Limited information estimation and testing of discretized multivariate normal structural models

Discretized multivariate normal structural models are often estimated using multistage estimation procedures. The asymptotic properties of parameter estimates, standard errors, and tests of structural restrictions on thresholds and polychoric correlations are well known. It was not clear how to assess the overall discrepancy between the contingency table and the model for these estimators. It is shown that the overall discrepancy can be decomposed into a distributional discrepancy and a structural discrepancy. A test of the overall model specification is proposed, as well as a test of the distributional specification (i.e., discretized multivariate normality). Also, the small sample performance of overall, distributional, and structural tests, as well as of parameter estimates and standard errors is investigated under conditions of correct model specification and also under mild structural and/or distributional misspecification. It is found that relatively small samples are needed for parameter estimates, standard errors, and structural tests. Larger samples are needed for the distributional and overall tests. Furthermore, parameter estimates, standard errors, and structural tests are surprisingly robust to distributional misspecification. This research was supported by the Department of Universities, Research and Information Society (DURSI) of the Catalan Government, and by grants BSO2000-0661 and BSO2003-08507 of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology.     

Propositions, Sets, and Worlds

If we agree with Michael Jubien that propositions do not exist, while accepting the existence of abstract sets in a realist mathematical ontology, then the combined effect of these ontological commitments has surprising implications for the metaphysics of modal logic, the ontology of logically possible worlds, and the controversy over modal realism versus actualism. Logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets exist if sets generally exist, but are equivalently expressed as maximally consistent conjunctions of the same propositions in corresponding sets. A conjunction of propositions, even if infinite in extent, is nevertheless itself a proposition. If sets and hence proposition sets exist but propositions do not exist, then whether or not modal realism is true depends on which of two apparently equivalent methods of identifying, representing, or characterizing logically possible worlds we choose to adopt. I consider a number of reactions to the problem, concluding that the best solution may be to reject the conventional model set theoretical concept of logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets, and distinguishing between the actual world alone as maximally consistent and interpreting all nonactual merely logically possible worlds as submaximal. I am grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), for supporting this among related research projects in philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics during my Resident Research Fellowship in 2005-2006.     

RELIGIOUS NATURALISM—WHERE DOES IT LEAD?

I respond to the four symposiasts who commented on my recent book Religion Is Not About God (2005)—religious studies scholars Donald Braxton and David Klemm, philosopher William Rottschaefer, and cognitive scientist Leslie Marsh. Various general and specific points relative to the nature of religion and the future of religion are either clarified or defended. Among the issues that receive attention are (1) the status and adequacy of my proposals for religious naturalism: Can it motivate wholeness, and is it finally a form of pantheism? (2) ritual practices, particularly those of Christianity, reinterpreted within the framework of religious naturalism; and (3) the adequacy of any naturalistic position to account for subjective properties of consciousness.     

制造行业管理胜任力与绩效关系的实证研究

通过对571名制造型企业管理者的问卷调查,探索并验证了制造业管理胜任力结构维度,检验了不同背景因素对管理胜任力的影响。结果表明:制造业管理胜任力具有六维结构,包含22个指标,其信度和效度较好;不同管理层次的管理者在制造过程控制和市场营销策划维度上的评价有显著性差异,不同企业规模下的管理者在行业核心理念和产品系统管理维度上的评价有显著性差异;产品系统管理与市场营销策划能力对制造业管理者绩效有良好的预测力。同时发现,制造业管理胜任力不能较好地解释周边绩效的变异量。     

Comparing self-esteem and perceived control as predictors of first-year college students’ academic achievement

Due to its widespread popularity, self-esteem is continually being promoted to students despite limited empirical support for its effectiveness in improving their academic achievement. As a result, constructs that are potentially more salient to academic performance, such as perceived control, have gone relatively unnoticed. Although past research has examined the link between students’ academic achievement and either their self-esteem or perceived control, few studies have compared both constructs simultaneously to elucidate which one is more important to academic success. This longitudinal study directly contrasted the effects of self-esteem and perceived control on the academic performance of 802 first-year college students. After accounting for incoming ability (high school grades), age, and gender, a structural equation model showed perceived control positively predicted students’ GPA. In contrast, the predictive effect of self-esteem on GPA was non-existent. Findings indicate that compared to self-esteem, perceived control is a more powerful predictor of first-year college students’ GPA. Implications for utilizing educational interventions to boost perceived control among college students are discussed.     

The Argument from Moral Experience

It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact, we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B) epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.

层次,形式与实在

Scientific progress in the 20th century has shown that the structure of the world is hierarchical. A philosophical analysis of the hierarchy will bear obvious significance for metaphysics and philosophy in general. Jonathan Schaffer’s paper, “Is There a Fundamental Level?”, provides a systematic review of the works in the field, the difficulties for various versions of fundamentalism, and the prospect for the third option, i.e., to treat each level as ontologically equal. The purpose of this paper is to provide an argument for the third option. The author will apply Aristotle’s theory of matter and form to the discussion of the hierarchy and develop a theory of form realism, which will grant every level with “full citizenship in the republic of being.” It constitutes an argument against ontological and epistemological reductionism. A non-reductive theory of causation is also developed against the fundamental theory of causation.     

Indirect perceptual realism and demonstratives

I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. I argue that indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory role in such judgements, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to the criticisms of Snowdon and Smith. The discussion is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs.