Asymptotic biases in exploratory factor analysis and structural equation modeling

Formulas for the asymptotic biases of the parameter estimates in structural equation models are provided in the case of the Wishart maximum likelihood estimation for normally and nonnormally distributed variables. When multivariate normality is satisfied, considerable simplification is obtained for the models of unstandardized variables. Formulas for the models of standardized variables are also provided. Numerical examples with Monte Carlo simulations in factor analysis show the accuracy of the formulas and suggest the asymptotic robustness of the asymptotic biases with normality assumption against nonnormal data. Some relationships between the asymptotic biases and other asymptotic values are discussed.The author is indebted to the editor and anonymous reviewers for their comments, corrections, and suggestions on this paper, and to Yutaka Kano for discussion on biases.     

Pragmatism, Critical Realism, and the Cognitive Value of Religion and Science

Pragmatism and critical realism are different vocabularies for talking about the cognitive value of religion and science. Each can be, and has been, used to make the case for cognitive parity between religious and scientific discourse. Critical realism presupposes a particular form of cognitive psychology that entails general skepticism about the external world and forecloses scientific inquiry in the name of a preconceived idea of what the nature of human cognition must be. Thus, of the two, pragmatism is the better vocabulary for fostering mutual understanding between religion and science.     

心理福利的结构研究

通过对幸福、福利及经济福利的反思 ,提出了心理福利这一研究课题 ;结合对被试样本的问卷调查 ,经因子分析 ,分别考察了心理福利的三个维度 :自我幸福感、生活满意感和对社会的行为性评价的因子结构 ;以此为基础 ,运用 L ISREL 8构建了心理福利的二阶结构模型。结果显示 ,模型与数据拟合良好。     

Putnam's Model-theoretic Argument(s). A Detailed Reconstruction

Two of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism are examined in detail. One of them is developed as an extension of a model-theoretic argument against mathematical realism based on considerations concerning the so-called Skolem-Paradox in set theory. This argument against mathematical realism is also treated explicitly. The article concentrates on the fine structure of the arguments because most commentators have concentrated on the major premisses of Putnam's argument and especially on his treatment of metaphysical realism. It is shown that the validity of Putnam's arguments is doubtful and that realists are by no means forced to accept the theses Putnam ascribes to them. It is concluded that Putnam fails to give convincing arguments for rejecting mathematical or metaphysical realism. Furthermore, Putnam's internal realism is discussed critically. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Darstellen und Rekonstruieren: Eine Hermeneutische Erwiderung auf Ian Hacking

Representing and Reconstructing: A Hermeneutical Reply to Ian Hacking. Hacking published in 1983 Representing and Intervening which has provoked, particularly in the US, the so called realism/anti-realism debate which is still alive today. He lays claim to anti-realism for theory and to realism for the experiment. Following him, only that which can be used for manipulating something (e.g., the path of an electon) is realistic. H. Putnam is a severe critic of this dualism. In my paper I am going to take the Hacking-Putnam controversy as a starting-point for the problem about the determination of the relation between theory and experiment in the natural sciences. I shall then follow M. Schlick's discussion of this problem and the current solution to the problem as offered by H. Pietschmann. The differing interpretation of Kant according to the three perspectives shall be the guideline for the argumentation. The goal of my argumentation is that theory and experiment do not live their own lives, that in experimenting one always continues traditional chains of action, and that natural science cannot be regarded independently of the life world it takes place in. This insight into the representing and reconstructing overturns in natural science, due to the necessity of human decisions, opens up their hermeneutical dimension. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism?

Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability. Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an analysis of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causal theory of meaning loses its force as a weapon against incommensurability. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Price of Non-reductive Moral Realism

Non-reductive moral realism is the view that there are moral properties which cannot be reduced to natural properties. If moral properties exist, it is plausible that they strongly supervene on non-moral properties- more specifically, on mental, social, and biological properties. There may also be good reasons for thinking that moral properties are irreducible. However, strong supervenience and irreducibility seem incompatible. Strong supervenience entails that there is an enormous number of modal truths (specifically, truths about exactly which non-moral properties necessitate which moral properties); and all these modal truths must be explained. If these modal truths can all be explained, then it must be a fundamental truth about the essence of each moral property that the moral property is necessarily equivalent to some property that can be specified purely in mental, social and biological terms; and this fundamental truth appears to be a reduction of the moral property in question. The best way to resist this argument is by resorting to the claim that mental and social properties are not, strictly speaking, natural properties, but are instead properties that can only be analysed in partly normative terms. Acceptance of that claim is the price of non-reductive moral realism.     

Structural family therapy with Mexican-American family systems

Characteristics of traditional Mexican-American families with consequent family rules that affect these family systems are discussed along with selected clinical cases. The specific cases discussed involve: (1) interactions with family of origin in intercultural marriages, (2) intracultural differences in levels of acculturation and traditional family rules, and (3) extended family impact in response to severe life crisis. The development of therapeutic processes from structural and strategic family therapy approaches, which reflect appreciation for cultural differences and strengths, is suggested.This material was presented at the annual meeting of the Texas Association for Marriage and Family Therapy, January, 1994, San Antonio, TX.