Top-down predictions in the cognitive brain

The human brain is not a passive organ simply waiting to be activated by external stimuli. Instead, we propose that the brain continuously employs memory of past experiences to interpret sensory information and predict the immediately relevant future. The basic elements of this proposal include analogical mapping, associative representations and the generation of predictions. This review concentrates on visual recognition as the model system for developing and testing ideas about the role and mechanisms of top-down predictions in the brain. We cover relevant behavioral, computational and neural aspects, explore links to emotion and action preparation, and consider clinical implications for schizophrenia and dyslexia. We then discuss the extension of the general principles of this proposal to other cognitive domains.     

How iconic gestures enhance communication: an ERP study

EEG was recorded as adults watched short segments of spontaneous discourse in which the speaker's gestures and utterances contained complementary information. Videos were followed by one of four types of picture probes: cross-modal related probes were congruent with both speech and gestures; speech-only related probes were congruent with information in the speech, but not the gesture; and two sorts of unrelated probes were created by pairing each related probe with a different discourse prime. Event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited by picture probes were measured within the time windows of the N300 (250-350 ms post-stimulus) and N400 (350-550 ms post-stimulus). Cross-modal related probes elicited smaller N300 and N400 than speech-only related ones, indicating that pictures were easier to interpret when they corresponded with gestures. N300 and N400 effects were not due to differences in the visual complexity of each probe type, since the same cross-modal and speech-only picture probes elicited N300 and N400 with similar amplitudes when they appeared as unrelated items. These findings extend previous research on gesture comprehension by revealing how iconic co-speech gestures modulate conceptualization, enabling listeners to better represent visuo-spatial aspects of the speaker's meaning.     

Influence of object size on baseline identification, priming, and explicit memory

We investigated the influence of size on identification, priming, and explicit memory for color photos of common objects. Participants studied objects displayed in small, medium, and large sizes and memory was assessed with both implicit identification and explicit recognition tests. Overall, large objects were easier to identify than small objects and study-to-test changes in object size impeded performance on explicit but not implicit memory tests. In contrast to previous findings with line-drawings of objects but consistent with predictions from the distance-as-filtering hypothesis, we found that study-test size manipulations had large effects on old/new recognition memory test for objects displayed in large size at test but not for objects displayed small or medium at test. Our findings add to the growing body of literature showing that the findings obtained using line-drawings of objects do not necessarily generalize to color photos of common objects. We discuss implications of our findings for theories of object perception, memory, and eyewitness identification accuracy for objects.     

Habit outweighs planning in grasp selection for object manipulation

Object-directed grasping movements are adapted to intended interactions with an object. We address whether adjusting the grasp for object manipulation is controlled habitually, based on past experiences, or by goal-directed planning, based on an evaluation of the expected action outcomes. Therefore, we asked participants to grasp and rotate a dial. In such tasks, participants typically grasp the dial with an excursed, uncomfortable arm posture, which then allows to complete the dial rotation in a comfortable end-state. We extended this task by manipulating the contingency between the orientation of the grasp and the resulting end-state of the arm. A one-step (control) group rotated the dial to a single target. A two-step group rotated the dial to an initial target and then in the opposite direction. A three-step group rotated the dial to the initial target, then in the opposite direction, and then back to the initial target. During practice, the two-step and three-step groups reduced the excursion of their grasps, thus avoiding overly excursed arm postures after the second rotation. When the two-step and three-step groups were asked to execute one-step rotations, their grasps resembled those that were acquired during the two-step and three-step rotations, respectively. However, the carry-over was not complete. This suggests that adjusting grasps for forthcoming object manipulations is controlled by a mixture of habitual and goal-directed processes. In the present experiment, the former contributed approximately twice as much to grasp selection than the latter.     

Explaining embodied emotions – with and without representations

Embodied accounts have offered a theoretical framework in which emotions are understood to be patterned embodied responses that are about core relational themes. Some authors argue that this intentionality should be understood in terms of some kind of non-conceptual representation format, while others suggest a radical enactivist framework that takes emotions to be intentional but not representational. In this paper I will argue that the abstract nature of the core relational themes emotions are about and the interrelatedness of emotions with each other and with other mental states speak in favor of emotions being representations.