory based and factor analytic structural models for analyzing change: A note on differences and similarities

This note is concerned with differences and similarities between structural models for analyzing change, which are conceptualized within two different modelling traditions: the one based on the classical test theory, and that within the factor-analytic approach. It is shown that these two possibilities lead to models for studying change, which are indistinguishable when using for data analytic purposes structural modeling programs, such as LISREL, EQS, COSAN, LISCOMP, RAMONA, EzPATH, SAS PROC CALIS. The reason for this data-analytic equivalence of the two conceptually different types of models is the confounding of their differences in the corresponding implied covariance matrix structures.     

THE THEOLOGICAL-SCIENTIFIC VISION OF ARTHUR PEACOCKE

Abstract. Arthur Peacocke has made seminal contributions to the interdisciplinary field of Christian theology and natural science. First, this paper presents a summary of his work, including his argument that critical realism provides for theology and science a common philosophical basis preferable to that of reductionistic materialism, vitalistic dualism, or divine interventionism. In specific, Peacocke proposes a form of panentheism in light of cosmology and evolution: God is immanent in and transcendent to the universe, with its open-ended processes characterized by both law and chance. God suffers with the travail of evolution; and Jesus is the normative realization of God's creative involvement with nature—a form of emergence with continuity. This paper then critiques each of these philosophical and theological positions.     

On the need for structurally competent counselling and psychotherapy: Neoliberal ideology,disability and the psy disciplines

This article highlights and problematises the psy disciplines' articulations with neoliberalism, with a particular focus upon disability and upon counselling and psychotherapy. Recent years have witnessed burgeoning scholarly interest in the potential complicities of the psy professions in a neoliberal agenda of individualisation, pathologisation and responsibilisation of human suffering. Such complicities are, in state therapy settings, driven by a growing need for these professions to offer cost-effective, evidence-based interventions to secure funding in an increasingly competitive market. Whilst the entwining of neoliberal ideology with therapy practices may be innocuous for some, it is contended that disabled people may be at particular risk of harm. A case is then made for training and practice to foreground structural competency, an awareness of how therapy encounters and client concerns are shaped by socio-structural factors, including, but not limited to, politics and political ideology. This would require not only an appreciation of the sociopolitical context in which therapy unfolds and its indubitable shaping of subjectivities, but also greater recognition of disability as a source of social inequity and oppression, as opposed to an individual phenomenon. Moreover, structural competency would require theoretical and demographic diversity in training and practice, which, in turn, would necessitate identifying and addressing barriers to inclusion for disabled people. Points raised are deemed of particular importance given the emergence of long COVID.     

Haitian and Haitian American experiences of racism and socioethnic discrimination in Miami-Dade county: At-risk and court-involved youth

We examine how juvenile justice-involved youth of Haitian descent in Miami-Dade County cope with structural racism and its impact on their mental health. Drawing on longitudinal ethnography, psychosocial assessment data, and a family-based clinical intervention funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, this article explores youth narratives of discrimination prior to and during the COVID-19 pandemic. We use critical race theory and theory of practice to understand youths’ perceptions as racialized bodies and stigmatized selves, highlighting the experiences and perspectives of a particular black immigrant group, ethnic beings caught up in the everyday practices of racialization, sociocultural marginalization, and racism. We frame these experiences as a variation of the complex continuum of structural racism and racial domination in the US. These experiences have caused anger, fear, anxiety, chronic anticipatory distress, and hopelessness among youth of Haitian descent. We conclude with some recommendations for therapeutic support that encourages youth to process their experiences, promotes their development of a positive self-concept, and provides them with mind-body techniques to attenuate the physical impacts of discriminatory events. The clinical trial registration number for this study intervention is NCT03876171.     

The many-worlds theory of consciousness

This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.     

Dyadic longitudinal models: A critical review

In this review, we discuss the most commonly used models to analyze dyadic longitudinal data. We start the review with a definition of dyadic longitudinal data that allows relationship researchers to identify when these models might be appropriate. Then, we go on to describe the three major models commonly used when one has dyadic longitudinal data: the dyadic growth curve model (DGCM), the actor–partner interdependence model (APIM), and the common fate growth model (CFGM). We discuss when each model might be used and strengths and weaknesses of each model. We end with additional thoughts that focus on extensions to new methods being discussed in the literature, along with some of the challenges of collecting and analyzing dyadic longitudinal data that might be helpful for future dyadic researchers.     

识字能力的单维性检验研究

本研究以义务教育阶段学生识字量测验为工具,综合运用探索性结构方程建模(ESEM)以及非参数项目反应理论中的摩根量表(Mokken量表)和DETECT分析方法,探讨了识字能力的维度。探索性结构方程建模结果显示,识字的单维性模型优于多维模型,多维的结果更多的体现出一个难度维度的特征,即字频的作用。Mokken量表分析结果显示,1~2年级和3~9年级测验更倾向于单维量表的特征。DETECT分析结果显示,两个测验的D值趋近于零,表明识字能力是单维能力。结合三种分析方法,识字能力具有单维性。     

Can Rawls’ Constructivism Avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma? In Reply to Shafer-Landau

In this essay, I consider two challenges implicit in Russ Shafer-Landau’s criticism of constructivists: the realism challenge and the relativism challenge, respectively. I do not try to offer a decisive set of objections to the challenges; instead I argue that some objective versions of constructivism, especially Rawls’s constructivism, are not susceptible to the criticisms.     

Is Intuition Necessary for Defending Platonism?

G?del asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of G?del’s conceptual realism’s basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, G?del asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too na?ve to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. G?del and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, G?del thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of G?del’s conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from na?ve, despite what some philosophers have claimed.